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Common sense, affirmed Ferrier, can neither be set
aside nor taken for granted by philosophy. Rather, it
must be converted into philosophy, and this "by accepting
completely and faithfully the facts and expressions of
common sense as given in their primitive obscurity, and
then by construing them without violence, without addition,
and without diminution into clearer and more intelligible
forms". In the period under discussion, the early nine¬
teenth century, the attempt to elucidate the phenomena of
mind and their linguistic moulds came under the title of
'mental science' or 'analysis'. More specifically, the
process envisaged for this science was inductive, what
Dugald Stewart would call a dual operation of analysis
and synthesis or Cabanis the method of decomposition and
recomposition. Agreement on the use of such a procedure
for the philosophy of mind or on the details of the tech¬
nique employed was never unanimous: in the case of the
latter, it had first to be established whether the
'scientist' was dealing at the outset with 'simple' or
'compound' phenomena and whether he was to proceed from
the known to the unknown or vice versa. Beneath this
controversy lay the roots of an earlier separation between
the 'analysis of nature' (wherein our representations
ii
are viewed as scattered across the linear board of their
presentation, and so distantly and only vaguely related)
and the 'analytic of imagination' (which arranges and
orders the disparate segments of temporal presentation
into a simultaneous table of comparative representations).
Michel Foucault, whose distinction this is, argues that
these two directions of analysis begin to converge to¬
wards the end of the eighteenth century. But the moment
of convergence, being fraught with difficulties for those
at the intersection, is less than happy. This uneasiness
of mind accounts, moreover, for the strain of conversion
in 'Common Sense' philosophy.
Nevertheless, where the struggles at the juncture
are most intense, there is a commensurate heightening of
philosophical awareness. Faintly visible in the first
inquiries of Thomas Brown (1778-1820) into causality and
volition, it reaches a crescendo in his more mature re¬
flections on memory and attention, the nature of con¬
sciousness and reflection itself. Emerging with this
apprehension, and giving it depth, is Brown's sensitivity
to the feelings of selfhood and his belief in the recovery,
however imaginary, of the individual's past. That sense
of an order to be captured and restored, combined with a
recognition of the affections which, more often, reap
the havoc of human nature, create in his writings the
sort of excitement associated not with the resolution of
iii
dilemmas, but with a prolonged, agonizing and continual
tension. The subsequent discussion moves towards as it
is moved by that realization.
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PREFACE
In his historical appraisal of Modern Philosophy
(1921), Guido de Ruggiero decried the "work of compilation"
which, arresting the "speculative impulse of classical
empiricism", originated in the "Scottish school at the
beginning of the nineteenth century". He goes on to
affirm that
"here the search for facts became an end in itself: in
the psychological museums of Reid and Stewart every trace
of mental life disappeared, and philosophy was reduced to
a schedule of the senses and the faculties of the mind,
drawn up by a process reminiscent of the doctors in
Moliere."
Presumably, one is to see these figures as the very op¬
posite of the honnete homme, affected in their professionalism,
extravagant in the claims of their speciality, imposteurs
of true learning and education. Although his name does
not appear on Ruggiero's list, Thomas Brown would seem to
deserve a similar epithet, for Carlyle found that his
otherwise "brilliant lectures" left him "irritated at
having his mind subjected to systematic analysis". If
one were to remain true to Moliere, one would have to
turn this irritation into satire.
My intention has been, rather, to examine the
operating theatre of the actual Dr. Thomas Brown, M.D.,
with a view to converting that 'museum' into a re-
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vitalized philosophic engagement. That it was once the
scene of lively and many-sided debate is readily attested
to by Brown's own relatively brief span of activities.
Between classical empiricism and the 'radical empiricism'
of William James there lies not an 'arrested* stream of
Scottish inquiry, but in Brown and others the makings of
some of the dominant (and more physiological) psychologies
of the nineteenth century: those, for example, of J. S.
Mill, Beneke, Ribot, Spencer and Alexander Bain. Mill,
for one, is always eager to applaud the work of Hartley,
Brown and James Mill in this connection. Admitting that,
however, one has still played unfairly with the Scottish
writers of that period, played moreover straight into
the hands of Ruggiero. The thought which carries the
label 'Common Sense Philosophy' does not rest on one
foundation only but on many and descending levels of
investigation. The pursuit of 'facts' was a singular and
not wholly typical aspect of those inquiries into the
human mind. I have sought at every stage to explore the
contributions of Brown from that premise.
I had originally designed to give stress to those
thinkers, both French (such as Condillac and Destutt de
Tracy) and English (Locke and Hartley), to whom Brown was
certainly indebted. Fruitful as this study was (and is),
it proved to be no match for the richness and subtlety of
his own, and quite original, analyses. These eventually
vi
opened doors which have led me into the recesses of
what I take to be the sine qua non of any serious philo¬
sophic enterprise, namely reflection. Appearing at the
end of the dissertation, my examination of this concept
will, I hope, enable one to dismiss the charges of
Ruggiero and others on Brown's, or even Reid's, behalf.
Moliere's doctors are perhaps suitable companions for
the diseased proponents of an idle speculation; they
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ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENT 612
X
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY
"I am more particularly puzzled with what you say about
our late most excellent friend Dr. Brown; but, after
revolving the subject long in my mind, I am nearly
resolved (according to my first impressions) to pass
over in silence any difference between our opinions
concerning Dr. Reid, more especially as it is a subject
on which I cannot help thinking that our friend has
laid himself open to a most triumphant reply.
- D. STEWART to Mr. Napier,
14 November, 1820.
2
There are occasions when the rain of blows from
a critic's pen falling mercilessly on the subject of
one's inquiry causes a mixture of pain and delight. The
latter response will depend, of course, on the incisiveness
of the criticism, on the lure of its inherent brilliance.
However unjust one might feel it to be, after the initial
shock has worn away, there is still that treacherous
moment of agreement, that first sense of the 'Tightness'
of the attack. Availing oneself of critical resources
is not quite the same thing as stumbling, unwittingly,
on such a passage, nor is that brief night of un¬
faithfulness comparable to the objective stance which
one tries in general to take towards one's subject.
Brown was not without his detractors. It would
be na'ive to suppose that in a period of intense, often
heated controversy, particularly over the claims and
procedures of the philosophy of mind, any writer of
note would come through it unscathed. No exception to
this, the 'metaphysician' who early became known in
1
Edinburgh as 'Darwinian Brown' amassed his own legion
of opponents. Best known perhaps was the apologist of
Alexander Bain adopts both labels from his
researches into the youthful enterprises and associations
of James Mill. See James Mill, A Biography (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1882) , p. 31H
3.
Thomas Reid against the alleged 'misrepresentations' of
Brown, Sir William Hamilton, whose determination it was
in the still glowing aftermath of Brown's demise to place
2
the latter "on his proper level". Needless to say, that
level was considerably lower than the one projected by
Brown's enthusiastic students or by his friend Dr.
Thomas Chalmers who occupied the chair in Moral Philosophy
at St. Andrews from 1823 and who was "most desirous of
a classical monument being raised to his memory behind
3
the manse" at Kirkmabreck. Coming upon a typically
virulent attack on Brown's 'misappropriations', one of
Hamilton's readers has inserted in the margin the very
fitting comment: "Don't you think you have given poor
Brown enough?" If one may judge by what he himself
affirms, Hamilton seems never to have tired of 'enumerating'
or providing 'samples' of Brown's "inconsistencies",
"mistakes", and "misrepresentation", let alone his
4
"appropriations" (notably from "Destutt Tracy"). But
2
Discussions on Philosophy and Literature,
Education and University Reform (1st ed.; London, 1852),
pp. 43 and 97.
3
The Rev. Wm. Hanna, Memoirs of the Life and
Writings of Thomas Chalmers, P.P., LL.D. (Edinburgh, 1851),
III, 131-2. The terms of a proposed subscription for a
monument to Brown are outlined in Appendix C, 502-3; Hanna
does not elaborate on the circumstances surrounding
Chalmer's apparent failure to raise the necessary funds.
4
Hamilton, op. cit., p. 97. In the 'supplementary
dissertations' to his edition of Reid's Works (Edinburgh,
1846) , Hamilton enlarged upon his complaint against Brown's
I 4
although Hamilton's sense of outrage and disapproval was
peculiarly strong, that of other writers and philosophers
during Brown's life-time was equally sharp and influential
of opinion.
The spirit of independence which pervaded Brown's
philosophical career led more than once to strained
relations with his peers. When, for example, Francis
Jeffrey attempted to interfere in his editorial capacity
with Brown's submission of another article for the third
number of the Edinburgh Review (the first was his review
of Charles Villers's Philosophie de Kant), Brown lost no
time in severing his connection with the Review; once
gone, he never returned to Jeffrey's fold.^ More im¬
portantly, he could not long withhold an open breach
with his teacher and predecessor, Dugald Stewart, in
spite of an initial effort to camouflage the divergence
of view-points. Recounting the "disagreeable circumstance"
of his first full year as Professor of Moral Philosophy
borrowing "without acknowledgment" from Destutt de Tracy,
notably in reference to "the sense of muscular feeling,
as a special source of knowledge" and as the basis of
"our notion of Space or Extension"; II, 868-9.
"*In a letter to Francis Horner on 9 April, 1802,
Jeffrey had lamented the "miserable state of backwardness"
in the Edinburgh Review; after noting some progress among
his reviewers he complained: "Brown has engaged for
nothing but Miss Baillie's Plays." Memoirs and Correspondence
of Francis Horner, M.P., ed. L. Horner (London, 1853), I,
TSFI
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at Edinburgh (1810-11), in a letter to his friend William
Erskine, he observes:
"What would I not have given to have had you here to
consult on all those subjects which I had to treat. I
was very much constrained, as you may believe, by the
unpleasantness of differing so essentially from Mr.
Stewart, on many of the principal points. But I con¬
ceived that it would be more honourable to state at once
my own opinions, than to seem to introduce them after¬
wards in other years; and Dr. Reid's name served every
purpose, when I had opinions to oppose in which Mr. Stewart
perhaps coincided. I got off, therefore, pretty well in
that way; though I must confess that it was one of the
most unpleasant circumstances attending my situation."
(Welsh, 195; for this and other
abbreviations cited in the text
see Appendix A)
I will have occasion shortly to remark again on this
masking of voices. For the moment, however, we must
pursue the question of "honour*.
The cat was soon out of the bag. Brown's lectures
were too public (not to say, publicly acclaimed) and too
forceful to parade or conceal delicate and fine dis¬
tinctions. Stewart eventually felt called upon to
vindicate his own honour. In the third volume of his
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1827),
Stewart took revenge in a badly tucked 'Note' at the end.
"Like most other men ... of very quick parts, [Dr.
Brown] was too confident in his rapid judgments; too
ready to conclude that there were no difficulties in his
way when he was unable to see them; and not sufficiently
aware that in his science, much more than in any other,
the success of our inquiries depends on that capacity of
patient thinking, to which Newton had the modesty to
ascribe all the merit of his greatest discoveries. In
this capacity, I cannot help thinking that Dr. Brown was
remarkably deficient; and to this cause, more than to any
other, I am disposed to impute his very loose and
6.
inaccurate use of language on various important occasions."
(Note C, 375)
In yet another version of the game of concealment, Stewart
endeavours to attribute to Welsh's "not always well-
judged solicitude" of Brown the imposition "on shallow
understandings" of the latter's views:
"The most exceptionable passages in Mr. Welsh's book . . .
are Ihose in which he speaks of Dr. Brown's powers of a-
nalysis, when he ought rather to have warned novices (who
are always most liable to be misled by an overweening
vanity) of the danger of attempting to analyze things
unsusceptible of analysis; or, in Mr. Locke's homely, but
expressive language, to have exhorted them to 'stop when
they are at the end of their tether'.
(ibid., 376-7)
It is a poor disguise, for a few lines later Stewart
cannot resist the suggestion of a "delusion which so
often misled Dr. Brown, of fancying, when he had got to
the end of his own sounding-line, that he had reached the
bottom of the ocean." (Compare Brown's own use of this
Lockean metaphor in L.III, 38.) In his memoir of Stewart,
prefixed to Stewart's own 'Biographical Memoirs', John
Veitch carried the injured philosopher's banner further
into the nineteenth century and more firmly into tradition.
Brown was simply an aberration whose thinking, being "in
direct antagonism to the results of Reid and Stewart",
had "turned aside, in some degree, the course of
speculation in Scotland, from the channel in which it
had begun to flow." But adds Veitch,
"he failed in permanently giving it an opposite direction;
7 ©
and his writings are now more generally regarded as
simply a brilliant episode in the course of the philo¬
sophical thinking of the century, which has followed an
earlier and more powerful impulse."6
Some were critical of yet another of Brown's
'wanderings', this time into the field of poetry. Lord
Cockburn explains, rather sympathetically, that
"his more judicious friends were disturbed by his verse;
which might have passed if he had done nothing better,
but which, though neither devoid of thought nor feeling,
was unworthy of his superior powers.... His friend
Dr. Gregory described his poetry as too philosophical,
and his philosophy too poetical."?
The same Cockburn could see the injustice of Stewart's
rebuke, attributing it not only to "a state of personal
irritation" (quite out of keeping with his usual "dignified
caution") but also to the "absurd" claims of the "learned
and excellent biographer of Brown", Dr. Welsh. It was
indeed a pity that Welsh chose to ally Brown's views
with those of the Phrenologists, such as George Combe,
who themselves openly disowned any allegiance to the
'metaphysics' of Reid, Stewart or Brown. Quite un¬
intentionally, this 'friendly biographer' became one of
Brown's worst enemies; the association of names, as
Brown himself would have admitted, was to stick like glue
in the minds of the unsuspecting. And so, while one
^Stewart, Collected Works, ed. Hamilton (Edinburgh,
1858) , X, lxxxi-lxxxn.
7
Henry Cockburn, Memorials of His Time (Edinburgh:
Adam and Charles Black, 1872) , pp. 317-8.
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might wish to defend Brown against his own critical
misrepresentation, it is virtually impossible to ignore
the accumulated legends surrounding his "affected1 manner
and "insidious" doctrines. These will plague us, as
they did him, throughout.
What was it then about that comment alluded to
above, and made by yet another Scottish thinker in the
nineteenth century, which could evoke such a reaction?
Perhaps it was the fact that it was born not out of
personal pique, but from a genuine concern for the
philosophy of mind itself; perhaps also the fact that,
characteristically, it struck at the very nerve-centre
of another's philosophy. Probably no one has understood
so keenly yet disagreed so cogently with Brown as this
author, who described him as an "analytic poulterer",
a "metaphysician" in executioner's garb. The caption
is both telling and highly misleading. But rather than
set a tenacious impression at the beginning, by re¬
producing the passage in its entirety, I will withhold
its appearance until the so-called 'poulterer' is him¬
self more fully described. In this way, I hope to be
able to communicate, something of the impact of that
criticism on an interpreter of Brown's philosophy.
The scene I will endeavour to trace and define
with the help of a Spaniard. Now any state of affairs
which solicits our attention seems to involve at least
9.
two factors (there is, for Brown, a third - called
desire, - but we can hold this at bay for the moment):
the first is the object immediately held in the focal
centre of our perception; the second comprises those
objects or events which although not spot-lighted are
kept, as it were, in the offing, as background, support
or conditions. In the case of a philosophical writer,
we can label these factors, respectively, the text and
the context. Of course, that which the author asserts
at one point can be set over against his arguments on
other occasions, and so within the scope of his writings
there will be a continual shifting of ground and focus,
a realignment of texts and contexts. At the same time
(and this is crucial for our understanding of what he
says), the body of his expressed opinions steps for¬
ward from the shadowy array of assumed but tacit
thoughts. Failure to see this aspect of his philosophy
is tantamount to a failure to understand what one is
doing, and hence to be fully attentive.
Ortega y Gasset has described this back-ground -
this ground behind one, - as a blending of subsoil,
soil, and adversary. The details of his description are
worth noticing. "The subsoil", he writes:
"composed of deep layers rooted in ancient collective
thought from which a particular thinker derives his
ideas, is generally something he is unconscious of.
The soil is of recent creation - the fundamental, newly
founded ideas accepted by the thinker. It is the soil
10.
in which he is grounded, and from which his own unique
thought and ideas stem. Hence he does not refer to it,
just as one does not indicate to people the ground upon
which one's feet tread at each moment. Finally, all
thought represents thought against, whether so indicated
verbally or not. Our creative thought is always shaped
in opposition to some other thought, which we believe
erroneous, fallacious, and needful of correction. I
call this the adversary, a menacing bluff, which at a
particular moment looms above our soil, and hence,
like-wise emerges from that soil."%
Since our interest lies in what sort of things Brown
attended to and under what stimulus or duress, I think
it would be helpful to illuminate, by painting in,
those compresent features of our emerging figure.
Fortunately, Brown lends himself readily to this type
of treatment. Even a cursory reading of Brown's work
will reveal that the context is all too frequently
missing: sources are left undisclosed, intentions
hidden, and struggles suppressed (or nearly so). Yet
paradoxically, in their very absence, the subsoil, the
soil and the adversaries speak as with a clash of
cymbals.
The "deep layers" and "recent creations" might
be said to overlap in critical places, and therefore to
be indistinguishable. There is a certain amount of
truth in this - notably in the area of empirical
methodology, - but if we confine the former to rumblings
O
Jos£ Ortega y Gasset, The Origin of Philosophy,
tr. Toby Talbot (N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1967),
pp. 73-4.
of a persistent kind, we can listen more closely to the
rustlings nearby. Similarly, one can only separate the
"recent creations' from the 'thought against' by
recognizing the existence of a kind of love-hate
relationship which tends to arise between or among
philosophers working on common problems. The youthful
imagination which paid tribute to its mentor in a poem
entitled 'To Professor Dugald Stewart, Esq.' belongs to
the same critical consciousness which opposed the
latter's atomistic presuppositions, his theory regarding
the suspension of volition during sleep, and his reliance
on inherent 'faculties' or 'powers' to account for the
activities which are the mind's expression of itself.
Here is the adoring disciple in a poetic mood:
"Dear were the hours, when mid the listening train
My truth-warmed soul expanded with thy strain;
When first, on eyes in careless musings blind,
Burst all the glories of the World of Mind."
Yet adoration, so poignant in youth, cannot long endure
the skeptical barbs of maturity and independent thought.
From an almost random selection of passages, on memory or
attention, sensation or consciousness, one could enlarge
upon the bitter-sweet quality of Brown's relations with
his teacher. In dramatic or operatic terms, the out¬
come could conceivably be a kind of philosophical dis¬
enchantment for two voices. And Reid might still be
heard mumbling behind Stewart's words. Through the
12e
juxtaposition of such passages# I would hope to convey
an impression of tension# of grating nerves: between a
philosopher for whom the mind was a veritable starry
heaven# studded with functions which had become 'faculties';
and a philosopher for whom the mind was simply all that
is felt by us at any one time and under any circumstance*
Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that it was Stewart
who taught Brown that those very times and circumstances
are both a burden and a challenge of complexity. And
it was Reid who impressed upon Brown the essential
simplicity and indivisibility of mind. In his capacity
as an analyst# therefore, Brown never lost sight of the
mystery cf the whole# of all the glories# as he put it#
of the World of Mind. That is the theme of this inquiry.
In filling out the details of Brown's tripartite
background# I will be forced to introduce a rather large
cast. This procedure might suggest that Brown was a
mere collector of opinions, a philosophical vulture
feeding off the bones of greater minds. Indeed# such
was the verdict of J.S. Mill# and more recently of (the
historian) Gladys Bryson. Brown is accused of drawing
"unskilfully" (Mill) on two Scottish traditions: that
of Humean analysis on the one hand and that of Common
Sense intuition on the other. In short# he is an
'eclectic' of the same class as Victor Cousin (in my
13.
opinion, rather good company). Sir William Hamilton's
incessant and, one feels, obsessive 'thrashing' of
Brown is too well known (and too ugly) to bear repeating.
According to Hamilton, Brown not only borrowed, but filched
with "silent appropriation", the psychological analyses of
Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis and Laromiguiere, -
the so-called 'sensationalists' and 'ideologiste$' of
eighteenth-century France. The characterization has
regrettably become crystallized: this fact alone, and not
Hamilton's petulant attacks, should cause distress. In
1934, the author of The Growth of PhilosophiGalRadicalism,
Elie Halevy, wrote that "Brown had felt the influence of
the French ideologists quite as much (as] if not more than
that of Hume; he borrowed so much from Destutt de Tracy
\ 9
and Laromiguiere, that he has been accused of plagiarism."
It is time that someone gave a fair trial to, and perhaps
acquitted, this 'poacher'.
The interweaving of subsoil, soil and adversaries
will have the appearance of a labyrinth from which there
is no escape. This should not deter our efforts. If I
may draw one conclusion in advance, it is that for every
point with which he agreed, Brown found cause for dis¬
agreement. His philosophical perspective was therefore
^The Growth of PhilosophicjlRadicalism, tr. Mary
Morris (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1934) , p. 435.
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slanted in neither direction: it was a genuine transcendence
of - literally, a climbing above but standing on, - the
intricate patterns and layers of past opinion.
Briefly stated, the subsoil was an empirical under¬
current stretching across a wide philosophical front, from
Bacon and Hobbes to Hartley and Priestley, with Locke,
Condillac, Berkeley and Hume mustered somewhere in between.
Reversing the tide of rationalism, this steady wave of
empiricists found in the return to sensory origins the
kind of immediacy it desired. (Just what sort of •immediacy'
we find in our original experience was a question which
hung in the balance until Reid exploded and redeveloped
the concept of 'simple apprehension'.) The decomposition
of experience into its elemental components was an analytic
technique sustained by a metaphysical principle. That
principle depicted a genetic development from lower to
higher forms of experience, from the passivity of the
senses to the activity of mind. In order to explain the
more reflective functions, one had to descend the ideational
ladder in search of the most primitive or rudimentary
data. To verify was to look down and back. Brown ac¬
cepted this model as unconsciously as we now turn to
basic linguistic norms. But the line of demarcation
between passivity and activity was never strictly adhered
to: it was clouded by rationalistic prejudices as, for
example, in Hobbes. Only with Condillac's statue was
15.
there ever any real possibility of a purely haphazard or
contingent accumulation and transformation of sensory
moments. (Both his disciples and Brown himself, as it
turned out, were unconvinced by this.) The lure of the
necessary always wormed its way into the heart of the
contingent. The outcome of analysis would be predetermined
by the shape of the analyzing mind. It was to the inves¬
tigation of that shape or 'form' that Brown devoted the
bulk of his philosophical energies.
The contributions of mind to the impact (for Brown,
the virtual bombardment) of sense - experience assumed
various guises. Sometimes they were rooted in physiological
structures and reactions of desire or aversion; sometimes
in reflective 'powers' of abstraction, comparison and
judgment; sometimes in habits of suggestion or association;
and not least of all in dispositions or propensities to
believe in certain basic features or qualities of ex¬
perience. If there was an overriding question, it was
this: how does the mind operate, both in and for itself
and in terms of the sensory impingement of the external
world? Again, Brown gave his consent to the mechanistic
tone of that question. He opposed physiological reductions,
but only on the grounds that they were, as yet, in¬
sufficient, misguided or incorrect. (Such was the blast
against Hartley and, on the level of "recent creations",
against Erasmus Darwin.) Similarly, he spoke out against
16.
sensationalistic reductions, wherein the functions of
memory, attention, comparison and judgment would be
equated (through reverse transformation or de-formation)
with the sensations of which they were the consequences.
"[The sensations] do not involve or constitute," Brown
wrote, "they merely give occasion to this third state
[the comparison of two percepts], and give occasion to it,
merely in consequence of the peculiar susceptibilities of
the mind itself." (L. XXXIII, 511) But as I have in¬
timated already, these "susceptibilities" were not to be
confused with the alleged proliferation of "powers" in
the hands of someone like Reid or Stewart: they were
simply what the mind was inclined to do or feel with
respect to other affections.
Brown's reluctance to give himself over to the
theory of inherent faculties extended to his choice of
the term "suggestion" to describe our habitual "association"
of ideas. The latter he found to be too restrictive, for
it excluded the vast range of emotional confluences which
plague and enhance our lives (L. XXXIV, 524). Moreover,
it implied something which, as far as he could see,
could never be shown: namely, that impressions were
immediately subjected to a special activity of clas¬
sification and distribution. "Our consciousness, during
perception," Brown asserts,
"is far from indicating any process of association; and
17.
all of which we are conscious, at the time of the suggestion
itself, is the mere succession of one feeling to another,
not certainly of any prior process on which this suggestion
has depended."
(L. XL, 93)
Here as elsewhere, the intervention of 'higher* mental
acts in the performance of 'lower' ones is ruled out,
initially for want of proof and secondly in the interests
of conceptual economy.
The emphasis which Brown gives to the natural
movement of thought, to its spontaneous eruption into
sequences of ideas or emotions, seems too deliberate to
be unconscious. Yet Brown, like his poetic contemporaries
and the aestheticians such as Alison (whom he greatly
admired), were responding to Hobbes's analysis of what he
called "Mentall Discourse",^ and in particular to the
alarmingly simple insight that "Thought is quick". Reid
pinched an ounce of this insight for his first Essay:
"No succession can be more quick than that of thought";
so the idea was obviously growing. The concern of Stewart
and many others for the maintenance of sound habits of
attention was a reflection of their despair in the face
of the peculiar 'raciness* of thought. What was food
to the poetic imagination was poison to the philosophical
analyst. Or at least so it seemed.
^Leviathan, Everyman edition, I, iii, 9.
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In fact, Brown drew heavily on this assumption,
just as he readily accepted the explosive simultaneity
of all perceptual experience. From his early Observations
on the Zoonomia of Erasmus Darwin and his medical dis-
sertatation, De Somno, to his final Sketch of the
Physiology of the Mind, he allowed his fascination for
the velocity of consciousnesst its successiveness, rapid
retrospects and suggestibility, to run rampant. For that
reason one can often read Brown with half an eye on con¬
temporary writers such as William James, Marcel Proust
and Paul Valery. According to Brown, mind must be seen
to be any state of consciousness (and nothing more) and
yet no particular state of consciousness (and nothing
less). It must refuse ultimately to be anything which
it is: any "affection" internal or external; any con¬
junction of antecedence and consequence; any conception
or feeling of relation; any act of recollection or desire
to attend; any emotion of joy or sorrow. It must be
immanent in each one, while at the same time transcending
them all. In the words of Valery:
"The character of man is consciousness; and the character
of consciousness is a perpetual emptying, an unremitting
unsparing detachment from everything that appears, no
matter how it appears. An inexhaustible act independent
of the quality or number of things that present themselves,
and by which the man in the mind must knowingly restrict




But if one refuses to be a single moment of the stream,
one is still 'he who refuses', and it is on this felt yet
logical 'identity' that Brown founds his belief in the
simple and indivisible mind. "It is the same individual
mind", he notes,
"which, in all these instances, is pleased and pained, is
ignorant, doubts, reflects, knows. There is something
'changed in all, and yet in all the same', which at once
constitutes the thoughts and emotions of the hour, and
yet outlives them, - something which, from the temporary
agitations of passion, rises unaltered and everlasting,
like the pyramid, that lifts still the same point to
heaven, amid the sands and whirlwinds of the desert."
(L. XI, 168)
That "something" was the elusive goal of Brown's mental
analysis. The image of the pyramid suggested itself and
was gone.
By now it should be apparent that deep layers have
shifted ground and are beginning to step clearly into the
light of more recent creations. This is inevitable. If
I were to say that Brown had inherited from Hume the idea
of the reducibility of human experience into its felt
qualities, into that mode of existence which is impression
or affection, I would be halfway towards announcing
Destutt de Tracy as a major influence on Brown. For I
would be on the verge of pronouncing, through the media
of Destutt de Tracy and Brown, that feeling is "everything
for us; that it is the same thing as ourselves"** (p. 42);
H-Destutt de Tracy, A Treatise on Political Economy;
to which is prefixed "A Supplement to a Preceding Work on
the Understanding, or Elements of Ideology", tr. Th.
20.
Vivre, c'est sentir. I would have to add that man is "a
being willing in consequence of his impressions and
knowledge, and acting in consequence of his will" (Elemens,
34). This would call to mind Brown's reiteration of the
Hobbesian thesis that voluntary action depends only on
"the last Inclination, or Appetite" (Leviathan, 29). And
still the windings and unwindings would not cease. The
effort of will which now describes man as a creature
going out of himself, attaining self-consciousness in the
very act (Maine de Biran), throws us back to Berkeley's
rediscovery of touch for the purpose of apprehending
extension; then forward again to Brown and Destutt de
Tracy who hit upon the realization that in extending my
arm, I discover not only the 'resistance' at the far end
of my movement but also the 'muscular sensation* through
which I reach it. I am, of course, giving expression to
that realignment of eighteenth-century perspectives which
begins to loosen the empirical supposition of pure
receptivity. That very operation of "loosening", of
Jefferson (Georgetown, D.C., 1817), p. 42; Jefferson
refers in the title to Elemens d'Ideologie, sec. II,
'Application de nos moyens de connaitre a l'dtude de notre
volonte et de ses effexsV
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shaking loose those ties which bind ideas (whether through
accident or of necessity), Brown regarded as the "first
meaning" of analysis (L. X, 152). And so we are well
within sight of our quarry. A simple comparison (yet one
with enormous implications) will suffice to illustrate
the alteration of view-points.
In the second of the Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous, Berkeley describes the sort of antics which
an object in the world must perform in order to 'catch
the eye' of the perceiver: "the attention must be
awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the
same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different
lights." Brown does not deny this feature of our paying
heed to something: there is a real sense in which we must
be drawn out of the Cartesian "prison" of reflective con¬
sciousness towards the periphery of our being.^ But
the motivation behind attention cannot be ignored:
paying heed is part of a more general externalizing thrust
on the part of man in his capacity for curiosity and
concern. "To attend", observes Brown,
"is to have a desire of knowing that to which we attend,
and attention without desire is a verbal contradiction
an inconsistency, at least, as great as if we were said
^Jose Ortega y Gasset, What is Philosophy?, tr.
Mildred Adams (N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1960),
pp. 154-65.
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to desire to know without any desire of knowing, or to
be attentive without attention."
(L. XXXI, 486)
An object or idea before us is therefore infused with the
emotional temper or climate of the experiencing subject.
"The eye has ... a double quickness, to perceive what
we love or hate, what we hope or fear" (L. XXXI, 487).
Like Ortega y Gasset and the poet Wallace Stevens after
him, Brown focuses on the condition of lovers to evoke
the peculiar complementary structure of attention, its
response to the beckoning 'fact' of presence or absence
as well as its eagerness to engage 'this* object and no
other. Thus absence is depicted as "nothing more than
the greater vividness of some mere conception, or other
internal feeling, than of any, or all of the external
objects present at the time, which have no peculiar
relation to the prevailing emotion." (L. XXXI, 487)
As I suggested earlier, any examination of mind or con¬
sciousness must begin within the context of a particular
time and circumstance. For Brown is, among other things,
a master contextualist. Attention, therefore, must undergo
a type of phenomenological 'loosening', a separation for
the purpose of discovering the actual experience of
consciousness in such a state.
"It is to our consciousness, of course, that we must refer
for the truth of any such analysis; and the process which
it reveals to us, in attention, seems, I think, to justify
the analysis which I made, indicating a combination Of
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simpler feelings, but not any new and distinct species of
feeling, to be referred to a peculiar faculty."
(L. XXXII, 491)
So much, then, for the soil of Reid and Stewart whose
myriad host of 'powers' must be opposed by a stringent
analysis; so much also for the subsoil of an antiquated
•science of mind and human nature', as Brown heralds in
the new science of 'affection-euw-motive', be it external
or internal; good-bye, as it were, to the statues of
'sensationalism' and welcome the 'susceptibilities' of
the human agent; farewell, that is, to subsoil, soil and
adversaries, for the analysis of mind will begin where
the 'physics' of matter left off.
Mental analysis is or now ought to be, proclaims
Brown, a process of "intellectual physics" (the notion of
a dual enterprise, combining the 'Physics of Matter' and
the 'Physics of Mind' was undoubtedly a legacy from the
Academy of Physics, - see Welsh, Note E, 506) according to
which "we reduce to simpler elements, some complex feeling
that seems to us virtually to involve them" (L. X, 151).
This is how, in Reid's terms, we arrive at "simple ap¬
prehensions". Traditional empiricism failed to subsume
mental phenomena fully under the joint aspects of space
and time: on the one hand, to attend to the 'constitution'
(L. VI, 95) of a simultaneous complex of phenomena and
thereby to regard carefully the interstices, the
"separating spaces" (Sketch, 14), - an idea which Bergson
ridiculed as "tending toward Zero the further one pushes
14
analysis"; and on the other hand, to remember the
changes as they grow (L. VI, 95), the successions as they
multiply, dissolve or alter the configurations into which
consciousness at any moment is apt to glide. The shape of
the analyzing mind is therefore both structured and
structuring, figured and figuring. One has to catch it
on the run. "It is unquestionably the same individual
mind", affirms Brown, "which, in intellectual investigation,
is at once the object and the observer." (L. IX, 138) How
then does one locate the center, the reality which is both
and yet neither? The answer, of course, is that it eludes
comprehension. As Georges Gusdorf has remarked in La
d^couverte de soi: "all we ever find [are] the products
15
it leaves in its wake." At every stage, one is
abandoned to the moment with only the sustaining hope,
fostered by memory (L. IX, 138), that 'this' moment bears
some relation to 'that' one, and that both together might
stand in relation to an unseen 'Other'. They are, you
might say, waiting helplessly for Godot. "Of the essence
14
The Creative Mind, tr. M. L. Andison (N.Y.:
Philosophical Library, 1946) , pp. 205-6.
^La d^couverte de soi (Paris: Presses universi-
taires de France, 1948).
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of mind, then, we know nothing, but in relation to the
states or feelings that form, or have formed, our
momentary consciousness" (L. IX, 138).
Nevertheless, in so far as the "unknown* is believed
in, we are rescued from the certain chaos and despair of
a mere aggregate and succession of states. Analysis cannot
touch what it cannot find. Therefore the vision of mind
o
as simple and indivisible remains intact. Moreover, the
insight into its unifying power bears fruit in the ordering
of our mental experience into suggestions simple and
relative: the former bringing into focus "mere con¬
ceptions, or fainter images of the past" (an idea bor¬
rowed from Hume and the sensationalists), and the latter
binding our separate perceptions or conceptions according
to their relations with each other (a resurrection in
white of the faded notions of 'judgment" and 'comparison').
It is, muses Brown,
"as if our mind could give its own unity to the innumerable
objects which it comprehends, and, like that mighty Spirit
which once hovered over the confusion of unformed nature,
convert into a universe what was only chaos before."
(L. LI, 283)
Brown is at least a critical philosopher in poulterer's
duds.
That hint of a mystery still to be resolved
compels us to retrace the steps taken by Brown in his
pursuit of a finer analysis. I have been slowly manoeuvring
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Brown into position under the spotlight, across a broad
stage of history. That background is no longer 'present'
but remains 'compresent': it is there together with that
which follows.
In the early part of his career, Brown restricted
himself to sharpening his philosophical tools at the
expense of his predecessors. There was nothing par¬
ticularly unusual about this development since it is a
rather common malady among philosophers. His extended
remarks in 1798 on Darwin's Zoonomia were intended to
serve as a commentary, and remain so. Their usefulness
lies in disclosing to the researcher some of the first
seeds of Brown's eventual assault on the psychological and
conceptual muddles connected with sensation, volition,
memory, and association. The dissertation which he wrote
for his medical degree (in 1803) was a direct reply to
Stewart's confusion (also spotted by his friend Prevost)
concerning the suspension of mental operations during
sleep. Stewart's fatal move had been the observation that
"in sleep those operations of the mind are suspended
which depend on our volition." Brown and Prevost pounced
on the implications of this thesis for the functions of
attention and memory, both of which were assumed to depend
on an 'effort of will'. Stewart was gracious in defeat,
and remained so until he discovered what this disciple
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of his was really like! No doubt Brown did not know this
himself until he began to write his Lectures for the Moral
Philosophy class at Edinburgh in 1808-09. Later, he found
himself embroiled in the so-called 'Leslie Affair', an
ecclesiastical fiasco of interference over Leslie's
appointment in 1805 to the chair of mathematics at the
University of Edinburgh. The real scapegoat in the con¬
troversy was Hume: in particular, his theory of causation
to which John Leslie in his 'Experimental Inquiry into the
Nature and Property of Heat' (1804) had shown himself to
be sympathetic. Brown felt that Hume had been doubly
betrayed: initially, because he had been misread (by
the 'moderates' of the General Assembly), and secondly
because he had been read through the coloured-glasses of
Reid. Although Brown defended Hume's analysis of
'necessary connection* in terms of the constant conjunction
of antecedents and consequents, he had a measure of
revenge against Hume's 'analysis' and Reid's 'intuition'
by accusing both philosophers of saying the same thing:
"that we are determined by an irresistible instinct, to
the belief of invariableness of antecedence, is allowed
by Mr. Hume, - that our belief of power is intuitive, is
the opinion of Dr. Reid, - and however opposite his language
may be, invariableness of antecedence is the very power
for which Dr. Reid contends."
(Inquiry, 1, 195-6)
But our concern is neither with the details of Brown's
emerging theory of cause and effect nor, at this early
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stage, with his philosophical back-stabbing. For it was
through his work in 1805 entitled Observations on the nature
and tendency of the doctrine of Mr. Hume concerning the
relation of cause and effect (which, by the way, Stewart
read in its pamphlet form with "much pleasure and much
instruction", - see Welsh, 96-7) that Brown began to
fashion for himself those surgical instruments of analysis
which are the object of our own inquiry. Whatever Hume
could not teach him, Brown taught himself. And the
upshot of these lessons was a prescription which would
pervade and dominate the whole of Brown's subsequent
thought: hold to what can be observed and classify it
carefully (L. IX, 133). Hearing this, one is perhaps
reminded of a constant refrain in Ferrier's "Philosophy
of Consciousness", to the effect that our only safety,
as philosophers, lies in the faithfulness and completeness
of our observations.
I am tempted to describe the youthful author of
the Inquiry as 'power-mad'. (Brown was a mere twenty-
seven at the time). There is little doubt that he was
intent upon exorcising the devils and hobgoblins of a
faulty or non-existent analysis. The idea of power had
been swelling into a beast of many connections, and Brown
was out to 'scotch this snake'. His operation was
conducted on two fronts: the first and more important
being phenomenalistic or psychological (French writers,
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such as Naville, were fond of comparing the 'phenomenalism'
of the Scottish school with the 'psychology' of Maine de
Biran) and the second linguistic. Setting before himself
a model of the ideal philosopher, he endeavoured to work
himself into the "habit of constant and quick analysis of
general words" (Inquiry, 2, 137-9 ftn.), words which,
however economical, were too often founded on "rude and
scanty observations". Like Reid before him, he believed
that "due attention to the signs [of a language] may, in
many cases, give considerable light to the thing signified
by them" (I.P., I, v, 54). But signs are no substitute
for the items which they point out. A vicarious analysis
is ultimately an empty analysis. As Brown puts it, words
are important "only as they suggest ideas" (Inquiry, 2,
153 ftn.). Nevertheless, the line separating the linguistic
and phenomenalistic analyses is a tenuous one, which we
must explore with due caution.
From the outset we are asked to consider the
philosophy of mind as a "science of analysis" rather than
as the product of "synthetic experiment" or "verbal
definition" or the "arrangement of nomenclature" (Inquiry,
2, 13 Preface). Approaching the phenomenal analysis first,
we see at work a process of what the French philosopher -
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Loosely described, this is a kind of digging in of one's
dissecting heels in the face of the temptation to advance
by mere accumulation. Stewart, for example, was a great
collector of phenomena but on these terms a poor analyst.
The field for analysis is what Brown calls this "mighty
system of changes"; in other words, a condition of
universal flux. Hence from either an external or an
internal direction there is a constant 'springing on the
mind' of "co-existing objects" or "co-existing series of
objects" (Inquiry, 3, 24-5; 2, 46 ftn.). In any "single
moment" (Inquiry, 3, 8; 25; 149), some sort of change is
taking place: "some sensation, or thought, or emotion,
is beginning in the mind, or ceasing, or growing more or
less intense" (Inquiry, 3, 8). Locked, as it were, in
this present and isolated moment by our "imperfect senses",
the series as a "whole" appears to us as "simple"
(Inquiry, 3, 148); that is, as not amenable to a finer
reduction into its "minuter elementary changes". Further¬
more, because there is an "unbounded" field of co-existing
series bursting on the scene, we cannot be certain that
any two series are mutually and invariably connected
(Inquiry, 3, 24-5). Thus a 'simple' phenomenon X at t^
may or may not be related (or, more strongly, 'bound')
to 'simple' phenomenon Y at t2« The implication is that
these simples conceal the whole truth. Nevertheless,
since we believe that the ever-shifting phenomena are
both connected and regular in their appearance before us,
we must turn to reason as the instrument for examining
the "relations of our ideas". Analysis, therefore, is
the retracing of steps leading up to the "aggregations"
of mind, to those "compound" feelings which, although
"but one affection", are yet the "succession" of certain
other ideas "preceding" them (Inquiry, 2, 18-19). More
sharply still, analysis is the detecting of concealed
elements (Inquiry, 3, 148) within the compass of simple
disguises. If Brown is correct, the breaking down of
simples is the break-through to discovery.
Yet here again Brown seems to place a metaphysical
restriction on the analysis of phenomena. In mind as in
matter there can be no final penetration to the 'most
elementary thing', the ultimate particular. We are always
stopping short to pick up and examine the penultimate
clue. Locke had hinted at a similar 'present limitation'
of our powers of discernment, but the French 'progressivists'
had taken this as an indication that the future would yield
what the present knows not. As usual, Brown is suspicious
of any view which rides on the hope of finding that
internal mechanism which will explain everything. And
he derides those thinkers who state that there are
"influences concerned, which are at once hidden from our
view, and yet of a kind which require no observation to
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reveal them to us™ (Inquiry, 3, 243). One is reminded of
Brown's dictum that we must hold to what can be observed
and classify it carefully.
To the trick of breaking down simples, Brown adds
a linguistic device. The language-user is requested to
find in his experience not only the 'impression' (in the
Humean sense) which serves as the prototype for the supposed
'idea of Power', but also the 'thing' denoted by the 'word'
power. Brown makes it clear that when he calls upon the
user to perform this secondary function, he expects him
to regard both the way in which he 'ought to use' that
word and the way in which he 'ought to perceive' that
sequential phenomenon. (Introspective analysts were
always telling other people what they ought to be seeing;
hence Ryle's more recent bursts of sarcasm.) Brown
effects a transition from a categorical to a hypothetical
perspective, from statements about 'power processes'
taking place to statements suggesting 'dispositional
behaviour-patterns'. The transition is recognizably
modern:
"When a spark falls upon gunpowder, and kindles it into
explosion, every one ascribes to the spark the power of
kindling the inflammable mass. But ... he means nothing
more than this very simple belief - that, in all similar
circumstances, the explosion of gunpowder will be the
immediate and uniform consequence of the application of a
spark."
(Inquiry, 3, 27)
But there is a compresent analysis lurking beneath this
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piece of sophistication, an analysis which compels the
individual to observe again that 'simple' which initially
conceals its 'history'. Thus linguistic analysis finds
itself paralysed and barren without the assistance of a
phenomenal retrenchment. The two operations are thus
mutually dependent, although Brown clearly gives the
edge to the latter.
The final recourse to phenomenal analysis is
Brown's bow to empiricism. While it seems true to say
that we always pause before the penultimate phenomenon,
this in itself does not limit the indefinite analysis of
complex appearances and their relations. The idea of
power, Brown concedes, is a general notion, a linguistic
short-hand for successions of a certain type. Yet for
that very reason, it expresses and reflects such relations
as are found to exist between phenomena. These relations
are constantly open to review. We may conclude, then,
that nowhere in Brown's canon on general ideas is there a
rule which precludes the indefinite analysis of (supposed)
simples into their (actual) elemental parts. As long as
there remains any possibility that the relations implicit
in a certain general idea may change - and no limit can
be logically assigned to this contingency, - we must
stand ready to adjust, or if need be to dispense with,
even the most coveted generalizations about our experience.
Especially cogent is Brown's intimation of a dual process
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of involution and evolution, whereby as phenomenal analysis
"involves1 towards those germinal elements, linguistic
analysis 'evolves' towards their simple and lucid ex¬
pression. As he remarks? "All languages . . . must, to
a certain extent, be analytical? evolving, in many suc¬
cessive words, the complex feeling of a single moment."
(Inquiry, 3, 124) Should either end of the process move
too quickly, their complimentariness is seized, items are
lost or smothered, and words are driven to airy nothingness.
Analysis is a taut and delicate balance.
Brown's struggle with analysis lends to one's
reading of the Lectures and the last-minute Sketch a
highly dramatic quality. I have gone back over early
ground in an attempt to show just where and how Brown
found his analytic feet. But once discovered the method
had to be controlled; otherwise it, like styles, would
run away with the man. The empirical side of Brown
favoured an unlimited use of phenomenal analysis, a con¬
tinual 'loosening* of knots and joints, a breaking down
and breaking through. The philosophy of mind "as analytical"
must be "science of progressive discovery" (L. XI, 162).
Since there was seemingly no end to the 'appearances'
which mind would leave in its wake, the field would be
inexhaustible". Brown's Credo to this effect is a master¬
piece of understatements "... the mind cannot exist,
without forming continually new combinations, that modify
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its subsequent affections, and vary therefore, the
products, which it is the labour of our intellectual
analysis to reduce to their original elements". (Ibid.)
It was with good reason, then, that Brown compared the
analysis of mind to the chemical analysis of compounds
(an idea imbedded in the soil of Hartley and the French
Ideologists)• For "it is only slowly", as Brown repeated
to himself, that we discover the elements and relations
of both (L. XI, 163). Yet implicit in this view of mind,
as giving over its hand-me-downS for its own amusement
and clarification, is the other face of Brown: the face
which did not dare to challenge the assumption of mind
simple and indivisible • Anc* so in the midst of empirical
testing, we find a metaphysical clinging to unity, an
almost tender regard for the transcending whole. (The
active voice is necessary to convey the sense of mind in
flight, away from its manifestations). The result is a
case of analytic schizophrenia.
In its final form, mental analysis becomes "virtual
only" (Sketch, p. 20). The analogy between mipd and
matter is nipped in the bud by Brown's realization that
there is no "essential union" in the latter, but only a
kind of "accidental apposition" (L. X, 152) among the
"multitude" of "separate existences". How unlike this
material picture is our limited view of the mind's
"products":
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"even the most complex feeling is still only one feeling;
for we cannot divide the states or affections of our mind
into separate self-existing fractions . . . nor distinguish
half a joy or sorrow from a whole joy or sorrow."
(L. X, 152)
What we cannot see fully we can nevertheless feel, and
what we sense, as through a mist, is the deep inter-
penetration of the parts of the whole. Here, as Bergson
testified in Time and Free Will,
"we feel a thousand different elements which dissolve
into and permeate one another without any precise outlines,
without the least tendency to externalize themselves in
relation to one another; hence the originality."^-'
Significantly, both writers turn to emotional states for
examples of that which "the analytic power of reflection
or reason" (L. X, 152) cannot fathom. And both return to
a more lucid understanding of those 'surface' structures
of abstraction and association, wherein the 'separating
spaces' are at best only 'loosely joined'. Brown stands
before the "products" of himself, Bergson before his own
"shadow". They recite their Credo:
"we believe that we have analysed our feeling, while we
have really replaced it by a juxtaposition of lifeless
states which can be translated into words, and each of
which constitutes the common element, the impersonal residue,
of the impressions felt in a given case by the whole of
society. "I8
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Two voices in unison, but disenchanted.
There is, then, a compresent sadness in the bold
and optimistic schemes which Brown pushes forward in the
name of a new Science of Mind. He is like a writhing
monster at odds with himself in the moment of truth, - a
public lecture. He twists and plunges, contradicts and
straightens himself out. Witness the struggle:
"Yet, wonderful, or even absurd, as it may seem, not¬
withstanding the absolute simplicity of the mind itself,
and consequently of all its feeling or momentary states, -
the Science of Mind is, in its most important respects, a
source of analysis, or of a process which I have said to
be virtually the same as analysis; and it is only, as it
is in this virtual sense analytical, that any discovery,
at least that any important discovery, can be expected
to be made in it".
(L. X, 151)
Who, except perhaps a fellow with a warped sense of
humour, would laugh now at Brown's misery? The decision
to proceed, to give the science of analysis his blessing,
was to cause Brown as philosopher and poet, the enduring
anguish of misrepresentation. But never one to leave his
readers in a fit of depression, Brown recollects himself
as often as he forgets. Speaking of memory, he wrote:
"To this wonderful endowment . . . which gives us the
past to compare with the present, we owe that most wonderful
of relations, of which the same being is at once the
object and the subject, contemplating itself, in the
same manner, as it casts its view on objects that are
distant from it, comparing thought with thought, emotion
with emotion, approving its own moral actions ... or
passing sentence on itself, as if on a wretch whom it
loathed, that was trembling with conscious delinquency,
under the inquisition of a severe and all-knowing judge."
(L. IX, 139)
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Here, our analyst in the dock has mushroomed into a two-
headed creature, part 'conscious delinquent* and part
'all-knowing judge'. His reality, if one can speak so,
lies somewhere in between, not so much in a 'point' as in
a 'tension'. So described, Brown's philosophy is, I
believe, a representative study of man.
The unveiling now of James F. Ferrier's rebuke of
Brown will not, I trust, come too early for a fair
verdict. Much remains to be said concerning Brown's
quest for a sound analytic method and his application of
this method at various stages of his career to a wide
range of philosophic problems. Nevertheless, this first
sketch ought at least to impede an over-anxious acceptance
of the point of view conveyed so strikingly by Ferrier.
"The human mind, not to speak it profanely, is like the
goose that laid golden eggs. The metaphysician resembles
the analytic poulterer who slew it to get at them in a
lump, and found nothing for his pains. Leave the mind
to its own natural workings, as manifested in the
imagination of the poet, the fire and rapid combinations
of the orator, the memory of the mathematician, the
gigantic activities and never-failing resources of the
warrior and statesman, or even the manifold powers put
forth in everyday life by the most ordinary of men; and
what can be more wonderful and precious than its pro¬
ductions? Cut into it metaphysically, with a view of
grasping the embryo truth, and of ascertaining the process
by which, all these bright results are elaborated in the
womb, and every trace of 'what has been* vanishes beneath
the knife; the breathing realities are dead, and lifeless
abstractions are in their place; the divinity has left
its shrine, and the devotee worships at a deserted altar;
the fire from heaven is lost in chaotic darkness, and the
godlike is nothing but an empty name. Look at thought,
and feeling, and passion, as they glow on the pages of
Shakespeare. Golden eggs, indeedl Look at the same as
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they stagnate on the dissecting-table of Dr. Brown, and
marvel at the change. Behold how shapeless and extinct
they have become! Man is a 'living soul'; but science
has been trained among the dead."l"
Such a picture of the man is, as I shall increasingly
maintain, an erroneous one and must yield to a more just
representation. In philosophy only false opinion must be
allowed to stagnate.
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No reasoning is more fallacious than this; that, because
two things are constantly conjoined, therefore one must
be the cause of the other. Day and night have been
joined in a constant succession since the beginning of
the world; but who is so foolish as to conclude from this
that day is the cause of night, or night the cause of the
following day?
- Thomas REID
Of no phaenomenon, as observed, need we think the cause;
but of every phenomenon must we think a cause. The
former we may learn, through a process of induction and
generalization; the latter we must always and at once
admit. ... On this, not sunken rock, Dr. Brown and
others have been shipwrecked.
- Sir William HAMILTON
I
I
AN ASSEMBLY OF OPINION
Brown's entrance on the side of the 'defence
counsel' in the Leslie controversy marked a dramatic
seizure of philosophic acclaim. The voluminous commentary
on Darwin's Zoonomia was but a minor prelude to the sudden,
orchestral, challenge of his illustrious forebearers,
notably Hume, Reid and Stewart, the latter himself a
participant. The theory of causation which he brought
forward on this occasion - largely in agreement with but
at the same time critical of aspects of Hume's position, -
was commended by John Playfair (see Welsh, 126) and
rather extensively adopted by James Mill.^ It also found
favour with Alexander Campbell Fraser, who was ready to
confess that he had indeed been saved by Brown's
"abstract" analysis of and "ingenious" inquiry into
the nature of "cause and effect". His 'sin' apparently
had been an unthinking acceptance of the "illusion" that
cause is a term referring to an invisible "power" which
mysteriously produces in objects the observed changes
called effects. The distance between his worship of Baal
''"Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, ed.
J. S. Mill (London, 1869), II, 256.
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and a "blind trust" in the notion of power as a mere
pattern of "invariable antecedence" was, however, too
great for him and he relapsed into "universal uncertainty"
2
and thence into "Cartesianism". As usual, it was the
compresence of Hume with Brown, and therefore to his
mind of "Positivism", which fed his doubt and that of
others. Schopenhauer was similarly attracted to the
non-empirical element in Brown's theory - the emphasis
3
on "innate, intuitive, and instinctive conviction",
which he promptly misconstrued, along Kantian lines, as
turning the law of causality into an a priori condition
of all experience. The remainder he shrugged aside as
pure "tediousness". Not surprisingly, Brown's heroic
stand was greeted as much by confusion as by applause.
That same confusion and indecision were rife among
his bitterest opponents as well. Reid more than anyone
was probably responsible for this, since he had drawn
the lines against Hume (Brown complained that the members
of the General Assembly had preferred to study Hume's
testimony, as it were, second-hand through Reid, thus
doubly betraying the former, - (Inquiry, 2, 186-9 ftn.)
2
Biographia Philosophica (Edinburgh and London: Wm.
Blackwood and Sons, 1904), pp. 47-9.
**The World as Will and Idea, tr. Haldane and Kemp
(London: Trubner and Co., 1886), II, 207. ~
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but not with an adequate and, one might add, his customary
4
lucidity. Adhering somewhat closely to Newton, "to
whose language", remarks Stewart, "he was superstitiously
attached" (A.P., II, 28 ftn.), Reid had argued that
natural philosophers "have never discovered the efficient
cause of any one phenomenon; nor do those who have
distinct notions of the principles of the science, make
any such pretence" (A.P., I, vi, 47); and so, "when they
pretend to show the cause of any phenomenon of nature,
they mean by the cause, a law of nature of which that
phenomenon is a necessary consequence" (A.P., I, vi, 46;
italics mine). Stewart objects, almost regretfully,
that such a position is tantamount to using "the phrases
physical causes and efficient causes as synonymous"
(A.P., II, 28 ftn.). Had Newton been less "guilty of
indefinite and ambiguous expression", and Reid less slavish
in his following of him, Stewart
"cannot help thinking that (Reid] would have reconciled
some apparent inconsistencies which occur in his later
publications, and obviated some of the cavils with which
4
For a comparison of their positions see L. L.
Laudan, "Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British
Methodological Thought", in The Methodological Heritage of
Newton, ed. R. E. Butts and J. W. Davis (U. of Toronto
Press, 1970), pp. 127-31. Laudan contends that "Newton
was in rather a quandary about causal questions" but that
Reid managed to capture and elucidate the "spirit" of
Newton's position.
44.
he has been assailed by his not always candid opponents."
(Who else but Brown?)
Ironically, when Brown himself equates physical and
efficient cause - "the physical cause . . . which has been,
is, and always will be, followed by a certain change, is
the efficient cause of that change" (Inquiry, 3, 89), -
both John Wilson^ and Hamilton, defending Reid, pounce
on Brown in turn, alleging that his equation rules out
6
the "idea" or "quality of necessity" in causal relations.
The situation becomes hopelessly muddled when one recalls:
(a) that Stewart supported ReidL in the view that efficient
(or 'metaphysical') causes belong exclusively to the realm
of human or divine agency (cf. Reid, A.P., I, v, 40; IV,
ii, 270; IV, iii, 280-1) and that, on the other hand, in
natural philosophy "when we speak of one thing being the
cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are
constantly conjoined, so that when we see the one we may
expect the other" (A.P., II, 24: Stewart calls this type
of cause, learned "from experience alone", a physical
cause); (b) that Brown supposed Hume's instinctive
belief in "invariableness of antecedence" to be comparable
5
In Blackwood's Magazine, vol. xl, p. 122 ff.
g
Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics
(Edinburgh, 1859), II, 384.
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(after the linguistic disguise is removed) to Reid's
intuitive belief "of power", with the result that they
were actually of the same opinion (Inquiry, 2, 195-204);
(c) that Reid, like Hume and Brown, denies that there is
any observable 'power1 (or 'cause') "upon the application
of one body to another" (I .P., II, xviii, 273) or between
events "one succeeding another" (I.P., VI, v, 628;
A.P., IV, iii, 278), either in nature or in the "operations
of our minds", yet in opposition to them is able to derive
the "idea of power" from "our own voluntary actions"
(A.P., I, v, 40), which power everyone has "over his own
actions, and the determinations of his will" (I.P.,
VI, v, 630) and such things as "gravitation" and
"magnetism" possess in "latent" form if not "manifest" to
sense experience (I.P., II, xviii, 273-4; Brown comments
that this latency or "continued power" is a product of
the imagination, - Inquiry, 4, 130); and finally (d)
that Brown believes he has served the very cause of
necessity by demonstrating that the proposition, "Every
thing which begins to exist must have had a cause of its
existence" is dependent on and reducible to the pro¬
position, "Every change has had a cause of its existence,
in some circumstance, or combination of circumstances,
immediately prior" (Inquiry, 2, 117). This last 'tidying
up' and strengthening of Hume's doctrine can be witnessed
at great length in Brown's recurrent approaches to the
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notion of 'invariability'. The foregoing series of twists
and counter-twists will perhaps explain his persistence
and illustrate the kind of terrain his challenge had to
navigate.
By the time Brown's Inquiry had reached its third
edition, the apology for Hume in support of Leslie had
been relegated to a condensed and summary fourth chapter.
Although Henry Laurie has found this to be the only in-
7
structive portion, I have chosen to pay heed to those
aspects of the work which reveal the systematic probings
of a maturing mind: in particular, those which indicate
the general development of Brown's theory and analysis
of mental transformations. What emerges will, I hope,
be a view of a complex methodology rising almost sur¬
reptitiously to the foreground of Brown's attention.
7
Scottish Philosophy in its National Development
(Glasgow": James Maclehose and Sons, 1902), pp. 238-9.
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THE DOCTRINE MOST INVARIABLE
The analysis of cause and effect which Brown under¬
took in these early years became in time a means of self-
assertion. To the picture of a balanced interweaving of
methodological components, both linguistic and phenomenal,
one has to add the portrait of a mind which is tightly
strung, eager at first and yet uncertain. Through this
tension one is then able to decipher a resolution in
embryonic form, a growing determination in which Brown
begins to recognize his need to give greater play to the
phenomenal operation. At the outset, and still in its
rather loose phase, the interaction of these functions
appears somewhat as follows.
Among the array of possible objects which might
confront the observer at any one moment, observes Brown,
only certain "simple trains" lend themselves easily to
the description of "a series of antecedents and consequents"
(Inquiry, 3, 25; also 387 Note A). Such a series must,
of course, be regarded initially as a 'whole*. This is
the force of its being termed a 'simple' series, at least
within the framework of our previous reconstruction. Yet
it can also be designated a 'simple* series in another
sense; that is, as a "separate" (Ibid.) or distinct
grouping of "progressive" (Inquiry, 3, 148) elements.
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The point is a difficult one and must be rendered more
explicit.
In its immediate impact, the bombardment of our
senses can be said to constitute what Russell at one time
called the 'data of acquaintance'. Since it is pre-
abstractive, the question of order becomes secondary.
Hence the concurrence of several series will tend to make
the eventual task of selection both arbitrary and fal-
sifiable. When we reach the point of carving out the
delineations of each series, we are apt to confuse the
arrangement of parts and so either assign a cause where
none exists or assign the wrong cause to the alteration
of objects or events. Automobile accidents, for example,
frequently create this kind of dilemma, and it is not only
a matter of human reconstruction, but also of the unique
filtration of events through the senses of the persons
involved. Furthermore, if we take each series to be a
separate or isolatable 'episode* in the total sequence,
it will be proper to label one part the 'antecedent' and
another the 'consequent'•, yet this rule may not be
applicable to the entire collection of series. Suppose
that one were to pull first a match then a cigarette out
of one's pocket (Series A)? suppose, next, that as one
ignited the match and cigarette, some leaking gas was
touched off (Series B); again, with the ensuing explosion,
one was propelled backwards (Series C); and finally, on
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striking a window, one sent the glass flying (Series D).
Within the scope of Series A or Series D, it would make
sense to speak of a group of antecedents and consequents,
but not within the bounds of Series AD. The match being
drawn out of the pocket does not have as its consequent
the window being broken or the glass being dispersed in
all directions. Moreover, there might be an intervening
series (called Series Jupiter) to be accounted for which
would make it extremely difficult to depict the situation
readily in terms of either direct or indirect repercussions.
Brown has just such a pattern in mind when he argues,
against Hume, (a) that concurring trains may or may not
(the matter is one of contingency) stand in a causal re¬
lation to one another; and (b) that owing to the incessant
barrage of co-existing objects, one series may be absent
or ineffectual if present, while a second or later series
may take place through the intervention of a third and
simultaneous series (Inquiry, 387-8 Note A).
In the illustration I have used above, a case
might be imagined where a spark from a short-circuiting
light-switch made the striking or igniting of the match
an irrelevant or 'weak1 feature of the resulting scene.
H.P. Grice, in his examination of "The Causal Theory of
Perception", cites an instance of the same kind of 'causal'
ambiguity;
"it might be that it looked to me as if there were a
50.
certain sort cf pillar in a certain direction at a
certain distance, and there might actually be such a
pillar in that place; but unknown to me, there were a
mirror interposed between myself and the pillar, which
reflected a numerically different though similar pillar,
it would certainly be incorrect to say that I saw the
first pillar, and correct to say that I saw the second;
and it is extremely tempting to explain this linguistic
fact by saying that the first pillar was, and the second
was not, causally irrelevant to the way things looked to
me. "!
According to Brown, the language we employ when we speak
of 'antecedents' and 'consequents* is determined in the
strictest sense by the particular context in which the
'simples' of any one moment are assembled. Beyond these
separate series, there is only an interminable booming
and buzzing (a la William James) of co-existing objects
striking the observer. The shaping of these contexts,
however, is not the product of linguistic analysis but of
the phenomenal analysis which breaks down those simples
to discover their components. Brown cannot discuss the
language of causality without conceding the crucial im¬
portance of that other function.
Given that qualification, Brown's definitions of
cause and effect, power and susceptibility are seen to
proceed a posteriori from the nature of our experience
of phenomena, whether mental, physical, or a combination
H.P. Grice, 'The Causal Theory of Perception',
in Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Swartz
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co. Inc. 1965), p. 462.
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of both. (See Inquiry, 3, 90-1 & 93: that mind and matter
or their interaction are in this respect at least 'all
of a piece* is, of course, an essential departure from
the division insisted upon by Reid.) In naming the com¬
ponent factors of any observed change in objects or
events, Brown argues, we find that we must restrict
ourselves to the 'appearances' which particular objects
'present* to us within a certain (that is, separable)
context or series. The appearance, for example, of a
piece of metal before it is heated and the appearance of
the object in its liquid form after heat has been applied
to it are the sole elements which can be said to form a
causal sequence. (An "appearance", explains Brown, is
"only a short term for expressing certain changes
observed", - Inquiry, 3, 163 f.) That these phenomena
have been in the past and will continue to be in the
future the only appearances to manifest themselves under
similar circumstances is the very heart of our notion of
and belief in causality. Beyond the walls of this
belief, the names 'cause' and 'effect' or 'power' and
'susceptibility' are left to beg and flounder without
the 'referents' which alone can render them 'meaningful'.
"We give the name of cause to the object which we believe
to be the invariable antecedent of a particular change;
we give the name of effect, reciprocally to that invariable
consequent; and the relation itself, when considered
abstractly [italics mine], we denominate power in the
object that is the invariable antecedent - susceptibility





This referential capacity among the four terms which
comprises their meaning at the same time defines the range
of possible objects or events to which they may on any
occasion point. To use any of these terms is to recognize
the limitations - past, present and future - of our
experience.
It is important, moreover, to be extremely
cautious in one's handling of names, these or any other.
One can "invent" names and suppose that this inventiveness
describes the business of the philosophy of mind (Inquiry,
2, 25), but such delusions of grandeur only conceal an
"empire of prejudice" and a certain complacency.
"Astonishment", on the other hand, is the product of a
more industrious pursuit of "elemental parts" (Ibid.). As
one digs away at those simple but deceptive wholes, old
"hypotheses", "analogies", and "relations of thought" are
exhumed in the face of new discoveries (Inquiry, 2, 23).
Only in this way, Brown contends, does one lay a proper
foundation.
In a similar vein, one can invent "qualities" of
a body and suppose that these are more than simply the
names we use to express definite "effects" known to or
observed by us (Inquiry, 3, 163-4). On being acquainted
with the colour, shape or hardness of a ball, we perhaps
feel entitled to say that we know also that among its
other qualities it possesses the 'susceptibility' of
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falling if previously dropped from our hand. But unless
this tendency to fall has been the observed effect of
the ball being dropped from our hand, we cannot "predict
with certainty" the appearance of the "fall" from the
mere appearance on one occasion of the "dropping" (Inquiry,
3, 170) nor, if this condition is satisfied, we can assume
that the susceptibility in question is anything more than
a "name" which we assign to the manifest consequent
(Inquiry, 3, 180). To attribute susceptibility to the
ball or power to the hand which makes it drop is to
furnish a proposed 'explanation' for the train of events,
where none exists.
"We must not think that words of our own invention,
convenient as they may be for expressing what we believe
[but cannot infer], are at all explanatory of the belief,
which they merely designate. ... We do not believe
that a particular sensation will arise in us, because we
have termed a certain object red; but we term the object
red, because we believe, that, on its presence in light,
a particular sensation will arise in us. . . . It is the
rise of these very feelings . . . which the names of the
sensible qualities themselves were invented by us to
denote. They indicate our belief of the recurrence of
the sensations, on every recurrence of the same external
circumstances; but they only indicate the belief without
explaining it." (Inquiry, 3, 180-1)
Hence the note of caution: there is only one person
worse than a namedropper and he is the counterfeiter.
To this slurring of names one must add the
abominable practice of raising metaphysical smoke¬
screens. Again, it is the misuse and over-extension of
language which breeds false inference and supposition.
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This noxious habit begins when we extend to "whole classes
of phenomena" what is known to be true only of "particular
phenomena comprehended in them" (Inquiry, 3, 244). In
the analytic search for elemental parts, of course, we
strive to break beneath the surface of immediate sensible
wholes. But the discovery of "elementary changes of things",
when made, can lead us to speculate that "there may be
affections of this kind [italics mine], too minute to be
distinguishable by us, yet similar to the impulses, and
re-actions and compositions and balancings of forces, in
the masses which we are capable of perceiving" (Inquiry,
3, 242). It is but a short step to the ready inference
that, deeper yet, there must be some internal mechanism
which, if uncovered by "a finer knowledge", would make
possible the certain anticipation or prediction of future
events. As I noted earlier, Brown contributes to the
charade a bemused insight into the contradictory statements
of the opposing claimants that there are "influences
concerned, which are at once hidden from our view, and
yet of a kind which require no observation to reveal
them to us" (Inquiry, 3, 243). Putting this another way,
we might say that the evidence from a fraction of the
class of phenomena has been utilized to make a generalisation
concerning the whole, with the additional anchor of a
decisive 'mechanism' at the end. Brown is more than
wary about both the function of general terms and this
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inroad of metaphysical "obscurity". But has he, in the
course of his objections to the above process, applied a
brake to the very analytic regression towards 'elemental
parts1?
Briefly stated, Brown's attack on the generalisations
of language raises the charge that the admittedly useful
'conciseness' of generalisations is too often taken for
granted and carelessly employed to obscure the very com¬
plexity of phenomena which it was intended to refine. If
errors continue to abound in science, the explanation
for this lies in a perpetual disregard for the "innumerable
phenomena" which ought to make it impossible - assuming
one has any intellectual integrity, - to pass lightly
from "the most striking phenomena, to other striking
phenomena" (Inquiry, 2, 137 ff ftn.). Brown shows himself
here to be particularly sensitive to those subtle shadings
which can alter the complexion of our apprehension of
phenomena. When Reid objected that, under Hume's theory,
'day' and 'night' would have to be said mutually to
'cause' one another since they uniformly succeed each
other (I.P., VI, vi, 660), he failed to obtain the depth
of illumination open to him. Alert to the opportunity
Brown explores, with the deft hand of a word-artist, the
multifarious character of these two terms, loosening with
every stroke any connection which might bind them more
directly together. (Inquiry, 1, 22ff;2, 137 ff ftn.; 3,
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300-4) .
"It should be remembered, that day and night are not words
which devote two particular phenomena, but are words
invented by us to express long series of phenomena. What
various appearances of Nature, from the freshness of the
first morning beam, to the last soft tint that fades into
the twilight of the evening sky, changing with the progress
of the Seasons, and dependent on the accidents of temperature,
and vapour, and wind, are included in every day! These
are not one, because the word which expresses them is one;
and it is the believed relation of physical events, not
the arbitrary combinations of language, which Mr. HUME
professes to explain. ... If we consider [those terms]
philosophically, they are the series of positions in
relation to the sun, at which the earth arrives, in the
course of its diurnal revolution; and, in this view, there
is surely no one who doubts that the motion of the earth,
immediately before sunrise, is the cause of the subsequent
position which renders that glorious luminary visible to
us."
(Inquiry, 3, 301-2)
Analysis, it seems, proceeds as much on the basis of
poetical fervour as it does by means of philosophical dis¬
tinction.
Overlooking the clumsiness of less acute analysts,
however, Brown affirms against the 'heresy' of the
nominalists (Inquiry, 2, 152 ftn.) that general ideas do
exist as "affections of mind existing independently of
the words which express them" (Inquiry, 2, 153 ftn.) and
serve as an "artificial memory, suggesting to us by
association the phenomena comprehended in them" (Inquiry,
2, 139 ftn.; italics mine). The thought of *triangleness',
for example, suggests to us any number of particular
triangles we may have perceived (and about each of which,
as particulars, we can have no general idea) without at
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the same time suggesting that we can formulate a general
proposition regarding all triangles (cf. Reid, I.P., VI,
i, 534-5). More than simply a convenient linguistic short¬
hand, general ideas express and reflect the "relations"
implicit in them (Inquiry, 2, 153 ftn.). Such relations
as may be said to be implicit in the idea of triangleness -
the number of sides, the sum of the angles, and so on, -
play a crucial role in distinguishing triangles from
other geometrical figures: "unless we admit the existence
of general ideas, an equilateral triangle differs as
much from a scalene . . . triangle, as from a square"
(ibid.). Furthermore, and here perhaps Brown reveals
his trump card, our apprehension of these relations de¬
pends on our belief in the uniform character of phenomena.
When we think of the 'whiteness' of snow, the 'heaviness'
of iron, or the 'ductility' of gold, we have in mind not
only "past sensations" in which particular objects have
been present to us in their observed effects, but also
the "future qualities" which we believe will always be
manifest to us with respect to snow, iron, or gold
(Inquiry, 1, 12-13). The apprehension of a particular
piece of iron as heavy does not itself, of course, en¬
gender the "idea of heaviness", yet neither is anything
expressed in the manifestation which would limit the idea
to one phenomenon (Inquiry, 2, 153 ftn.). Curious as
his course might seem at this stage, if Brown is to
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preserve the existence of general ideas with any sort of
logical justification he must steer a delicate course
between the nominalist pitfall into particularity and
the realist perception of an "external essence of general
images" (Inquiry, 2, 152 ftn.). If he succeeds at all,
the reason may be that he endeavours to tie general ideas
(a) initially to a belief in uniformity, (b) with equal
force to the function of suggestiveness, and (c) only
less so to a real presence as mental affections. From
this standpoint, general ideas would appear to be both
economical and practical while at the same time being
intuitively felt and hence empirically grounded.
We have noted that general terms, such as 'heaviness*
or 'sweetness' are inextricably bound to a belief in
uniformity. Taking the propositions 'Iron is heavy' or
'Sugar is sweet' we mean to assert, suggests Brown, that
iron "will, tomorrow and for ever" be heavy, and sugar
sweet (Inquiry, 1, 12-13). In an almost Spinozistic way,
this sheer 'power to be' some characteristic or another,
in this case heavy or sweet, defines the respects in which
anything can meaningfully be affirmed about a quality or
property of an object. We may say, for example, that 'th
loadstone is magnetic' (where this is intended in the
universal sense of 'All loadstones are magnetic'), and
suppose that its being magnetic is the reason or
explanation for the attraction of iron to it (Inquiry, 3,
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182). And saying this, we may further suppose that we
have asserted something special or significant about a
certain property of iron. But the very fact that we
think there is something significant in our assertion
gives wind to the suspicion that we are fishing about
with 'pointers" to detect in the loadstone a sur¬
reptitiously efficient or immediate cause for the
subsequent attraction of iron to it. Explanations of
this sort - and to Brown, of course, they are not ex¬
planations at all - are shabby excuses for metaphysical
wool-gathering. What does explain the attraction of iron
to loadstone is the "uniform and invariable antecedence"
of the latter to the appearance of the former. Reason
does not demonstrate this; belief attests to it. Brown
concludes, therefore, that 'magnetism' is only a name
"for our belief of the continuance of [the iron's]
tendency to approach a loadstone" (Ibid.). What is true
of 'magnetism' in one context is said to be true of
"heaviness' or 'sweetness' in another.
The intent of Brown's analysis of such predicates
as 'magnetic', 'heavy', and 'sweet' is to reveal their
durability for subsequent use in empirical statements.
In his paper "A Query on Confirmation", Nelson Goodman
has described predicates of this sort as "projectible",
that is to say, as capable of being projected from con¬
firmed instances in the past to future cases. Further
expounding this view, Henry E. Kyburg Jr. writes:
"He [Goodman] takes projectibility to be an empirical
property of the predicates ... so that we can only have
evidence that a predicate is projectible: we take 'green®
to be projectible, because we have projected it successfully
in the past, and that provides evidence that it is
generally projectible. But we might be wrong, though
rational."*
Brown's choice of the word 'invariable' is probably
unfortunate for he undoubtedly has in mind this 'projectible'
feature of his own examples. Yet it is perhaps significant
that he elects a path more akin to deductive certainty,
in so far as the function of belief in his philosophy is
to give force both to the linguistic operations of naming
and describing and to the contingency of all statements
of matter of fact. He is, I think, in this respect torn
between Humean scepticism and some form of rationalism.
As Kyburg suggests, it may be "rational" to expect the
loadstone to be 'magnetic' at t in the future, although
on the basis of evidence at the time quite "wrong" to
say so.
The above delineations might, however, fall short
of certain expectations. To some it might appear that
science has been deprived of its excursions into the
dense jungles of minute observation. Conceptual revision
2
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is seemingly a very distant relative of the search for
(real or actual) causes which is said to typify more
immediate experimentation. But that this opinion is
misguided (if temptingly natural) and that Brown was aware
of its obfuscation (if only partially so) can perhaps be
shown in either one of two ways.
In the first place, whatever it is, explanation is
not something which one might snare in an experimental
trap. Discovering an additional item 'somewhere' is not
the same sort of thing as coming across an explanation,
although it might provide a basis for devising an ex¬
planatory scheme. Confronted by a piece of evidence we
could remark, 'There, that's the explanation*. Our
bewilderment over certain marks on the contents of a
plate and the loss of portions of it might be relieved
by our inadvertently stumbling on a mouse under the coal-
box in the corner. But the nose and feet indentations
are not to be accounted for because the mouse is a mouse.
As Brown affirms in another context, we have not assigned
a "reason" when we say "that grass is green, because it
is green" (Inquiry, 3, 181). To argue that grass is
green because we have repeatedly observed it to be so is
merely to pu~fc forward a generalisation as a straw-man
substitute for the genuine article. A recent philosopher
of science, D. W. Theobald, has given strength to Brown's
insight: "laws and generalisations", he asserts, "do not
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by themselves explain since they are merely the summary
3
reports of what has been observed." Brown seems to
regard the philosophical safari in pursuit of 'power
sources' as a further case in point. Some individuals
might be lured into thinking that as long as there remains
even a remote chance of uncovering these hitherto un¬
detected centres, we must continue to allow that the
real causes of observed events lie somewhere in such
regions. The assumption underlying this notion, of course,
is that with the discovery of such sources we will be
able to provide 'explanations' for what happens in the uni¬
verse around us. But in so thinking, we are right back
in the mouse trap. What these individuals seem to miss
is the recognition that observations are innocuous little
items unless they are understood within some sort of
framework. And understanding them is part and parcel of
putting together convincing explanations. "Only theories
. . . explain in the sense of enabling us to completely
4
understand our observations."
But again that feeling of dissatisfaction creeps
over us. Surely the hunters on the philosophical safari,
3
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 76; italicsmine.
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Ibid. I will have occasion to return to this
subject later.
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someone might object, are dealing wholesale in theory; if,
that is, we understand by 'theory® simply a reflective
way of seeing (from the Greek theorein, to see) events
around us. Allowing that a satisfactory explanation is,
among other things, a theoretical construct which not
only makes certain 'ontological claims' but also anchors
these in such a manner as to make intelligible some
phenomena,^ we must presumably permit the hunters to
have their 'power sources1 and their 'reasons' too. The
question of whether or not their explanation, so-called,
is a satisfactory one thus becomes the sole ground of
dispute. Brown cannot deny them this victory, merely a
share in the spoils.
If the objector is correct, Brown is faced with a
much more difficult task. On the other hand, should he
succeed he would further refine the question at issue.
His answer has already been foreshadowed and would seem
to take the following form. (a) A theoretical construct
which makes 'ontological claims' is not thereby permitted
to make contradictory claims; for example that the
'existents are unobserved yet somehow (from beneath the
sybil's stool) revealed to us (Inquiry, 3, 243). (b)
Within the context of the successive phenomena passing
5Ibid., p. 77.
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before us, such 'powers' if they existed at all would
simply he one more item in the parade (Inquiry, 1, 8-9;
Inquiry, 2, 35-6; Inquiry, 3, 92). (c) Given this stipulation,
•powers' - if one must use that term (Inquiry, 3, 201-2), -
are better explained by what is actually known about the
performances of objects or events. (d) What is known, of
course, is that phenomena tend to be grouped in (line
themselves up according to) different series, about which
it is meaningful to say that some items are 'antecedents'
and others 'consequents'. (e) It is meaningful to say
this if we regard, say, an 'antecedent' in the strictest
sense (hence in the only reliable one) as that which
precedes a 'consequent' not merely on one occasion but
continually (Inquiry, 2, 46). (f) Since continuity
implies an indefinite stretch into the future, we must
affirm that specific 'antecedents' are at once uniform -
this is attested to by past observations, - and invariable, -
this we owe to an intuitive belief (Inquiry, 3, 175).
(g) The term 'power' has no other signification. As
though to provide invincible proof for this point, Brown
argues skillfully that both Hume, with his admission of a
determinative 'irresistible instinct' and Reid, with his
belief in 'active power', have (perhaps unwittingly)
agreed with Brown that power means (refers to) nothing
but "the belief on invariablences of antecedence"
(Inquiry, 2, 195-6). (h) Thus the explanation of, let
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us say, the magnetism of the loadstone is based on our
belief in the invariability of its performance. This
invariability, moreover, can neither be perceived nor
inferred (Inquiry, 2, 203-4). (i) An explanation of this
kind is more satisfactory in so far as it meets more
fully the exigencies of the situation; that is, in so
far as it makes more intelligible the passing array of
phenomena within the limits of what can be known and
said about them. ("It is no small part of science [Brown
remarks] to be well acquainted with its boundaries of
inquiry." Inquiry, 2, 35). Finally (j) in the last
analysis, we are forced to conclude that "it is our faith
itself which, in a great measure, makes the surrounding
objects what they truly are to us, by rendering permanent,
in our voluntary use of them, what otherwise might have
seemed to pass away in the moment in which we had chanced
to be under their influence" (Inquiry, 3, 11). Brown's
conclusion should not come as a surprise: the impact of
such 'faith* on our total apprehension of the world around
us has been slowly gathering momentum.
In the second place, an explanation serves in part
to convey what is already understood by us into virgin
territory, as it were, into territory which has not yet
been subjected to conceptual delineation. Brown re¬
peatedly warns us against the hazards of too many long
analogous journeys into night. Reaching out with one
66.
metaphorical leg, he assures us, is a reasonably safe
undertaking: "if the metaphor be even rhetorically just,
[it] must always express, at least one resemblance"
(Inquiry, 3, 120-1). With respect to the terms 'bond1
or 'connection', which we rather glibly apply to causal
situations, the analogy hangs on certain identifiable
factors of resemblance: their contiguity in space and
time or their constant conjunction. (Hume was un¬
doubtedly the pioneer analyst in this area.) Given such
resemblances we feel strongly that we are entitled to
subsume A and B under one roof. The resemblance between
'being under one roof' and 'being analogous' can be said
to carry the same force.
When we draw an analogy, part of what we are doing
is constructing an imaginative association which somehow
overrules the legitimate uniqueness - claims of the parties
involved. Any family living together, whether it be a
logical or a sociological one, possesses this vital feature
of complementary resistances. As a rule, families of
either sort do not thrive on total assimilation and sub¬
mission. As the Chinese would say, yin and yang are
contained as tear-drop on inverted tear-drop within one
circle. A resemblance, however, need not be the product
of our depicting to ourselves or to others something like
'being under one roof' or 'conjoined in a circle'. Our
propensity for imagining only makes it seem so. Getting
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one's nind around the traditional distinction between the
analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality
provides a simple test-case in this regard. On a purely
theoretical level, it is possible to separate one form of
analogy from another: that is, we can delimit the establish¬
ment of a relationship on the basis of actual (or formal)
and virtual (or derivative) predicates from the positing
of a relationship between formal predicates in proportion
to the natures of the analogates.^ Here, the imaginative
bows to the intellectual pursuit of understanding. But
with whatever type of expression one might choose to
describe or give expression to an analogy, the effect
would be to bring together something which one has
previously witnessed and something which one is never
likely to witness (in any ordinary sense of that word),
namely an analogy. Construed in this way, as having a
unity in diversity, the analogy of the 'bond' or even
that of the 'analogy' itself becomes a useful method of
pushing back the frontiers of thought.
But there are occasions when we tend to reach too
far with too much.
"Other circumstances are soon added, and gradually ex¬
tended, which., though true of the object from which the
^cf. F. Ferrd, Language, Logic, and God (London:
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1962), pp. 67-77.
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the figure was taken, may not be true of the object, to
which, on account perhaps of that single resemblance, it
was originally applied."
(Ibid,)
Returning to the original illustration, we find that the
analogy has been overloaded with certain unidentified
factors, which afford little or no resemblance to the
terms "bond' or 'connection*. On the basis of these
factors, we do not feel that the bond has been fastened,
but rather that the whole analogy has been loosened and
rendered clumsy in its step. Brown rightly suspects at
this point that some unannounced metaphysical intermediary
has been endeavouring to slip its way into the analogical
fold. In fact, of course, the whole enterprise is
doomed to collapse:
"it will be found that the metaphor does not really
express the existence of any thing interposed since the
very supposition of any such link would only transfer an
imaginary difficulty from one observed object to another
object unobserved and leave, between the new hypothetical
antecedent and its consequent, an invariableness of
sequence as inexplicable as before."
(Inquiry, 3, 119; italics mine)
So much then for bad analogies.
In striking out against pseudo-explanations from
this angle, Brown exposes once again the troublesome
supposition that if a 'thing interposed' can be found,
it will constitute the explanation. He has, moreover,
centred our attention on the ways in which analogies
function or fail to function, thus preparing the ground
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for his empiricist insistence on analogical delineation
from a position of strength. The particular weakness of
the opposing argument is that if terms such as 'bond' or
8power' are to be used analogically to explain causal
sequences, they must be employed according to the rules
whereby all analogies may be said to operate, and this
clearly has not been done. A factor has been inserted
which, almost paradoxically, does not belong. Indeed,
the paradox is a subtle one.
The thing interposed does belong in the sense that
some people liken causal sequences to the thrust of an
inner generative power, while others think of them in
terms of connective fasteners. Analogies, as we have
seen, do tend to operate in this way: they lure the
unknown in out of the cold and offer it sustenance in
familiar surroundings. To this extent we seem to be in
the throws of a proper analogy. The question then
arises, however: are these surroundings truly 'familiar'?
What is it that we know about 'inner generative powers'
or 'connective fasteners' which would make us want to
bring them under the same roof with causal sequences? If
there is any point at which Brown collides headlong into
Cartesian Occasionalists, Physicalists, Berkeleian spiritualists,
and Reidian analysts, this is surely the moment. Resisting
the prevalent hypotheses (a) that the universe might be
'hooked up' in such a way as to produce causal efficiency,
whether coincidentally or by divine Agency, or (b) that it
might 'hinge on' the presence of efficient or 'last minute'
devices, Brown affirms that these cannot be the bases for
analogical explanation (Inquiry, 2, 104 ff; 3,87ff). They
do not belong for two very simple reasons: (a) the things
interposed, by whatever name one prefers to call them,
are not items within our experiential framework (that they
could be is a consideration waived by the second point);
and (b) even if there were things interposed, they would
merely be new links in the sequential trains which we
have adequately delineated by the concepts 'antecedents'
and 'consequents'. Since we find ourselves obligated to
explain causal sequences by analogy, it is only fitting
that we should select the most precise means. If some
people prefer to cling to bad analogies, then "invariable-
ness of sequence [will remain] as inexplicable as ever"
(Ibid.). Brown himself, of course, might well be accused
here cf clinging to bad reductivism. Of this his critics
were convinced and adamantly so.
I have adhered rather closely throughout this second
argument to a position carefully enunciated by W.K.
Clifford in his essay entitled the 'Aims and Instruments
7
of Scientific Thought'. At least in principle, he and
7
Lectures and Essays (Macmillan & Co., 1879) pp. 124-
57.
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Brown seem to agree on the nature and purpose of analogical
explanation. There are three basic tenets to their
position: (a) that in explaining any phenomenon, one is
attempting to describe the unknown in terms of or as
8
being 'made up of' what is already known or understood;
(b) that this process is analytical in so far as one is
concerned to break down the unknown or intractable into
9
"simpler constituents which are already familiar to us";
and (c) that the particular way in which one chooses to
use the word 'cause' will depend on one's attainment of a
level of satisfaction with regard to the objects or events
under surveillance. In this last connection Clifford's
exposition bears a striking resemblance to many accounts
of this sort in Brown's Inquiry:
"When you have made out any sequence of events to your
entire satisfaction, so that you know all about it, the
laws involved being so familiar that you seem to see how
the beginning must have been followed by the end, then
you apply that as a simile to all other events whatever,
and your idea of cause is determined by it."10
I would not wish to leave the impression, however, that
Clifford and Brown are at one, or close to being so, in





to accept singular or all-encompassing solutions, and he
does not attempt to fix a universal criterion for causality.
His is very much a mixed attitude of cautious pragmatism
and quiet determination. Brown is sensitive to the
vicissitudes of life and yet is inclined to be more
spirited and single-minded (I would not go so far as to
say dogmatic) in his views. In many ways, he follows
Hume in being disposed to proceed on the basis of a
rigorous methodology of what I should call 'prototypal
reference' (Inquiry, 2, 118 ff ; also 3, 267 ff) . Time and
again, we are called upon to submit our ideas to the test
of certain instinctive 'beliefs' which, when all is
revealed, make the world what it is for us.
One final consideration remains: namely, the
question of prediction. The terms 'explanation; and
'prediction' are frequently taken to be synonymous, or
at least interdependent. It is said that if we can uncover
a satisfactory explanation for a particular set of events,
then that set becomes 'predictible'. There are a number
of underlying assumptions here which stand in need of
reappraisal.
Firstly, it is not clear whether the inference to
be drawn from the achievement of a satisfactory explanation
to our ability to predict the movements of a certain set
of events is a deductive or an inductive one. If it is
j I
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the former, the assumption would be that the course of
these events (Es) can be demonstrated a priori and thereby
must have the force or necessity of a theorem in geometry
or a mathematical equation. The mathematical orientation
of such thinkers is only too obvious (cf. Inquiry, 2,
82 ff; also 3, 184 ff) . Brown like Hume is just as certain
(now on the strength of conviction) that natural phenomena
cannot be dealt with in this fashion.
"If there be nothing to be measured, there is no opportunity
for mathematical reasoning; and if there be something to
be measured, it is not to the science of measurement that
we owe our knowledge of it, but to some other source."
(Inquiry, 3, 186)
If the inference is of the latter kind, the assumption
would be either that inductive inferences are of the
same logical type as deductive ones -- which is to say that
they could be reduced to the latter - or that inductive
inferences have the sort of status which would enable
someone to make an accurate prediction on the basis of
particular pieces of evidence. It is difficult to see
how either alternative could be deemed acceptable. The
second has distinct possibilities, assuming again that
the evidence is 'strong' enough to yield an 'informative8
conclusion and prediction;^ yet whatever its merits
in its own right, it plays a highly suspect role as a
^See Theobald, op. cit., p. 66.
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bridge between explanation and prediction. Explanations
12
differ widely in character and structure; they are
theoretical constructs, not observable phenomena; a
decision regarding their very satisfactoriness might be made
on the basis of the predictive factor itself; and supposing
they are satisfactory, we may or may not have occasion
to think of them in relation to predictions. What sort
of claim would it be, then, which would make us reason
that if we have an explanation for Es we can predict Es?
Secondly, perhaps the argument does not rest on an
inferential assumption after all. Perhaps what is as¬
sumed is that when we say 'x explains Es' we are at the
same time affirming 'x predicts Es'; that is, that the
13
words 'explain' or 'predict' can be used interchangably.
But if this is the case how is it that when we say 'Tom
will beat her again tomorrow when she gets home' we are
predicting the occurrence of the beating but not answering
12Ibid., p. 103.
13
Carl Hempel is today responsible for fathering
the thesis that explanations and predictions are essentially
synonymous. Regarded in the past an event may yield an
explanation, while projected into the future the same
event will yield a prediction. Hence the synonymity is
conditioned only by temporal considerations. For an
elaboration of this thesis, see Henry E. Kyburg Jr., op.
cit., pp. 3-4 and 234-5.
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everyone's anxious but silent appeals for an explanation?
Ort as I suggested above, why is it that when we are
sometimes in possession of an explanation - 'His stomach
was bothering him throughout the concert', - we would
never think to tie this to a prediction about the course
of events on the next occasion ('Suppose he has a stomach¬
ache next week; will he wring his hands like that again?')?
Brown might interject at this point that the linguistic
assumption of synonymity rests on still another assumption,
which has something to do with the way some people regard
the world.
Thirdly, then, the assertion fusing together
explanations and predictions may depend on an assumption
of universal 'regularity'. Rejecting the inferential
assumption, and waiving a detailed consideration of the
linguistic one, Brown lights on this third possibility
as being perhaps the most instructive. This is not to
say that he concurs fully with its viewpoint, but rather
that he sees its potential as an instrument for clarifying
what we can affirm about causal sequences. What must be
denied at the outset is the variation on this assumption
which asserts that given a new set of circumstances (CS2)
for Es, we are able to predict Es with the same 'certainty'
with which we predicted Es in Cs^. On the one hand, the
alleged certainty is ill-founded resting as it does,
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Brown suspects, on those misleading inductive and
deductive orientations.
"There is no phenomenon whatever, of which the prediction
is not contingent, even after innumerable instances of
it, in past sequences, have been observed by us: and,
before it has been observed by us at all, the uncertainty
cannot in any instance be less, but must, on the con¬
trary , be much greater."
(Inquiry, 3, 239)
On the other hand, it takes for granted that Es in CS2
would remain unaltered:
"the reasoning proceeds on an assumption which is
contradicted by our general physical knowledge, the
assumption that bodies, in new circumstances of combination
always retain their former tendencies, and have no
additional phenomenon that results from their joint
action."
(Inquiry, 3, 239-40; also 2,
88-89)
Yet although we may want to attest to the powerlessness
of reason and observation to penetrate the inscrutable
face of Nature, we want at the same time to concede that
it is on the basis of observation alone that we are able
to judge of "the particular case" (Es in CS2) at hand
14
(Inquiry, 3, 236). While it might appear that Brown
14
Dugald Stewart takes a similar •contextualist* ap¬
proach, allowing that variations in circumstances will tend
to erase whatever 'certainty' past conditions have built up
under the guise of anticipation. One noticeable amendment
to Brown's theory appears in the form of a "subject" which,
according to Stewart, stands (logically) between cause and
effect, and on which the former 'operates'. Specifically,
then, whenever the subject finds itself in different cir¬
cumstances, the same cause working on it will produce an
effect not previously encountered or accounted for. What¬
ever happens, "our ignorance concerning the state of the
subject" defeats predictive certainty. Stewart's model is
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is yielding ground, he is in fact only trying to protect
what he deems to be valuable in the empiricist enterprise;
namely, the placing of strict limits on what can actually
be said about observed phenomena. But more than this, he
is returning to his view of the universe as a vast system
of changes to enhance his own position on uniformity.
The question of power has already resolved itself
into the following form.
"Instead of searching for an Impression, we should first
have considered whether it be necessary to seek for one.
It matters little, whether, in some technical arrange¬
ment, we are to give the name of an Impression or the
name of an Idea, to our feeling of power: the great
question is, whether we have such a feeling, and in what
circumstances it arises."
(Inquiry, 3, 272-3)
Casting our minds back over the phenomena presented to
us, we immediately detect the presence of a multitude of
sequential patterns. Some of these are too "loose and
casual" to evoke any feeling of regularity in their
appearance (Inquiry, 3 , 276); this type must be carefully
segregated from the rest. (Brown accuses Reid of having
failed to perceive the need for such a separation (Inquiry,
the human patient to whom, amidst the fluctuations of his
disease, the same medicines are administered, sometimes for
better, sometimes for worse. For Brown, there is no
'subject' as such, but rather the appearance of new physical
groupings against which our expectations are powerless.
In both cases, however, the key-note is caution with
change. See A.P., I, Appendix, 352-3 ftn.
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2, 196 ff). Others afford every indication that their
appearance is uniformly ordered. Beyond this customary
observation of successions of phenomena, however,
memory is incapable of supplying us with further leads.
Custom is the tool for enabling us to sort carefully
through the mixed debris of sequential patterns for the
repeated occurrence of antecedents and consequents. It
serves no other end. The "feeling* of power owes its
emergence to another source.
While experience teaches us to be cautious in
assigning or determining particular causes for any
phenomenon, it does not relate "to the belief of
causation of some sort" (Inquiry, 3, 285). We assume
that given Es in Cs^ certain factors will invariably
appear as 1 antecedents * and 1 consequents'; we assume
further that given Es in Cs2» certain other factors are
likely to take their places as 'causes' and 'effects'
(we might call this an 'open-ended' assumption). If we
now take Es in Cs^ and Es in CS2 as established pre¬
cedents, we have no doubt that on every future occasion
when these appear, the factors concerned will be ordered
in the same patterns. This belief in the invariability
of antecedence and consequence is all that can be meant
by the term 'causation' (Inquiry, 1, 11 ftn.), and if
we isolate the word 'invariability' we have the only
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possible source for our feeling of power. Thus,
"uniform antecedence, which has reference to the past
only, does rot imply the idea of power; but uniform and
invariable antecedence, which has reference not merely
to the past, but to every future case, is the most exact
definition which can be given of power."
(Ibid.)
The foundation for our apprehension of causal sequences
is nothing short of an irresistible belief in their past
and continued appearance.
It might be objected that Brown has aimed at too
high or theoretical a level of exactitude with respect to
the future occurrence of Es in Cs . I think that this
n
objection is well placed. The detection of uniformity
in past sequences is at most a tentative one; to be
'exact' in the strictest sense, it would have to accord
with the results of an infinite number of memory 'testings'.
Projected on to future sequences, this same uniformity or
(as Brown prefers to call it now) 'invariability' retains
and even magnifies that very tentativeness. But perhaps
this line of argument merely takes exception to the
exuberance of Brown's language ("to every future case")
as it concerns our belief in the uniformity of certain
types of sequential patterns. In spirit at least,
Brown's remarks agree with those of the scientist who
takes it upon himself to think beyond past and present
circumstances into the darkness of new possibilities.
Without the assumption of uniform antecedence and con-
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sequence he would be wallowing in fanciful speculation.
As Clifford affirms: "The aim of scientific thought is
to apply past experience to new circumstances; the in¬
strument is an observed uniformity in the course of
15
events." We must now turn to this importunate element
which has already left its mark on the development of
Brown's analysis of the idea of power. Without it, his
efforts would themselves have to be numbered among those
'loose and casual' sequences.
15
Clifford, op. cit., pp. 131 and 155.
3
SOMETHING IRRESISTIBLE
In the previous chapter, we watched Brown steer
the idea of Power away from the tempting possibilities of
a -priori reasoning and inductive inference. Having
denied to each the power of penetration into the unknown,
Brown must now substantiate his own claim and bring into
the spotlight his own irresistible candidate. He ac¬
complishes this feat in two ways: first, by taxing to
the full the part played by assumption in the apprehension
and ordering of our experience; and secondly, by re¬
constructing Hume's theory to show how it erroneously
resolved its own scepticism. From this point, it is but
a short step to an impassable metaphysical presupposition.
If our customary recollection of past sequences
yields only a tentative view of uniformity, it becomes
necessary to supply some kind of special underpinning to
our conception of sequential patterns under all temporal
conditions. The very contingency of the array of passing
phenomena makes this task particularly difficult. Not
only is it the case that not all sequential series lend
themselves to conceptual delineation into 'antecedents'
and 'consequents', but it is also true that the assort¬
ment itself often distracts us from the business of
- 81 -
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philosophizing about our experience. Hume,, asserts
Brown, wrongly reduced all associations or sequential
series to the order of causes and effects, implying that
in every instance whatever, some factor would "carry the
mind" to the conception of its "co-relative" (Inquiry,
1, 31). Such is the inevitable downfall, in his estimation,
of anyone who places too great an emphasis on the operations
of the transitional imagination; such too are the short¬
comings of a person who is insensitive to the subtle
shadings of the inner world. Brown is as likely to
employ this sort of argumentation as he is to give vent
to the inward drift of the poet?
"What innumerable images arise every hour in the most
unpoetic fancy? and how small a part of life is composed
of the actual impressions of external objects 1 Resemblances,
contiguities, and a thousand circumstances, which cannot
be included in any formal class of associations, call us
perpetually away to the world within. But, while we
wander in that world, we are not always philosophizing,
and fixing every rising idea, as the effect of a pre¬
ceding one."
(Inquiry, 1, 35)
Be that as it may -- and Brown has put his finger on
Humean "sore-spot5, - the limitations of memory, association,
and perception, in addition to the avowed phenomenal flux,
create a need for some "extraordinary" intervention.
The intervention comes, in fact, in the most
ordinary fashion. Since we can neither reason nor infer
that the future will invariably 'resemble' the past, we
must assume that this is so (Inquiry, 1, 35). It is not
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for us to ask why we should assume such resemblance.
The question itself would imply a further level of con¬
firmation, and because all other routes have been closed
by the assumption, it would have nowhere to go. We can,
however, ask for a demonstration of force, as this in
itself will bolster morale. That morale should be low
is, of course, somewhat ironic. According to Brown, the
assumption of invariability is fixed on "the firmest
possible foundation" (Inquiry, 1, 40). To feel uneasy on
this foundation is to doubt the instinctive realities of
human nature. Had Hume been a genuine sceptic, he would
have denied "the reality of the instinct" (Ibid.), but
this of course he was unable to do. In demanding a show
of strength, therefore, we can only be asking for some
indication of the ramifications of our resting the case
for invariability in the lap of belief. These ramifications
Brown is more than willing to explore.
In the first place, by affirming this belief we
save ourselves a great deal of time and frustration.
Hume had argued that our belief in the resemblance of
past and future sequences was based on transitive recall
and habitual expectation. When A appears for the nth + 1
or 2 time, we pass over in our minds from the idea of A
to the idea of its usual attendant B (the memory factor
of transition), and fully expect B to make its appearance
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(the habitual element). To say that we believe A and B
to be causally connected is simply to affirm that we have
a customary expectation of their co-appearance in a
particular sequential pattern (Treatise, I, iii, 14).
Whatever psychological force this feeling of 'of-course-
ness' may have (the term is that of H.H. Price), it is
not wholly in accord with the conditions of what I should
call phenomenal impact.
"Various objects at the same moment affect us, and form
an aggregate, which is, probably, at no other period
exactly the same. If, therefore, the return of antecedents
and consequents, exactly similar, were necessary, before
any belief could arise, it never would arise."
(Inquiry, 1, 18)
Brown's objection here has some merit: we have seen that
memory is unable to produce anything more than the notion
of uniformity with regard to past sequences; the factor
of expectation implies a resemblance between past and
future sequences, and so transitive recall is of no help
to us. In order to overcome the temporal impasse, and to
eliminate the frustrations of sheer contingency, we have
the option of bridging the gap between past and future
sequences by an appeal to an immediate belief. And so,
"it is not from the experience of custom, that we form
our conclusion; for all, which that experience tells us,
is not that A is the cause of X, which is the real
phenomenon considered, but merely that B and C, which co¬
exist with A, are not the cause of X, but are foreign
and superfluous circumstances, since they have been often
observed before, without the succession of X."
(Inquiry, 2, 125-6)
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To put this another way* we can affirm that unless our
observation of certain types of sequential patterns is
originally accompanied by the belief in the invariability
of antecedence and consequence, these patterns will never
serve as models for causal expectation in the future.
Brown is clearly in rough straits and he knows
this. To admit, as he does, that custom teaches us to
observe the uniformity of past sequences, and to observe
especially that it is A, not B or C, which is the
constant antecedent for X, is to give Hume just the
foothold that he needs. For surely this customary
uniformity is all that we require to build a psychological
expectancy, even in the midst of the most variable of
contingencies. Until a contrary experience arises to
shatter that expectancy, its objective correlative in a
"constant conjunction" remains intact. Does Brown really
want to throw out something so well confirmed by our
experience?
The answer to this obviously troublesome question
is ambiguous. On some occasions, Brown will assert that
the evidence of one case is as strong as, if not stronger
than, the e/idence of a thousand cases, for at least two
reasons: (1) because age tends to weaken not to
strengthen convictions; and (2), because in view of the
the phenomenal impact no separate series is,-as 'simple'
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as it might at first appear (Inquiry, 1, 17-18). The
first of these is open to empirical dispute; the second
would seem to dissuade us from adopting an immediate
faith in anything. On other occasions, he seems to
waver between the position, that belief in causation
arises merely from a "known immediate sequence" (Inquiry,
2, 170 ftn.) and the view that a belief of this sort
arises, again from a particular case, but now from our
assurance that this case will not be falsified by a
"contrary experience" (Inquiry, 2, 125-6). With the
latter, he clearly bows to the need for confirmation
through repeated instances of the particular sequence.
Therefore belief cannot be immediate. The only leg on
which he might stand is the former case: this would
couple the quality of immediacy with the notion of
instinctive accompaniment. The observations of the
particular sequence clearly must be "made with judgment"
(Ibid.). We must recognize that this is in fact a
separate series of phenomena, constituting what we would
judge to be a 'sequence'. Furthermore, the sequence
must be dealt with while it is still within the field of
observation; it cannot be allowed to ferment in the casks
of memory. If these conditions are satisfied, and we
find that we do believe A to be the invariable antecedent
of X, then we might say that given Es (where A precedes
X) in CsR, Es will always take place in Cafa. But
this patching up still will not do: the qualifications
are merely extra padding, and point away from immediacy
in the direction of a more 'mediate® apprehension. Unless
Brown can penetrate the wall of customary expectation
which surrounds our attitudes towards causality, he is
himself frustrated in his attempt to topple Hume.
The time-saving device must come in the form of
something as basic to experience as our perceptual
faculties themselves. Brown conceives of this device
as "intuition", an aspect of our way of looking at things
which "does not stand in the need of argument, but is
quick and irresistible as perception itself" (Inquiry, 3,
246). Speed is essential; anything less vapid or
immediate than intuition would have to be 'mediated* by
some process of reasoning or habit formation. And
nothing must come between the observed set of events Es
and the accompanying intuition of Es (where A precedes
X) in Csx as invariable. Belief is thus a "tendency"
with which we are divinely "endowed" (Inquiry, 3, 249)
and which is as "instinctive" in us as the urge to suck
when we are infants (Inquiry 2, 49; also 3, 171).
Moreover, it arises in conjunction with the normal means
of perception, thereby enhancing rather than denying our
experience of the phenomenal impact. Our belief in the
invariability of Ax presupposes the appearance of the
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the sequence Es (where A precedes X) in Cs^; our intuition,
that is, is to grasp the whole of any sequence, not merely
fragments from a disjointed or incomplete series. The
appearance of A with B or C or of A alone is not suf¬
ficient to arouse this instinct (Inquiry, 3, 170). Again,
if "a very slight difference of the circumstances of
bodies produces, or . . . renders apparent to our senses,
qualities altogether dissimilar from those with which we
were before acquainted" (Inquiry, 2, 90), the belief in
the invariability of AX adjusts itself accordingly. We
would then affirm that given Es in Cs2, A does not
precede X, and that this is invariably so. The answer
to Hume must therefore be as follows: having observed
the whole sequence Es (where A precedes X) in Cs^, we
believe that A will invariably precede X; the repeated
appearance of this sequence will indeed bring about a
feeling of 'of-course-ness', but this feeling in no way
supplants the original; should the sequence in Cs2 take
a different form, experience alone will enable us to
determine the exact nature of this new sequence, and
belief alone to grasp its invariability; and finally,
what experience informs us concerning the past and
present, belief assures us with respect to the future.
The second ramification of adhering to the
assumption of invariable resemblance between past and
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future is that belief, as an intuitive "faculty", is a
way of making (from the Latin facio, thence faoultas)
the unknown fall within the range of human experience and
apprehension. This point requires careful elucidation.
What belief does not do is to make 'translatable' the
unknown into the known; if this were the case, the
ordinary instruments of perception, memory, and reason
would be able to handle the "evidence of things not seen"
(Inquiry, 1, 10). Brown has already gone to considerable
lengths to demonstrate that they are not capable of so
coping. Nor is belief or intuition geared to pull magical
rabbits out of worn-well hats; it does not deal with what
might he, but with what is. And yet, there is a unique
feature to its dealing: "it is intuition only that passes
over the darkness which is impenetrable to our vision,
and speaks to us, as from another world, of the things
which are beyond" (Inquiry, 3, 280). One's ears may
tingle with the suspicion that this faith in things from
another world sounds very much like Herder or Kant. It
is not within our scope to track down that suspicion,
except to insert the comment that it was to this aspect of
Brown's Inquiry that Schopenhauer granted his sole
applause, assuming perhaps that Brown meant by belief in
invariable antecedence what he and Kant meant by an a
priori category of the understanding. (See The World as
Will and Idea, II, 207-8.) I would add only that I see
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no justification for his comparison. Whatever Brown may
have thought generally of "the things beyond", in the
present context he undoubtedly has in mind the inscrutable
mask of the future. For the future has this in common
with the 'wholes1 which we discussed earlier: that both
conceal behind their guise of 'simplicity' innumerable
fragments and complexities of phenomena. Belief has
something to do with the resemblances between past and
future in so far as the latter is regarded as a simple
counterpart of the former. Experience breaks down the simple
wholes of invariability just as analysis involves towards
the germinal elements of simple perceptions. Yet belief
enables us to take a stance towards the future in much
the same way, I should think, as general ideas enable us
to face the entanglements of linguistic precision and
endless qualification. This is surely all that we are
saying when we affirm that belief makes the unknown fall
within the existential range of human encounter with the
phenomenal impact.
Having thus let the cat fully out of the bag,
Brown has only to show that Hume's version of belief was
well-aimed but ill-founded. In the first and second
editions of the Inquiry, his argument is directed in
large measure towards the controversy over Leslie in the
General Assembly and consists of a critical apology for
Hume; by the third edition, it has acquired some of the
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sophistication evolved in the foregoing reconstruction.
Its direction, however, is quite straightforward: if
we ask whether Hume in fact denied that we have any idea
of power, the answer must be 'No'? and if we ask whether
Hume's theory of power is a just theory, the answer must
still be, but now with different force, 'No' (Inquiry, 2,
194). For the expressed benefit of the General Assembly,
Brown adds:
"It must, therefore, be consoling, to find that however
false his theory of the origin of the idea of power may
be, he still asserts, that we have an idea of power, and
that, hence, the asserted impossibility of the idea of
divine power does not follow from his theory." _
(Inquiry, 2, 189 ftn.)
Where, then, did Hume go wrong?
If we are to believe Brown, Hume wandered off the
track quite simply because he insisted on trailing after
missing impressions. From Brown's point of view, Hume is
hopelessly enmeshed in a narrow epistemological criterion.
Suspecting that a philosophical term (in this case, the
notion of power) lacks meaning, Hume is obliged by the
rule of consistency to go scouting about for the 'impression'
which it may or may not lack (Inquiry, 3, 267) . He finds
it - and so saves his scepticism, or loses it, depending
on one's perspective - as the "feeling of a customary
connection" between elements of a repeated sequence of
objects or events (Inquiry, 2, 185-6). Brown quotes in
full the 'fatal' passage in which Hume announces that our
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•"customary transition" from one object to its usual
attendant is the very "sentiment or impression from Which
we Form the Idea of Power or Necessary Connexion"
(Inquiry, 2, 189-90). Hume's mistake, of course, lies
in his assumption that he must find a prototype for the
idea of power which is its copy. The demands of a strict
"nominalism", remarks Brown, are precisely that "rash"
(Inquiry, 2, 118-20). Unfortunately the prototype he
chooses does not at all match the copy:
"In short, Mr. Hume's account of the origin of the idea of
power, either proceeds on the belief of the previous idea
of power, or supposes it to be a copy of that form from
which it is completely different."
(Inquiry, 1, 34)
Hume's search is thereby seen to be both unnecessary and
redundant. If he has a feeling of or belief in "necessary
connection" or "invariable antecedence" at all, this
feeling is "in kind as truly original, as any of our
other feelings" (Inquiry, 3, 271), and it becomes quite
useless for him to convince himself that his belief is
"a genuine feeling" (Inquiry, 3, 268). To the folly of
this redundancy, Hume adds the inconsistency of a scepticism
which doubts what it believes and believes what it would
not doubt.
Is it possible, however, that Brown is ensnared by
the same 'reductivist' trap as Hume? Does Brown make
belief equal in status and strength to Hume's all-
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important impressions? The answer is a perplexing 'yes®
and 'no'. We cannot doubt at this stage that belief,
for Brown, is as fundamental to our way of dealing with
the world as perception, memory or reason. But at the
same time, we must allow that since it is only as
fundamental as any of these, it does not occupy that
crucial epistemological position which perceptions hold
in Hume's philosophy. Consequently, although it may
appear at times that Brown is replacing Hume's 'nominalism'
with a type of his own, the impression is an illusory
one. Belief in the invariability of antecedence and
consequence is a means of penetrating the dark obscurity
of the future, not as instrument for recording the crude
data of phenomenal impact. It is not the basis for any
idea, but rather a feeling of human consciousness as
legitimate as any other.
Conclusion;
Addressing himself once more to the question of
causality in the Lectures, Brown makes use of the paintings
of Titian to illustrate his contention that the proper
interpretation of cause and effect springs from the
mechanics of relative suggestion. "The cause does not
suggest the effect," he observes,
"merely as a separate object of our thought, nor the effect
the cause, as a separate object. It suggests also the new
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feeling of their mutual relation. When I look at a picture
of Titian, for example, and the conception of the painter
instantly arises, I do not think of Titian merely as an
individual, unconnected with the object which I perceive,
I do not think of him in the same manner as I may have
thought of him repeatedly, at other times, when the
reading of his name, or the mention of him, in conversation
on works of art, or any other accidental circumstance may
have recalled him to my mind. If I had only the conception
of Titian, as I may have conceived him in those other
cases, the suggestion would be truly a simple suggestion;
but this simple conception of the artist is instantly
followed by another feeling of his connection with that
particular work of his art, which is before my eyes, - a
relation, which it requires no great analytic discrimination
to separate from the simple conception itself, and which
arises precisely in the same way as the other relations,
which have been considered by as, - the relation of
resemblance, for example, when in music, one air suggests
to us a similar melody, - or the relation of proportion,
when we think of the squares of the sides of a right
angled triangle, in Pythagoras*s celebrated theorem."
(L. L, 263-4)
It was from this perspective that I maintained earlier that
»
the Inquiry brings to birth some of the first shoots of a
growing system of mental transformations. It is necessary,
however, to consider further certain resistances in
Brown's mind which required this system to grow in one way
rather than in another.
One such resistance, and it refers back to what we
have said about bad analogies, concerned the derivation of
the idea of power either from muscular effort alone or
from the wider terrain of physical and psychological
exertion. Unlike Maine de Biran, Reid and Stewart were
reluctant to place the notion of 'will-power* squarely
and exclusively in the primitive lap of our muscular
system. Reid had remarked that "when we will to do a
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thing immediately, the volition is accompanied with an
effort to execute that which we willed" (A.P. II, i, 63?
italics mine). Yet he insisted that this effort should
accompany volition "whether [in] body or mind". (The
whole idea of accompaniment was, as we shall see, foreign
to both Brown and Maine de Biran, the latter in particular
fusing the act of will and the muscular effort into a
single Consciousness' and that of 'self'.) Stewart,
however, sought to reinforce Reid's sentiment:
"It must indeed be acknowledged, that, after having had
experience of our own power, we come to associate the idea
of force, or of an animal nisus, with that of a cause; and
hence some have been led to suppose that our only idea of
cause is derived from our bodily exertions. Hence, too,
it is that in natural philosophy our language frequently
bears a reference to our own sensations. The ideas of
cause, however, and of power, are more general than that
of force, and might have been acquired although we had
never been conscious of any bodily exertion whatever.
There is surely no impropriety in saying that the mind
has power over the train of its ideas, and over its
various faculties, as well as over the members of the
body."
(A.P., II, 18)
In a sustained challenge to the idea of volition itself,
whose implications Stewart deemed an "abuse of words"
wherein "the question concerning the freedom of the will
is completely prejudged" (Elements, III, Note C ftn.),
Brown struggled to refine these collective observations.
In the process he found himself wrestling first, with
the problem of voluntary action and then, with his own
'painful' awareness of the complexities of consciousness.
Nothing short of human freedom, as Hamilton was fond of
pointing out, was at stake in Brown*s deliberations
PART TWO
EVOLUTIONS
The essential achievement of the will . . . when it is
most 'voluntary' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and
hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat;
and it is a mere physiological incident that when the
object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences
should ensue.
- William JAMES
It's no good to seize hold of the idea against its will;
it then seems to surly that you wonder what attracted
you in it. The preferred idea comes only when there is
no other idea in its place. Hence you can evoke it only
by thinking of nothing else. At times I have spent more
than an hour waiting for it. If you have the misfortune,
feeling nothing coming, to think; 'I am wasting my




MONTAGUES AND CAPULETS: A KIND OF VIOLENCE
There is a persistent form of conceptual anxiety
connected with our handling of mental and physical terms.
Viewed from one angle at least, the history of philosophy
becomes a chronicle of continuous pushing and shoving
between reductivist advocates of one or other of these
groups. Seemingly innocent remarks, such as 'I tried
(or wanted) to move my arm, but couldn't* invariably
trigger off another row. It is as though philosophy were
some kind of 'Romeo and Juliet' tragedy bred of the disease
called Montagues and Capulets. Wherever individual members
of these 'families' meet, someone tries to capitalize on
our hesitation with a scheme for swift and total victory.
Yet, more than the traffic in uncertainty between these
vaguely defined lines, it is the despair of what E.E.
Cummings might describe as 'nonlines' which is the
philosopher's headache.
The pounding has of late risen to a crescendo, and
this turn-of-events makes historical discussion all the
more perplexing. Any post-Rylean observer would be
inclined to admit that the notion of a polar field of




disjoin, it is difficult to imagine which way, if any,
logical traffic would move. Even conceding that there
are no 'occult* processes taking place in a 'something'
or 'place' known as 'the mind' and that behaviouristic
methods can be applied to concepts as much as to physical
processes, we are left with the feeling that more has
been snatched from under our feet than we would care to
allow. Our philosophic ennui hangs on, as it were, against
our better judgment. To step back into the traditional
warring game under this cloud is to invite neurotic
2
symptoms of the first order.
Salvation can only come with a fundamental agreement
on aims. In the simplest terms, and freed from excessive
qualification we can, I suggest, depict this common end
as the desire to flush the mind out of its mystery.
Ortega y Gasset once remarked: "Contrary to what is
usually assumed, philosophy is a gigantic effort at
superficiality, that is to say, at bringing up to the
surface and making open, clear, and evident that which
3
was subterranean, mysterious, and latent." The play on
1
G. Pyle, The Concept of Mind (N.Y.: Barnes &
Noble, 1962), p. IT.
2
I have in mind the sort of anxiety (known as attention-
turned-neurosis) which has been described with compassion
and wit by Irwin Edman in his essay "The Philosophic Neurosis",
Philosopher's Quest (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1947), ch. 3.
3
What is Philosophy?, op. cit., p. 111.
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the word "superficial" should be regarded as a curative
whenever we are overwhelmed by the temptation to take
too seriously our own methodological approach to the task
at hand. Philosophical sanity is largely a matter of
finding footholds, however weak or illusory; in this
respect, mutual toleration and assistance are the more
humane guides to an assault on mind and body.
Given this background of reservations, an investigation
of Brown's analysis of the relation between our willing
to do something and our doing it is none too easy. The
term 'volition' not surprisingly caused him a great deal
of consternation. I shall endeavour in this chapter to
illustrate just how this word brings about a philosophical
traffic-jam and the manner in which Brown sought to resolve
the problem. To give breadth and possibly depth to his
discussion, I will make occasional allusions to other and
contrasting formulations or dissolutions of the question.
It is not my purpose to wage a full-scale attack on the
history of the idea. One must recognize, however, that
Brown neither dealt with nor apprehended the concept of
volition in a historical vacuum. Uncovering such a
concept, and its accomplices, is in part spinning out
facets of its lineage. More recent analysis has tended to
ridicule (or simply ignore) the sorts of presuppositions
which imposed themselves on the traditional rules of play.
Significantly, this mood is almost wholly in accord with
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with Brown's own empirical iconoclasm; and Brown was
still party to the game then in progress! Hence, our
traffic-jam becomes somewhat more than a sportive breach
of philosophical peace. We must decide where and in
what sense a traffic-jam might even occur.
While treating of the complexity of our ordinary states
of mind in his final Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of
of the Human Mind, Brown makes a passing reference to the
"fuller examination and analysis" of one such state con¬
tained in the Inquiry. Termed 'volition' in the earlier
work, 'the will' in the later one published shortly
before his death, that state of mind will prove to have
telling repercussions on Brown's theories of attention,
association, (or 'suggestion') and belief. For the
moment, it is important only to notice how far the con¬
cept of volition has travelled since its first injection
into the context of an analysis of Humean causality.
Indeed, a more accurate appraisal of its history might
be that it emerges as Brown is breaking out of his
philosophic cocoon and survives until after his death.
Any demarcation of a 'cocoon stage' is bound to be
arbitrary, but for two reasons I would place it at the
appearance of the second edition of the Inquiry in 1806.
On the one hand, both his Observations, published in 1798,
and the first edition of the Inquiry are essentially
critical works, in which the direction and scope of the
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arguments are determined by their original authors.
Admittedly the former, particularly in a section entitled
"Of Voluntary Ideas", displays germinal elements of a
central notion developed by Brown in his later writings.
(We will have occasion to return to this portion later.)
These elements, however, are understandably fragmentary
within a critical context, and do not appear in the
first edition of the Inquiry. On the other hand, Brown's
own reference in 1820 is to the Inquiry's two subsequent
editions (in 1806 and 1818), presumably because these
involve the kind of detailed analysis of the concept on
which he would insist. That much is clearly stated, and
certainly reflects Brown's inclination to be his own
master. There is very little variation, in fact, between
his first full-born assertions and those posthumously
revealed in his Lectures. The changes which do appear
concern the philosophical ramifications of the views
which he had put forward. It is as though the significance
to Brown of his own theory was gradually unfolded during
a lifetime of reflection.
The second general feature of this state of mind
to be considered involves its relevance to the discussion
of cause and effect in which it appears. This point can
be summarily dealt with here, although again its im¬
plications are rather far-reaching. In large measure,
the Inquiry is an effort in philosophical exorcism: what
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Brown is concerned to expose is the error of assigning
mysterious Powers to the relation between antecedent
events and their consequents. That there are events
external to the mind, objects in the world which undergo
change, is never in question. In so far as Brown
acknowledges events of this type, however, he must take
into account the so-called 'events' which infringe upon
this class. These are the causal sequences which are
commonly believed to bind the mental and the physical
spheres, as when someone (not something) bends his arm
4
or blushes in embarrassment. On this view, it is one
thing for a person to observe and speculate on the
impact of a hammer on a piece of glass and quite another
to feel oneself actively winking at the world outside.
According to Berkeley, only an "incorporeal active sub¬
stance or spirit" has the "power" to "do anything"
(Principles of Human Knowledge, sec.'s 25-28); moreover,
the "making and unmaking of ideas" in the mind itself
not only defines volition but corners the very notion of
4
The binding is all the more intriguing if one con¬
siders the types of 'knowledge-claims' entailed by both.
See, for example, Bronowski's remarks on these two kinds
of resolutions: "I won't make that flourish again because
last time it hit my wife"; and "I won't make that flourish
again because last time it embarrassed my wife." The
Identity of Man (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History
Press, 1965), pp. 22-3.
power* Whatever doubts we may have about the relationship
of one physical object to smother, we can feel causality,
as it were, from the inside. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau
5
this "feeling" was everything. Our first glimpse, then,
of the conceptual traffic-jam comes in the form of a
supposed transfer of the 'idea' of power from the mind,
where it is said to be indubitable, to matter, where its
origin is less than certifiable.
The quarry now becomes more formidable. If Brown
is to eradicate a misconception, he is compelled to give
further chase to this new and powerful argument. Noting
that there are really two issues here - the movement of
limbs and the nanipulation of ideas, - Brown endeavours
to tackle each in turn. The present chapter will be
primarily concerned with the first of these.
We are immediately confronted with definitional
uncertainties. Within any system, be it metaphysical or
scientific, a certain number of definitions (ideally, a
minimum number) have to be assumed. Not to assume any
is to spend one's time moving in circles or towards an
infinite regress. Occasionally, one suspects that
definitions have been regarded in the past rather like
the axioms which contain them: that is, as being either
5
Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1877), tome I, livre iv,
243 (fmile).
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self-evident (as Euclid believed of axioms) or un¬
questionable within the bounds of the system (described
in logic today as an extra-systematic consideration).
Consultation with a dictionary may be very therapeutic,
but does little to alleviate the strain of a nasty habit.
If one begins a philosophical exercise convinced that
the terms one defines are, in some way, infallible, then
something of the old 'axiomatic complex' still remains.
A similar type of mistake found its way into contemporary
philosophy when Norman Malcolm, for example, announced
with no hesitation that "ordinary language is correct
language",6 although the brunt of this formulation has
since been toned down. A more modest, if not accurate,
appraisal of philosophical activity would seem to be that
it strives to find out how we can best employ certain
concepts within the restrictions laid down by our previous
experience of the world. If this procedure entails ac¬
cepting a preliminary definitional stance, it also involves
tentative revision all along the way. There is more
pragmatism than strict deduction in our treatment of
important terms.
Brown and Reid appear to be at confused odds over
Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language", in
Ordinary Language, ed. V. C. Chappell (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 18.
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this very issue. After "defining" volition as the de¬
termination of the mind either to do or not to do something
within our power, the latter asserts:
"If this were given as a strictly logical definition,
it would be liable to this objection, that the determination
of the mind is only another term for volition. But it
ought to be observed, that the most simple acts of the
mind do not admit of a logical definition. The way to
form a clear notion of them is, to reflect attentively
upon them as we feel them in ourselves. Without this
reflection, no definition can give us a distinct con¬
ception of them."
(A.P., II, i, 58-9)
A priority is thus established which is most significant:
one begins by reflecting on and distinguishing from others
particular mental acts? one then constructs a definition
in the light of one's reflective investigations. One
discovers, for example, that desires, appetites, hopes
and fears are not commensurate with volitions; they are
not, as Reid states, "logically equivalent". This
phrasing, moreover, must be taken in the less rigorous
sense of 'not functioning in linguistically identical
ways'. Is Reid then subjecting to reflective analysis
certain mental acts, or is he really conducting an
examination into the uses of words? If the latter al¬
ternative, are these uses to be judged 'more acceptable'
than others, and if so, on what grounds? Let us turn now
to Brown's modus operandi.
At first glance, there appears to be little
separating the views of both writers. They seem to agree
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that one must ascertain, by reflecting upon one's ex¬
perience, the conditions under which one could be said to
will anything. Blushing and weeping, asserts Brown, are
reactions to our "prevailing passions" (Inquiry, 3, 35) of,
for example, shame and grief; as such, they are similar in
kind to changes which are brought about "in phenomena
purely material". The movement of an arm, however,
involves the "conscious" intention to affect a change in
our bodily state. In fact, Brown argues, the only ob¬
servable difference between blushing and swinging a
limb lies in this "prior feeling" of wanting or desiring
to do the latter (Inquiry, 3, 36). The relationship
between antecedent and consequent holds for both: only
when we instantiate the variables do we detect things of
a dissimilar "nature". Nowhere, certainly, does a
mysterious Power intervene in the transition from one to
the other. Having stated this set of conditions, Brown
casts his attention back over the voluntary element. But
here again, the monster of definition rears his trouble¬
some head.
Although his appeal is still to the evidence of
personal reflection, in the sense of interior-bound
'observations', Brown finds it compelling to introduce a
verbal distinction between volition and desire. Within
the larger design of his theory of cause and effect, the
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two terms are used interchangeably. When attending to
volition itself, however, he allows for a "commonly"
held distinction between them. What emerges is a defini¬
tional demarcation ostensibly drawn along lines of accepted
usage, but in actual fact geared to counter Reid's pro¬
posals and to enhance his own. This is a slippery
business and must be entertained gingerly, lest Brown be
exposed to abuse of the sort hurled at him by Hamilton
in defence of Reid. It will be my contention that Brown
is forced by his own theory, and hence on intrinsic
grounds, to adopt the distinctions which he does make
and at the same time to overlook them whenever he finds
it expedient.
Having once decided to contest the issue with Reid,
Brown uses much the same linguistic tactics and, not
surprisingly, arrives at a different conclusion. At one
stage, to be sure, even the conclusions appear to coincide.
For according to Reid, the most distinctive feature of a
volition is its objective correlation to an action of our
own. The logic of the concept, he affirms, is such that
"what we will must be an action, and our own action"
(A.Po, II, i, 60). Limiting his remarks specifically to
bodily movements, Brown describes the correlation between
volition and action as "immediate". Like Reid, he has in
mind not physical but linguistic necessity. One does not
say, "I wish to do x or to move y", only to sit back and
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wonder whether the doing of x or the moving of y will take
place. (Ryle ridicules exponents of voluntary 'executions®
before the act on just this point: if we postulate
t.
'willing' going on without performances, then all chaos
can logically break loose. There, however, the similarity
ends.) Whether this appeal to what we say or feel under
normal circumstances holds up under the strain of an
amputee's dilemma remains to be seen. It is clear,
however, that both Reid and Brown see an essential link
between willing and doing. The contingency of the con¬
nection is not here at stake: if willing and doing were
regarded equally as 'events', then undoubtedly the
relationship would become problematic. The tenor of the
arguments put forward by Brown and Reid is rather one of
conviction that willing is something highly personal
involving, so it would seem, the intimacy of our selves
and our bodies. Nevertheless, the alleged necessity or
immediacy is only a broad framework within which individual
persuasions will manifest themselves.
Reid makes a useful distinction between willing
and desiring certain types of things. The mode of our
"common language", he asserts, is such that we are
entitled to say that we desire meat or drink, or ease from
pain, but not that we will them (ibid.) Why should this
be so? Reid adduces at least two reasons. First, although
we may desire many things - a pot of gold at the end of a
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rainbow perhaps, or a sumptuous feast of cheese and wine, -
these objects are quite frequently beyond our grasp at
this or any moment. This is not to say that we can never
act upon our desires; merely that there is a recessive
quality to desires such that from deep within our states
of 'wishful thinking', we may not be able, or have the
opportunity, to approach the threshold of satisfaction.
We speak sometimes of a person virtually 'seething with
desire', but it probably does not occur to us that he
will actually give play to his impulses, except perhaps
for an outward display of agitation. Ordinary physical,
social, or even psychological restrictions see to that.
Secondly, not a few of our desires are directed well
outside our range of capability towards things which
might happen to others. We wish one another 'dead', for
example, or 'the best of health* or success in a particular
venture. That we can desire for others, as well as for
ourselves, gives to the concept a flexibility of application
which, Reid attests, is not the property of volition.
Thus, multi-faceted and extrovert, desire is at best an
"incitement to will" (ibid.).
Against the sort of qualitative distinctions which
Reid presents, Brown enlists the aid of a generative
psychology. By doing so he departs, at least initially,
from a strictly logical analysis of concepts. Indeed,
he can be seen striving to discover the psychological
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foundations for the proper use of the terns 'volition*
and 'desire'. In spite of this apparent reversal of
form, he shares with Reid the notion that desires are felt
to be more "complicated" (Inquiry, 3, 45) and less straight
forward than volitions. Whereas the latter move "rapidly"
towards their termination, the former linger in us as
though uncertain about which guise to take. We may
desire to ease the pain of an overfed stomach, but as we
sit uncomfortably wondering what to do, we may also be
looking forward to an after-dinner snooze or a glass of
brandy. Out of this complexity a decision may arise to
take some antidote, in which case our feet will carry us
swiftly to the medicine cabinet. Yet we could just as
well remain immersed in our misery, and make no move to
alleviate the distress. The marks of volition, therefore,
are its brevity and simplicity. It is a feeling "on
which certain . . . movements are immediately consequent".
By contrast, a desire holds on to itself, as it were, and
has "no such direct termination" (Inquiry, 3, 40). In a
sense, the nan who abstains from the pleasures of life
can be said 'never to let himself go'. Using the il¬
lustration of bodily movement, Brown observes: "in the
free and healthy state of the body, to desire the motion
of our hand is to move it" (Inquiry, 3, 42; italics mine).
Far from being inconsistent with what we have said, this
remark demonstrates Brown's concern to find here an order
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of events,, from desires to volitions, leading up to and
ending in action. For released from the tension of
restraint, desires lose their "insignificance" and become
operative (ibid.). Viewed as a "train of feelings"
(Inquiry, 3, 50), therefore, rather than as a conceptual
demarcation, desires and volitions emerge as co-members
of the same class poised or idling, as the case may be,
at different ends of their unity.
In the long run, Brown pays mere lip-service to
the traditional suggestion from Locke (if not, Plato)
down through Reid that because desires and volitions are
distinct and separable, inaction or wrong action is the
product of conflict between them. Furthermore, he is not
in the least swayed by the argument that although
volition is frequently accompanied by desire, the former
can overthrow the determination of the latter. Locke had
written:
"though [the] general desire of happiness operates
constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any
particular desire can be suspended from determining the
will to any subservient action, till we have maturely
examined whether the particular apparent good which we
then desire makes a part of our real happiness, or be
consistent or inconsistent with it."
(EHU, ed. J. Yolton, Bk. II,
ch. XXI, 123)
Quite apart from the consideration of ultimate ends,
and almost in one voice, Reid adds: "The determination
of the mind may be, not to do what we desire to do. But,
as desire is often accompanied by will, we are apt to
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overlook the distinction between them." (A.P., II, i,
61) Cases of what William James later called (in his
Principles of Psychology) "inhibition by antagonistic
thoughts" abound in the ordinary sphere of human con¬
duct. In fact, part of what we mean by the term 'will¬
power' is just this apparent ability on our part to steer
activity away from strong currents of desire. While the
question of free-will is obviously trying here to mount an
offensive, it is only of peripheral interest. The real
question is whether Brown has snubbed a reasonable dis¬
tinction to his own disadvantage.
His argument indicates that he considers the dis¬
tinction to be somewhat forced and contrary to actual
experience. Although from time to time he may give the
appearance of being too atomistic in his analytic break¬
down of wholes into their elemental parts, he has a
subtle feeling for organic unity and interrelatedness.
In this respect, he is closer to Condillac and Destutt de
Tracy for whom any part of a sequence resulting in overt
behaviour is simply an accumulative shading of its pre¬
decessors. There is a kind of developmental 'piling-on*
which combines internal relatedness with change. In
Brown's view, volition is a higher determination in the
sense that, given a particular graduation of desires,
the final one will yield an expectation of fulfillment.
One does not wait at the threshold of action to see
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whether or not one's will-power can assert itself to gain
the upper hand. To have advanced that far is to possess
the assurance that one will in fact do what one wants,
whatever the outcome. Conceptual delineation, therefore,
performs the convenient function of marking out for
attention various stages in their progressive completion.
This, however, is its sole utility. By abstracting phases
out of a complex continuum, we are able to study their
arrangement (Inquiry, 3, 42) and relative influence.
By adopting an organic perspective, wherein the
whole not the part fixes our attention, we can avoid
dwelling on dissimilarities and can, instead, bring to
light vital interconnections. The answer to our preceding
question, then, would seem to be that Brown deliberately
sets himself a difficult, but quite defensible course
in order to resist three erroneous suppositions: (a)
that volition and desire operate as polar opposites;
(b) that where one begins and the other ends, either a
struggle ensues or a chasm opens up; and (c) that the
occurrence of either eventuality calls into being a
power cf the will not previously accounted for. It is
crucial to Brown's argument that he play down the dis-
tinction between volition and desire; otherwise, he
cannot help but invite the very trouble-maker he wishes
to dispel. It is clear, however, that he favours a
strengthened version of the genetic position. Here, as
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elsewhere, he proceeds by a conceptual analysis which is
apparently indistinguishable from the former.
It is necessary to amend this thesis in at least
two respects. 1. In the first place, Brown is not alone
in emphasising the essential fusion of desire with
volition, and therefore does not stand before Reid (or
Locke for that matter) completely unarmed. His arsenal
of supporters, as it were, includes Condillac and
Destutt de Tracy, with a round or two from Hume when the
question touches on motivational influences. Three
possibilities seemed to open themselves to these writers:
either the terms 'desire' and 'volition' are synonymous
and hence may be used "indifferently" (the phrase is
that of Destutt de Tracy in his Elemens (Sec. II, 54); or
desire and volition differ only in degree (again Destutt
7
de Tracy, but primarily the view of Condillac); or the
specification which might allow for a separation of desire
and volition stems solely from the latter's terminal
contribution to bodily motion or new ideas. (This is the
substance of Hume's definition of volition, although he
admits that the will is not, strictly speaking, a
7
Condillac, Traite des Sensations, ed. Georges le
Roy (Presses Universitaires de France, T947), Part 1, ch.
3, sec.'s 6, 9. Compare also Zora Shaupp, 'The Naturalism
of Condillac', in University of Nebraska Studies in
Language, Literature, and Criticism Nol 6, p. 371
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"passion", - Treatise, II, iii, 1, 399.) Of these three,
the third is by far the most important. Yet all three
share this common feature; namely, that volition cannot
be set apart as a special 'faculty' or 'power'.
We should perhaps remind ourselves at this stage of
the germinal elements contained in that notion. Locke had
stated that the will is "nothing but a power in the mind
to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or
rest, as far as they depend on such direction" (EHU, Bk.
Ill, ch. XXI, sec. 29; italics mine). He saw the mind
determining the will (ibid.) to show a preference for one
thing or another (ibid., sec. 23), and some "uneasiness"
motivating the mind in turn to bring about a particular
change (ibid., sec. 29). Reid and Stewart inherited the
idea of determination: the former openly defining
volition as an act of determination (A.P., II, i, 58) ,
the latter inserting the suggestion of a subject "Agent"
who self-determines" his course of action (A.P., I, 352-
3)o Neither denies the motivational factor. Preceding
and preconditioning every wilful change is a feeling of
pleasure or pain with its respective desire. We want
either to maintain or to alter our present state of
affairs; and having the 'power' to do so we execute the
appropriate act of will. It is a mental 'directive',
however, which steers volition in one way or another.
By affirming that "there may be determination and
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action without judgment" (A.P., II, Li, 67), Reid makes
room for a certain power or "direction" in the affairs of
non-rational creatures. "Brutes", "savages" or indeed
any human being for whom "appetite, affection, or passion,
gives an impulse to a certain action" are well supplied
by nature against "the defects of his reason" (ibid.,
66). Consequently, we can and do alter our present
condition wihtout an act of will, and we do so with "a
kind of violence", drawn by an impulse "toward a certain
object" (ibid., 70). But it is the "brute part" rather
than the "manly part of our constitution" which motivates
us in such instances, preferring a violent to a "cool
principle". The latter is the source of our "self-
government", achieving through a "struggle" with the
former that state of manhood wherein the individual is
"master of himself" (ibid.). The 'ego', in Freudian
terms, is thus empowered to direct our energies, boosting
or retarding them as it sees fit. But only in some
cases, Reid admits, can "conception and volition . . .
keep pace" with the "motions" of our human frame (ibid.,
65) .
Stewart's laborious efforts to accentuate the
indeterminacy of the state of mind of the subject at any
particular moment only confirm this position. Although
it seems true to say, on his view, that there is no
constant conjunction between motive and action, the same
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motives at different times issuing in different actions,
and therefore no proper analogy between motive and action
and cause and effect, the basic reason for scepticism is
this uncertainty about the subject's present condition.
Nevertheless, whatever the state of an individual's
"intellectual powers" or his "active principles" (A.P., I,
352-3) these determine the Agent's act of will. Of the
three elements, therefore, namely motive, mind, and volition,
the second constitutes the focus for controversy.
Hume forthrightly dismissed the mental directive (or
'reason') from this area. Volition, he argues, is sub¬
ject to vivid ideas of pleasure and pain, and these alone
(Treatise, I, iii, 10, 118-9). Both the will and our
desires (or 'passions') are the "immediate effects" of
pleasure and pain (Treatise, II, iii, 1, 399). Reason
has no place among the motives to our will, since the
intellect and the passions can never vie with each other
for "government of the will and actions" (Treatise, II,
iii, 3, 416). Briefly stated, his explanation takes this
form. That which is "contrary to truth or reason" is a
"judgment of our understanding"; that is to say, some¬
thing which has "reference to it" or is one of its kind
(ibid.) ; the passions clearly do not belong to the
category of "judgments of the understanding", and so can
only oppose reason if they are "accompany'd with some
judgment or opinion" (ibid.); in that case, of course,
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it is the accompanying judgment which is or is not con¬
trary to truth; a passion can be "unreasonable", - if,
for example, it is founded on an object which does not
exist, or if it chooses the wrong or a foolish means to
achieve some end - but then, this again is a matter of
"false judgments"; in the last analysis, our passions
move us irrevocably in the direction of action, guided
perhaps but not propelled with the help of reason.
Although we may listen to reason and learn from it which
steps precede or follow which, the motivation to take
these and not others stems from those "original existences"
or "modifications of existence" called the "passions"
(ibid.). The direct intervention of a third factor, the
mind, is categorically ruled out.
Hume, of course, deliberately steers away from the
suggestion that 'mind' and 'power' could be unified under
the banner of 'mental power'. He simply finds no empirical
justification for such an idea. That this view was dis¬
tressing to his opponents can be readily seen in the way
at least one of these tried to slip through the noose.
In his 'Essay on the Difference between the Relation of
Motive and Action and That of Cause and Effect, in Physics;
on Physical and Mathematical principles', Dr. James Gregory
takes exception to Hume's negative appraisal of the idea
of power. Appealing to the wide acceptance of its ordinary
usages, he writes;
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"The term Power is frequently used in very different
meanings, that is, to denote different notions. For
example, we say, A man has the power of speaking; the
King has the power of dissolving his Parliament; Heat
has the power of melting ice; A stream of air is the power
in some machines, and the expansion of steam in others;
A lever is an useful mechanic power; The second power of
the number eight is equal to the third power of the
number 4.
As men do not confound those different notions
expressed occasionally by the term Power . . . it is to
be presumed, that the different meanings of the term are
sufficiently explained or understood by them from the
things to which it is applied.
It is to be presumed, that they have found or
fancied some resemblance or analogy among all the things
or notions to which the term Power is applied; and that
it is employed literally and strictly to denote some of
them, and metaphorically to denote others."8
In its "strict and literal meaning," the phrase "to have
power" is synonymous with "to be able". The notion of
power, moreover, can be said to entail three factors:
first, the idea of a Being which possesses power; secondly,
the notion of "intelligence or thought" ('to be able' also
means 'having the discretion to*); and thirdly, the notion
of "voluntary agency" (power implies the ability to do
something; the "exertion of power" is the mark of a
(free) "Agent") (ibid., 151-2). The inability of a person,
to acquire or grasp this notion indicates what Gregory
calls the "Inertia of Mind":
O
Philosophical and Literary Essays, (Edinburgh,
1972), I, 149-50.
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"limiting, however, the signification of the phrase to
denote merely the incapacity of acting optionally or
discretionally, without motives, or in opposition to all
motives [italics mind], . . . and expressly excluding
from the meaning of the phrase the circumstance of mind
remaining or persevering in any state into which it once
gets."
(Ibid., 154-4)
Whatever it is, power is a "transient condition" of
mind, a propensity or disposition for doing something,
which is to be carefully distinguished from those "mere
conditions" of both mind and body, such as "madness",
"vivacity", "genius", "knowledge" or "vice" (ibid., 154-
5). Blundering into the kind of obscurity which inevitably
spoils a good point, Gregory tightens the rope around his
own neck. What began as a 'capacity' for action ends up
as a positive "Force of Mind" (ibid., 153), however transient,
and thus prepares itself for evolution into reification.
That 'ideological' disciple of Condillac, Destutt
de Tracy, strikes out just as surely, although perhaps not
with such expertise, against Locke's presuppositions.
Here again, desire is said to have an immediate hold on
volition, in the sense that the terminal step into action
(or the 'act of will') is a direct product of our desires.
According to de Tracy, one can recognize in desire two
characteristic features; (a) that desire is "the source
of all our wants"; and (b) that desife directs "all our
actions", and hence is "the source of all our means"
(El&nens, sec. II, 57). In the first case, the phrase
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"source of" implies an inseparability between desires and
wants. Thus, if we truly want something, we want to
satisfy our desire for it (ibid., 56); again, the
"effectiveness" (ibid.) of our want is recorded in our
actually and consciously desiring the object or event in
question. The second general feature of any desire is
its culmination in an action which of itself is instrumental
in bringing the desire or want closer to its objective.
Not only are desires compelling, but they also determine
the direction which that compulsion will take. Among
the various kinds of action brought about in this way
are those which de Tracy designates as our "intellectual
operations". These in turn perform a directive function,
guiding us in the "employment" of all the other types.
Yet even this unique service rendered by the intellect
does not qualify it for a position outside that large
class cf "actions", which de Tracy calls "our means"
(Elemens, sec. II, 57). And so, de Tracy remains steadfast
in his conviction that "our will directs all our actions,
which can be regarded as the means of supplying our wants"
(ibid., 59). "Involuntary movements" are discounted on
the grounds that they are not, strictly speaking, means
towards the completion or satisfaction of our wants.
Concerning this point he remarks:
"they furnish us no means of modifying, varying, suc¬
couring, defending, [or] ameliorating [our existence]. . . .
They cannot therefore properly be placed in the rank of
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our means, unless we mean to say that our existence
itself is our first mean, which is very true but very
insignificant; for it is the datum without which we
should have nothing to say, and certainly should say
nothing."
(ibid., 58; see Appendix B)
We might further clarify de Tracy's position by adding
that if we adopt a rigorous sense of real desires and
effective means, then the class of significant actions
must appear more limited than it otherwise would be.
Whether or not this view is correct -- and it does seem
to favour a distinction between intentional activity and
habitual behaviour, - de Tracy allows no room in the
termination of desires, or in the immediate progression
from wants to actions, for a special and mental inter¬
mediary .
There is yet another dimension which Destutt de
Tracy lends to our discussion, one which brings us back
full circle to Brown and the question of the voluntary
movement of limbs. This aspect of volition concerns
its relation to the self, or rather, to the consciousness
of self.
Condillac had suggested that in the 'fundamental
sensation' of respiration, in the very motion of breathing,
lay the seeds of self-awareness. Out of this sensation,
combined with new sensations and memories of the old,
would evolve the idea of self. Presumably, if all else
9
Schaupp, op. cit., p. 47.
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failed, respiration would continue to provide a kind of
rudimentary identity-factor. Such hypothetical regressions,
however, are not as important or perhaps reasonable, as
the notion of an underlying, and physiological, continuum.
Other philosophers in the period, many of whom succeeded
Condillac, worked on, refined, or gave unique slants to
his theory. Rousseau, for example, connects the idea of
motion with the feeling that one has wished it, and
establishes self-discovery on this primitive base. In
Emile, he describes the discovery in terms which recall
the self-certainty of Descartes. "I feel it," he writes.
"I wish to move my arm, and I move it without that movement
having any other immediate cause than my will. It is in
vain that one tries by reasoning to destroy this feeling?
it is stronger than any evidence."10
Evidence for what? Evidence that I am (que je suis) .
Maine de Biran takes the feeling one step further.
In moving my arm, I experience the effort of my will
(I'effort voulu) and this effort, at once intimate and
pervasive, assures me that I am."^ Nothing is closer
to myself, and therefore more fundamental, than this
^°Oeuvres completes, op. cit., I, iv, 243; italics
mine.
11
Oeuvres de Maine de Biran, ed. P. Tisserand
(Paris: Librairie F61ix Alcan, 1932) , VIII, 257-9. cf.
P.P. Hallie, Maine de Biran: Reformer of Empiricism,
1776-1824 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959),
pp. 7-8.
125.
straining of my being to reach out of itself, to overcome
any obstacle in the path of fulfillment. The resistance
engendered by or implied in every wilful activity im¬
presses upon one the reality of self, in a way in which
the merely passive receipt of sense impressions could
12
not. Moreover, this reality is enhanced by and
"purified" in the sheer act of willing. Reid for his part
insisted that the will "must have an object" (A.P., II,
i, 59), but Maine de Biran does not permit that 'impurity8 -
the 'resistance' not in myself or my limbs but later
abstracted and reified as an 'object' outside myself, -
to detract from the sheer joy of what one might call
'efforting self'. In a sense, therefore, self-fulfilment
is less a matter of obtaining an object, and more a
question of attaining one's objective in the very exercise
of the will. Volition, in the philosophy of Maine de
Biran, becomes the touchstone of selfhood.^
cf. Lucien Levy-Bruhl's account of M. de Biran's
philosophy in his History of Modern Philosophy in France
(Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1899), pp. 326-7.
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Volition is, further, the touchstone of causality
(Hallie, o£. cit., p. 85). Critics of Brown were con¬
vinced that he had failed to comprehend these two implicit
aspects of voluntary movement: the consciousness of self,
and the intimate experience of causation. Robert Blakey
quotes Sir John Herschel's characterization of Brown's
theory as one "in which the whole train of arguments is
vitiated by one enormous oversight; the omission, namely,
of a distinct and immediate personal consciousness of
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Destutt de Tracy brings the willing self fully into
the open. Not only does he experience his own "sentiment
of willing", and thus "the possibility of acting", but
he also perceives a resistance to both in the form of
other beings (Elemens, sec. II, 49). My will confronts
that of another; what is mine as feeling and willing
encounters what is yours in these respects. The dif¬
ferences thus brought to the fore confirm me as a
personality distinct from you, and my property as an
"inalienable" holding excluded from yours (ibid., 52-3).
It follows from this, writes de Tracy, that "we have
found how the sentiment of personality or the idea of
self, and that of property which flows from it neces¬
sarily, are derived from our faculty of willing."
(ibid., 53) Thus, to the solitary ecstasy of de Biran's
willing subject, de Tracy adds the strife and challenge
of interaction. Consciousness of self is consciousness
of what is ours in the way of feelings, volitions, and
causation, in his enumeration of that sequence of events,
by which the volition of the mind is made to terminate in
the motion of material objects." History of the Philosophy
of Mind, (London, 1848); 31 ftn. But the suggestion that
volition serves as a 'prototype of causation' presupposes
a certain view of causation, a particular theory about cause
and effect. Brown, I think, holds this 'presupposition'
to be the crux of the matter: until one has arrived at a
satisfactory account of causation, it is difficult to say
what status, if any, volition might have.
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actions. As the phenomenologists and existentialists have
more recently suggested, self-consciousness is the
recognition of what exists for me, given the particular
'perspective' which constitutes the 'here' of my body.
The property of selves, in de Tracy's terminology, is the
mine and thine, the here and there, of human intercourse.
With typical incisiveness, Ortega y Gasset adds:
"Our 'heres' are mutually exclusive, they are not inter-
penetrable, they are different; with the result that the
perspective in which the world appears to him is always
different from mine. . . . Not only am I outside of the
other man, but my world is outside of his: we are,
mutually, two 'outsides' jfueras), and hence radically
strangers (foresteros)."14
We have now progressed from the 'luminous interior' to the
public thoroughfare along the corridors of individual
volition.
It may appear, however, that we have travelled a
long way from Brown. But when we have gathered in all
the tangential support we will, I think, find ourselves
closer to the heart of his theory. If nothing else, the
historical buttressing should accentuate the importance
of Brown's resistance to 'third parties'. His concern,
as we have seen, resolves itself into the following
question: if we allow that desire and volition do
possess rather unique functions, must we also admit that
^4Man and People, tr. Willard R. Trask (New York:
W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1963), p. 75.
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the gap between them, however slight, holds implications
of a more sweeping nature? More simply, if there is a
conceptual gap what, if anything, does it contain?
Brown®s answer, and that of the writers we have men¬
tioned, is quite emphatically, 'Nothing at all substantial'.
Individual variations aside, there is general agreement
among these philosophers that human actions are the product
of a field of inclinations, complex by virtue of its
multiplicity and contrast, yet nevertheless singularly
determinative when it reaches the point of termination
or release. Underlying this field is the consortium of
pleasures and pains into which are herded the peculiar
propensities fashioned by experience in each person.
Thus, behind every instance of volition one can discover
active substrata of desires and primordial associations.
The relation between volition and desire may be neither
necessary nor sufficient, as Maine de Biran^ and Brown
both argue? even the objectives may differ, in the sense
that the immediate aim of extending my arm and the
'apple® of my desire are dissimilar ends. (Reid too,
it should be noted, recognized a difference in 'objects',
insisting that "what we will must be an action, and our
own action; [but] what we desire may not be our own
15cf. Hallie, op. cit., pp. 121-2.
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action, it may be no action at all", - A.P. II, i, 60).
But such is the relation between them that it becomes more
than odd to say that 'the one doeth what the other knoweth
not of.6 Will-power does not alter the fact that a
certain movement has taken place; it merely reveals the
last and emphatic step in a series of desires whose com¬
binations and recombinations it has momentarily ceased
(Inquiry, 3, 45). The more enlightened the will by the
rational appraisal of various situations, the more suc¬
cessful presumably will be the outcome. Yet this cor¬
rective to our impulses does not overthrow their determination.
Illumination need not remain a theoretical achievement; it
can, and does, reach down into the depths of those active
substrata. In Reid's hands, these accumulated insights
in "every man come to years of understanding" are the
basis of a system of valuations which, serving as an
"exercise of judgment" during periods of "calm in the
mind", determine his action; moreover, "the determination
is wholly imputable to the man, and not in any degree to
his passion" (A.P., II, ii, 67-8). It is just this
severing of the link between passion and judgment, between
'feeling1 and 'value', whether in a mind stormy or at
rest, which makes suspect and ultimately falsifies for
Brown that "determination1. In the last analysis, it is
the one who divides the house against itself who brings
down the roof by calling in reinforcements. This is the
130.
moral propounded by Brown and some at least of his con¬
temporaries .
2. The second qualification to Brown's thesis will
already have been implied by much of the foregoing dis¬
cussion. Clearly, volition and desire can be separated
for purposes of analysis and elucidation. What Brown
must object to is the view that the products of abstraction
are real products: that is, items in the universe of
experience having a qualitatively dissimilar nature. Now
'nature' is a big word, one which encompasses notions of
'real things' or 'essences' as well as ideas of 'properties'
or 'features'. Feelings are not, properly speaking,
'things' although we are apt to confuse the issue by
asking, for example, 'What is this thing called love (or
hatred or desire)?' But if we are shown a certain pattern
of behaviour, and are told that 'this is a manifestation
of love (or hatred or desire)', we might want to characterize
this demonstration as being 'sudden' (or 'uncalled for'
or 'rash'). We might even describe their 'inner' presence
as being 'warm' (or 'upsetting' or 'tormenting'). There
are occasions, therefore, when we can, and must, assign
predicates to feelings; there are probably many more when
we cannot, or refuse to, go beyond the enunciation of the
'feeling-term'. Taking apart the feeling of volition and
the feeling of desire would seem to be an instance of the
former. Brown performs this operation himself; he
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abstracts the appearance of one from the appearance of
the other, and characterizes both. There is nothing
extraordinary in this procedure. Why, then, should Brown
be so cautious about the undertaking? Before answering
this question, however, let us complete the characteri¬
zation put forward by Brown.
We are faced, initially, with a multitude of those
feelings called desires. "The number of desires," writes
Brown, "of which the mind is susceptible, are as various
as the objects of supposed good unpossessed" (Inquiry, 3,
39). Noting judiciously that man's desires are "as un¬
limited as his power is bounded", Brown divides the most
important objects of desire into ten categories: con¬
tinued existence; pleasure; action; society; knowledge;
power (directly as avarice); the affection or esteem of
others; glory; the happiness of others; and, with utter
candour, the unhappiness of those we hate."^ To this
16
L. LXV, 520. In a slight reversal of form, Brown
surpasses Reid in the sheer number of desired objects.
Reid had singled out only three - namely, power, esteem
and knowledge, - although he by no means excludes others
from the field. Unlike Brown, however, he offers a clear
and useful distinction among appetites, desires and af¬
fections. Desires, he asserts, "are distinguished from
appetites by this: that there is not an uneasy sensation
proper to each, and always accompanying it; and that they
are not periodical, but constant, not being sated with their
objects for a time, as appetites are" (A.P., III, ii, 128).
Affections, on the other hand, are "principles of action in
man, which have persons [rather than things] for their im¬
mediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being
well or ill affected to some person, or, at least, to some
animated being"(A.P., III, iii, 139).
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number and variety, we must further add the "innumerable
images, that are incessantly mingling in them" (Inquiry,
3, 45). The complexity of the field of desires is thus
heightened by the every-shifting direction of that field's
intent. Brown does not explore adequately the active
relation between desire and image, but he suggests at least
that the latter keeps desire on the move, luring it from
one possibility to the next in the sheer restlessness of
associative recall and imaginative projection. Proust
would no doubt appreciate his intimation of an 'involuntary'
stream of whiffs, tingles, glimpses, and savourings.
Against this turbulent medley of field-combination
stand the "simplicity" and "rapidity" of volition (Inquiry,
3, 45). An act of will takes one, as it were, straight to
the mark. Its termination is the substance of its ex¬
pression: nothing intervenes between the emergence and
the completion; no image tempts it to linger over its
execution; the 'feeling' is short-lived by virtue of its
objective being accomplished. That volitions are so
constituted is, for Brown, a matter of logical necessity.
The immediacy or 'efficiency' with which this feelings moves
its charge determines whether or not it is to be classed
among "significant desires", termed volitions, or insignificant
desires", called simply desires (Inquiry, 3, 42-3). Yet
even this two-fold classification must be handled care¬
fully, for it merely reflects the analytic break-down of
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a single, large class of feelings into significant and
insignificant members. The ultimate criterion for dif¬
ferentiation is order (Inquiry, 3, 42): significant
desires appear last, and they appear under the form of
ostensible movement or action? all other desires, however
real, are insignificant. Presumably, Brown would treat
the amputee's dilemma as a simple case in point. His
desire for and even sense of movement do not render the
state of affairs any more significant from the point of
17
view of visible results. Movement must follow desire
if that 'desire' is to be deemed an 'act of will'. The
necessity, however, extends no further than this. It is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary truth that B (the
waving of an arm) will follow A (wanting so to wave it).
Only the pattern of antecedence and consequence, invariably
repeated, can give rise to such a belief. Volition,
therefore, is characterized by the belief in the immediate
termination of a particular desire (Inquiry, 3, 43-4).
The above analysis exemplifies the difficulty in
abstraction of setting one concept apart from another
without retaining in the process the original whole as
background. The whole in this instance is the train of




field-combinations of desire to another point which we
might designate the 'terminus in movement'. We see the
concepts of desire and volition against the background
of this succession, and consequently we see the concepts
set over against one another, complementing and fulfilling
rather than opposing each other. If Brown resists the
interpolation of "something more mysteriously indefinable"
(Inquiry, 3, 39), it is for reasons of unity and cohesive-
ness as much as for want of empirical evidence. He is
cautious to extremes in assigning properties to the
feelings of desire and volition because he wishes to
preserve their interpenetrating unity. Those which he
does assign - number and singularity, duration and brevity,
complexity and simplicity, - feed on a common class of
feelings, revealing that class under the perspective of
arrangement. Viewed from one end, the class is a frenzy
of mixed groupings; viewed from the other, it is a clear
determination. To study this class of feelings, there¬
fore, one must play with telescopic sights, first en¬
larging then shrinking the field. In reading Brown one
is reminded of Bergson's description of the progress of
a desire from obscurity to deep passion.
"Now, you will see that the feeble intensity of this
desire consisted at first in its appearing to be isolated,
and, as it were, foreign to the remainder of your inner
life. But little by little it permeates a larger number
of psychic elements, tinging them, so to speak, with its
own colour: and lo! your outlook on the whole of your
surroundings seems now to have changed radically. . . .
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The fact is that, the further we penetrate into the
depths of consciousness, the less right we have to treat
psychic phenomena as things which are set side by side."*8
Brown is not altogether free from the spatial or quan¬
titative depiction of psychic phenomena - his trains of
events are largely strung out in linked successions, -
but he makes some effort to view them qualitatively, as
19
dynamic shadings of a "growing intensity", whose cul¬
mination is an effort towards change.
Conclusion;
We have followed Brown through his persistent cam¬
paign to oust what Ryle later called the "hypothesis of
20
the occult inner thrusts of actions". These "occult
21
precursors of overt acts" were seen to center on a 'power1
of the will, separate from and transcending the multi¬
plicity of desires, but also attached to the will in some¬
what the same way that 'exists' is sometimes thought to be
superadded to 'God'. Brown voices his scepticism in the
form of a hypothetical question:
18




The Concept of Mind, op. cit., p. 67.
^Ibid., p. 81.
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"Let us suppose our only knowledge and belief# with respect
to muscular contraction, to be, that the motion of the
hand has followed, does follow, and will uniformly follow,
the will to move it. In these circumstances, would our
knowledge of this particular phenomenon be less perfect
than now; and should we learn anything new, by being told
that the will would not merely be invariably followed by
the motion of the hand, but that the will would also have
the power of moving the hand?"
22
(Inquiry, 3, 38)
Like Ryle, Brown is concerned to weaken the causal thrust
of statements about volition, and in particular to free
23
them from the 'myth' of a special pre-act 'execution'
or 'power' so to execute. Yet he makes no attempt to
extricate himself from the implications of his own version
of a causal principle conjoining mental and physical
'events'. Although nothing mysterious surrounds the 'act
22
A remarkable parallel to Brown's scepticism
(indeed, to his theory as a whole) appears in Book IV, chap¬
ter iii, of Hippolyte Taine's On Intelligence ("Self and the
Organized Body"). Even the flair for sardonic 'pushing-to-
the-limit' is reminiscent of Brown at his best. "When I say
that I have power or force to move my arm, I merely wish to
say that my resolution to move my arm is constantly fol¬
lowed by the movement of my arm . . . it is in itself
nothing more than a character, a property, a particularity
of a fact, the particularity of being always followed by
another fact, a particularity detached from the fact by
abstraction, set apart by fiction, kept in a distinct state
by means of a distinct substantive name, till the mind,
forgeting its origin, believes it to be independent, and
becomes the dupe of an illusion of its own effecting."
(italics mine) (London: L. Reeve & Co., 1871), I, 203-4.
23
Ryle, 0£. cit., p. 66.
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of will" on his view, there is clearly a chain of developing
processes which, by abstraction, yields a mental ante¬
cedent and a physical consequent. Such a chain, however,
implies more than a succession of events, some preceding,
some following others. It suggests a common avenue
('events') along which desires pass towards their des¬
tination in physical movement and satisfaction. Hence the
physical and the mental are disjoined and conjoined, at
once separate and all of a kind. The assumption is that
the 'Montagues' and the 'Capulets' (of earlier infamy)
are different families who nevertheless belong to the
same race.
Erasing that special effort, of which Reid and
Hamilton attested they were conscious, does not therefore
alleviate the strain or resolve the conflict of mental and
physical terms meeting in the market-place of action.
The question of free will, which I suppressed above even
as it was brewing into a storm, feeds on this dilemma.
The struggle for positioning which arises between Reid
and Brown is repeated (just how closely is not surprising)
in J.S. Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's
Philosophy (1865; especially in chapter XXVI). On one
side, we find the "fact of an invariable sequence between
every event and some special combination of antecedent
conditions"; on the other, the "consciousness" not of
"what I do or feel" but of "what I am able to do". In
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the latter case, my alleged ability to determine the
course of events, and this 'in an instant', tends to unite
both a physical outcome to a mental rider and a steed of
passion to "some foreign power". (Plato's image to this
effect in the Phaedrus appears to have a tight hold on
subsequent philosophic debate.) One cannot discuss the
freedom of the will without trampling on that linguistic
issue or, for that matter, on sensitive toes. That sen¬
sitivity would be enough to convert Brown's analysis of
volition into a determinist stand of the first (or to some
minds, worst) order.
Somewhat in the manner of Sartre or Merleau-Ponty,
Brown holds that a decision (or on his view, the 'terminus
of desire') is a manifestation of significant motivation.
"The motive (for any undertaking) is an antecedent which
acts only through its significance, and it must be added
that it is the decision which affirms the validity of this
significance and gives it its force and efficacy. Motive
and decision are two elements of a situation; the former
is the situation as a fact, the second the situation
undertaken."24
Hence, deliberation is at best a post facto operation,
following necessarily on the heels of a decision which of
itself reveals to us the 'force' or 'significance' of our
25
motives. In matters of will, it is the decision that
24
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, tr.




counts; for this alone is our source of information re-
26
garding our 'intentions' or designs. Again, the sig¬
nificance of any desire is the very act by which it is
known: in so far as this act is the will, there can be
no troublesome gap between 'willing' and 'acting*. Vesey,
I think, is right to interpret Wittgenstein as saying
that nothing must come between them, lest we resign
27
ourselves to mere 'wishing'. The theory of indeter-
2 6
cf. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E.
Barnes (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966T, p. 484. Brown
clearly believes that one can trace the order of our in¬
tentions back along the train of desires, although this
procedure would have to be a reflective one and would entail
passing from the light of significant into the obscurity of
insignificant ones. He would probably agree with Wisdom
that "if a decision has a mental explanation at all, it is
always in terms of desires; and if desires have a mental
explanation at all, it is always in terms of other desires"
(Wisdom, op. cit., p. 125; italics mine). It is on the
basis of such retrospection that one begins to realize not
that one's will opposed one's desires, but rather that
there was a struggle among one's desires which terminated
in the emergence of the stronger; Brown criticizes Reid's
failure to see this 'evolutionary' principal at work among
desires. (cf., however, A.P., II, ii, 67) The idea that
one could will what one does not desire or desire what one
does not will indicates a short-sightedness on the part of
anyone searching for explanations. If a person examines
his desires faithfully enough, he will find that certain
desires, which at first sight appear to be stronger, are
in fact weaker than others. (Inquiry, 3, 47 ff). The
choice of a dull concert over an exciting movie may be de¬
termined by what Wisdom has called a "desire to desire";
in other words, one may want a taste for it or to shower
oneself with the admiration of others (Wisdom, op. cit.,
pp. 128-9). Desires, as Reid himself observed, often
possess this 'extroverted' quality.
27
Vesey, op cit., p. 54; Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, I, 615: "Willing, if it is not to be a
sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be
allowed to stop anywhere short of the action."
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minisra or 6 free will' substitutes for the dread tyranny of
desire a 'new determination* by the mind or self. Once
this foot-hold is established, it is an easy step from
'self-determination' to the notion of 'will-power*. And
rightly or wrongly, since no one wants to allow that he
might be making a 'fool* of himself, a great deal of
28 _
weight tends to hang on this notion. But we have taken
the circular route back to the unique status of the will
and its prized executions. Brown stands firmly opposed
to such a status, and so must reject indeterminism along
with its assumptions. He, like Vesey and Ryle, will not
countenance any 'secret' about voluntary action. The
pity is that that secret has long been held to contain
the only grounds for rational behaviour.
2 8
Karen Horney has stressed the need for people to
recognize "the disparity between [their] facade of per¬
fection and [their] actual trends." New Ways in Psycho¬
analysis (N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1939), p. 245.
2
THIS LITTLE STRESS
We were concerned in the previous chapter with
what might be called the physical extension of volition.
Our initial steps turned on the difficulties entailed by
the use of both physical and mental concepts to describe
the voluntary movement of limbs. This consideration
evolved through the analysis of the terms 'volition' and
'desire' into a prolonged engagement with the exponents of
substantivization. The notion of willpower' as an inter¬
vening determination was seen to be both mysterious and
unnecessary. Still more important was the discovery that
the complexity of influential or motivational factors was
not without its own terminating crescendoes. Not only
was an external ordering not required, but the transition
from desires to volition, and thence immediately into
action, was found to be experientially innocent, merely
a question of certain desires rising to significance, and
of a consequent repeatedly following on the heels of an
antecedent. Brown's position never wavered from this
emphasis on conceptual elucidation from the vantage-point
of experience. This clarification, however, was greatly
enhanced by the insights of a number of his contemporaries
into the interpenetration of desires and the self-
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conscious function of volition.
Yet the voluntary movement of limbs is only half
the story. Brown is equally involved in the 'interior1
question of the movement of ideas. Our break with the
overt manifestations of 'what we will' need not, however,
stress the inner nature of this latter process. In fact,
it will prove more advantageous to forego the spatial
analogy of 'outside' and 'inside' as much as possible.
Our subsequent analysis will, instead, concentrate on the
ramifications of what might at first appear to be a rather
straightforward issue. These, I believe, outweigh in
importance the preliminary considerations, and certainly
occupied Brown's attention to a greater extent. Con¬
tinuity is nevertheless provided by the notions of
voluntary recall and deliberate shifts of attention.
Hence our investigation will proceed naturally from the
immediate question to its implications for memory and
attention. Lest the opening up of the intricate terrain
of those two concepts appear to take an independent course,
it is hoped that this evolutionary background will not
be forgotten. Indeed, the pursuit of Brown's thinking
on these matters forbids such an eventuality.
In reply to Reid, Brown had argued that "the
determination of the mind never is, and never can be, to
do what we do not desire to do" (Inquiry, 2, 69). The
force of his objection is both phenomenal and logical.
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We cannot dispose of desire by any means whatsoever not
only because volition is, in Brown's view, the ultimate
fulfilment of desire, but also because any desire which
stands ready to be so terminated is "more or less per¬
manent and lively" (Inquiry, 2, 72). Tenacity to the
point of persistence is a characteristic of those of our
desires which may be said to bear fruit. But this tenacity
is instrumental in other respects.
The way of ideas is bound to perplex us since, with
the exception of deductively certain sequences of thought,
it is not altogether clear whence and how we arrive at
many of our notions. There is little or no stretching of
language in the remark that an idea 'popped into our heads')
that we 'almost had an idea', or that we 'just remembered
something'. These phrases simply indicate the peculiar
'raciness' of thought to which our words are too seldom
party. Indeed, the strain of alluding to a fast-flowing
'stream of consciousness' need not be quite so objectionable
if we take into account these ordinary expressions of
bewilderment. Perhaps it is a good sign that ideas do
'pop up' in such abundance; otherwise, we should be dim-
witted.
A second consequence of the way of ideas is that
we try to exercise control over some, if not all, of them.
It is a natural reaction which breeds on the distresses
of the first feature. But it assumes an attitude towards
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•will-power' which is scarcely convincing. What is least
persuasive about this view is the supposition that we can
will ideas into being. A quite different question is
whether it makes sense to talk about wishing something
into existence: to say, for example, "If I could wish a
child into existence, I'd have one." With a modicum of
rephrasing and interpretation, we can assess such a
statement in terms of the strength of the desire and the
feasibility of bringing to pass the desired end. The
obvious replies are: "Well, do something about it";
"That's not very practical"; or "You wish for the strangest
things". Some, not all, of the things we want are 'far¬
fetched' (that is, well beyond our immediate reach), and
most of these can be specified. But how does one decide
under what conditions an idea might or might not make an
appearance? How, that is, does one refuse to countenance
an idea that is already there?
On the long view, Brown believes that we are as
helpless to come upon ideas as we are to get rid of them.
They arrive, take their stand, and leave, borne on by a
train of suggestibility whose mechanism is virtually self-
regulating. As long as they are 'there', present to our
minds, they fully occupy consciousness, each, in turn,
filling the 'thought-space' which it has both entered and
created. If the mind is 'elsewhere', then another idea
has 'filled' it. For whatever else it might be, the mind
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cannot be more than that which it contains, however 'large"
the occupation. To transcend our present state is simply
to be in another; to wish to get out is to be there.
Hence, willing an idea is not only beyond our means, it
is redundant. The willing and the idea arrive together,
the latter logically subtracting the former in the process.
From this general, and admittedly sweeping, re¬
statement of Brown's position, we must retrace our steps
in search of the subtleties of his argument. We will not,
however, recover all of the ground until we reach the
discussions of memory and attention, both here and in
Part Three.
Brown complains in the Inquiry that "a sort of
shadowy and indefinable empire has been assigned to our
volition, as if the whole train of thought were in some
greater or less degree, directly under its control"
(Inquiry 3, 55). The 'tyrant' thus portrayed is only a
metaphorical exaggeration of the theory that thought
entirely determines itself. A thinking man is one whose
will stands in active relation to his ideas, producing,
manoeuvring, disposing of them as it sees fit. Perhaps
Berkeley's description of that "active substance",
Spirit, will serve as well as any to illustrate this
point:
"I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and
vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is
no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea
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arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated
and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of
ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active.
Thus much is certain and grounded on experience: but
when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas
exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with
words."
(PHK Part I, sec. 28)
If to think is to juggle ideas, and if this operation
depends in turn on the 'power' of volition, then the
self-determination of thought is a function of the self
as Agent. In an editorial comment on Reid's analysis of
the Will, Hamilton accuses Brown of having "virtually
abolished all rational freedom, all responsible agency,
all moral distinctions". Thus, Brown's complaint against
the "empire" of volition is turned against him: either he
is for reason, so conceived, or he is an anarchist! But
has Brown been fairly represented? Is he compelled to
accept those alternatives?
What troubles Brown is the suggestion that an idea
must be 'absent' in order to be 'called up'; that is, it
must 'not be' so that one can will it 'into being*.
Conversely, an idea must be 'present' if one is to get
rid of it: willing it 'out of being', in other words,
presupposes that it 'is'. Where then is the difficulty?
If something has to be called forth, obviously it is not
^"Reid, Works, ed. Sir Wm. Hamilton (6th ed.;
Edinburgh, 1863), II, 531 ftn.
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there; if something has to be disposed of, obviously it
is there. The child who is late for supper is summoned;
the friend who overstays his visit is gently pushed out
the door. The difficulty does not lie in the mutual
logical exclusion of 'absent* and 'present' or of 'being*
and 'non-being'; Brown has no wish to flout reason in that
respect. The spurious element is to be found, rather, in
the very 'act' of making or unmaking. Reason has gone
astray in the logical portrayal of these concepts.
Where would one have to 'look', asks Brown, to
find, for the purpose of summoning, an idea? In the case
of the child, he might be playing in his room or visiting
his little friend next door. If one does not know 'where'
to look, one may call out his name or in desperation
telephone the police. There is at least a recognizable
distinction between 'having an idea where to look' and
'not having the foggiest notion where he might be'. Thus,
summoning entails locating and calling into presence. An
absent or 'missing' idea, on the other hand, already has
a 'place'. One can always be certain about 'where' to
find it: in so far as one has the idea 'in mind', re¬
gardless cf how difficult it may be to grasp, it is
there. For all we know, ideas may play in spare bedrooms,
but if 'having an idea' means anything at all, it means
'having it before one'. And there the analogy between
children and ideas decisively ends I
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Summoning an idea is therefore a curious activity.
The location of the idea is predetermined as being already
before one, and the calling into presence must surely
deafen its ears. One can only conclude that it is un¬
necessary to summon it in the first place. Berkeley had
observed that when we will "straightway this or that idea
arises". Yet the particular idea which we will is already
summoned; for it is this idea, not that with which we wish
to occupy ourselves. If he had called for 'any idea', he
would surely have experienced and registered surprise at
the coming. Since he nowhere mentions such surprise, we
are tempted to say that willing had in fact preceded
itself, arriving with the idea before it could call out.
The act cf willing or summoning an idea is therefore
logically self-defeating.
Getting rid of an idea is equally curious. The
visitor can be, if necessary, locked out; easing him out
with dignity may be problematic, especially if he feeds
on your company, but the act of expulsion can in time be
achieved. Expelling, then, involves locating-away and
removing from presence. An idea destined for this fate
has, on the contrary, a location-inside. To whatever
'place' it is sentenced, it carries this location-inside
2
with it. Certain viscous substances have the same
2
I have encountered, coincidentally, the use of very
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property. Moreover, there is something almost Falstaffian
about ideas: one lives with their hollow but poignant
threat, "Banish me, banish all the world." To think on
'something else' is either treacherous or impossible,
depending on the state of the idea with its location-
inside. If 'treacherous', the idea hangs on like a guilty
conscience; if 'impossible', one is simply not thinking
on 'anything else*, however delusive the feeling. Thus,
if one has any sense, one does not banish ideas; one
lets them slip away unobtrusively. The logic of expulsion
does not apply to ideas, just as it is seldom under¬
stood by visitors.
No act, therefore, unmakes an idea; only a 'non-
act' can eventually succeed. Since willing is an
activity, it is wholly unsuited to the task. To wish
similar metaphorical language in Freud's analysis of
repression. According to Freud, that which is caused to
vanish - the ideational presentation of an instinctual
drive, - is absorbed into the unconscious, only to "return"
through "substitute-formation" and other "symptoms" left
in the "train" of repression. Bearing this in mind, one
can readily see the striking parallels in his account.
"In general, repression of the ideational presentation of
an instinct can surely only have the effect of causing it
to vanish from consciousness if it had previously been in
consciousness, or of holding it back if it is about to
enter it. The difference, after all, is not important; it
amounts to much the same thing as the difference between
ordering an undesirable guest out of my drawing-room or
out of my front hall, and refusing to let him cross my
threshold once I have recognized him. ... I need only
add that I have to place a sentinel to keep constant
guard over the door which I have forbidden this guest to
pass, lest he should burst it open." General Psychological
Theory: Papers on Metapsychology, ed. Philip Rieff (N.Y.:
Collier Books, 1963), p. 110 and p. 110 n.
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the non-thought of x is to wish the thought of the non-
thought of x, and so on ad infinitum. On the other hand,
not-wishing the non-thought of x may allow the thought of
x to pass over into the thought of y. There is nothing in
the logic of not-willing, however, which can overcome even
this contingency.
We must now regroup at least some of these distinctions
around specific points in Brown's argument, picking up
the textual slack as we go. As early as his critique of
Darwin's Zoonomia, Brown raises doubts about our ability
voluntarily to cummon or reject ideas. "Dr. Darwin
ascribes to volition so much power over our ideas," writes
Brown, "that he considers it, as not merely capable of
inducing, but of destroying them." (Obs., 240) The
field of 'induction' is that of recollection, and we will
examine this first. Either an idea which is induced
"exists" prior to volition or "I will something; I know
not what" (Obs., 236). If I will no particular idea,
the emergent "existence" of any specific one "cannot,
therefore, be ascribed to the volition" (ibid.); that is,
if I take cat three wishes on 'nothing* I cannot con¬
gratulate any of them on the appearance of 'something'. ,
Of course, by mixing universal negative ( (x) - <}>x) and
existential affirmative ( (3x)4>x) terms, we only confuse
the issue; a null class is not equivalent to a class out
of which at least one, but not necessarily any one,
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member is to be chosen. Or again, the proposition 'No
idea is wished' is not equivalent to the proposition
'Some idea is wished*. Brown's point is simply that
unless we know in advance which idea we want to recollect,
it makes no sense to say that we wish to recollect this and
not another idea. In short, the statement 'I want to
think x' adds nothing to the statement 'I am thinking x'.
Brown is perhaps never more fully in accord with
Ryle than when he removes from assertions about what we
are doing the explanatory device of pre-act mental pro¬
cesses. 'Willing' does not make an idea more 'present' to
thought than 'thinking' it. Far from explaining how the
idea came into our heads, the intimation that we willed
it serves only to derange a perfectly straight-forward
description. At the same time, thinking, reflecting upon,
or recollecting a certain idea is bound up with the laws
of association which govern all thought. Brown's commit¬
ment to the principle of association was to mark him in
the annals cf philosophy as one of the co-founders, with
3
Hartley and James Mill, of the Associationist 'School'.
3
It is difficult to say who was most responsible
for this categorization of Brown. V. Cousin, A. Bain,
and J.S. Mill all contributed to the mould-casting. Sir
William Hamilton's hand is also ominously present in the
act of labelling; of that we can be fairly certain. J.S.
Mill, for one, obtained a great deal of mileage out of it.
See "Bain's Psychology", in Dissertations and Discussions
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Unfortunate as this depiction might be, particularly in
4
the light of Brown's obviously spirited independence, it
remains to be shown just how these laws of association were
applied to the problem at hand. It may be helpful to
consider three such instances. I shall label them respec¬
tively, (1) the Dream Case, (2) the Case of Thinking Of,
and (3) the Memory Case. The first and third cases will
be found to share many, although not all, important character¬
istics. The third introduces a rather special feature
whose relevance to the general context of our discussion
will be immediately apparent. All three can be regarded
as interdependent variations of the same theme.
(London, 1867), III, 98 & 116; and "Bailey on Berkeley's
Theory of Vision", in Dissertations and Discussions
(London, 1859), II, 851 Hippolyte Taine, perhaps merci-
fully, elevated Brown to the stature of a "Psychologist",
concerned with others of his breed to define the "soul"
and the "order of all that it contains" (italics mine).
See Life and Letters of H. Taine; 1828-1852, tr. by R.L.
Devonshire (Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd.,
1902) , Appendix II. More recently, Gladys Bryson has brought
him down again with a thump, accusing him first of being an
"eclectic" and then of having "borrowed some ideas from the
associationists". Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry
of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton U.P.,
1945), p. 145. Does a Hborrower' possess the rights of





Darwin had stated that "we can spontaneously call
up our last night's dream before us, tracing it industriously
step by step through all its variety of scenery and
transaction" (Obs., 236-7) . To this affirmation Brown
replies not with the argument of inconsistency (according
to which we cannot will the existence of that which co¬
exists with the volition), but with an argument of a dif¬
ferent sort. We begin by assuming that every volition is
caused by a particular sensation, one peculiar to it alone.
' If A, B, and C are the subjects of a dream, then the
'voluntary recollection' of A will stimulate a "fibrous
motion" producing a sensation As, which "terminates in
the fibrous motion B" (Obs., 237). But the order of
subject-matter in a dream is not determined by volition
for, as Darwin himself had conceded, the will is inoperative
during sleep. Thus, D not B may have succeeded A in the
context of the dream. B, however, is now firmly con¬
nected with A as being A's successor, in the light of
(conscious) voluntary recollection. What then becomes
of D? The answer can only be that it disappears. Brown
concludes:
"one link being lost, the remaining changes of the dream
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could not possibly be traced. Unless, therefore, we
suppose, that the order of the sensitive, and associate
ideas, during sleep, is the same, as the order of our
voluntary ideas, during our waking hours (which renders
volition useless) the regular causation, by one faculty,
of a series of motions, excited by another faculty, is
evidently impossible."
(Obs., 237-8)
This ingenious, if curious, argument tells us a great
deal about Brown's views on association. The explanation
in terms of "fibrous motions" is really unnecessary to
the point regarding the incompatibility of conscious and
unconscious 'association*. As Brown clearly states, the
'order' of subjects is not the same in both. Whatever
'laws' govern the arrangement of 'content' in one's un¬
conscious moments, these cannot be ascribed to waking
experience."'' Yet far from confirming the power of
volition to 'summon up' particular sequences of ideas,
this argument strengthens Brown's contention that the
unique order of conscious ideas undermines that very
power; in his words, "renders volition useless". If A
triggers the thought of B (however one might choose to
describe the mechanics of this 'triggering'), then no act
of volition is required to call into presence the idea of
B. On the other hand, the idea A makes an appearance, a
In this connection, Brown makes no essential
advance on the views expressed by Condillac in his Traite;
see I, v, 3, 4 and 5; II, ix, 10 and 13; III, viii, 2.
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fact for which some account must be given. Do we recol¬
lect A by willing it into thought? The argument of in¬
consistency provides a ready answer, but this argument
has been waived.
Let us suppose, again, that it makes sense to say
that we 'voluntarily recollect' A. Given A's appearance,
B, C, D, and so on, follow; not voluntarily but on the
basis of a conjunctive or associative relation. Pre¬
sumably, a similar sequence would evolve if we 'willed'
to recollect B instead of .A, or C instead of A or B. But
let us assume further that there is no associative
binding. Then, having once recollected A by an act of
volition, we would have to repeat the volition for B, C,
D, and so on. Indeed, wherever we started, this point
would be no more and no less compelling than any other;
moreover, the same conditions would hold for each idea
successively willed into presence. Such voluntary in¬
determinacy, however, would play havoc with the intelligible
reconstruction of a dream. (Of course, a dream might
resist any attempt at reconstruction, but that is another
matter.) Hence, if the recollection of the dream is to
be meaningful, the clues for order must come from another
source. Either a pattern exists for the will to follow,
in which case volition is irrelevant, or else there is no
pattern but only isolated and coincidental objects of
willed effort, in which case the recollection is in-
156.
significant. Our ordinary experience in this regard would
seem to indicate (a) that it is through a sustained
desire to recapture a dream that we remember anything at
all, and (b) that we are very much at the mercy of some
kind of "dream relatedness' if and when certain subjects
do emerge. These factors have nothing to do with
"remembering x as . . ." or 'remembering that x was or
is w . . .': such patterns concern the way in which we
remember things. The "order" with which Brown is concerned
involves, rather, the basic succession of ideas brought
out in recollection. This may or may not correspond to
the 'actual' succession of ideas in the dream, but that
consideration is fruitless since we cannot both recollect
the 'real' order and recollect the 'remembered' order.
Brown asks only whether the logic of 'willing' plays any
part at all in the formation of a series A, B, C . . .or
A, D, F . . . . It is his understanding of the problem
that volition collides with and does not furnish the
'order' (whatever it is) which is there for our perusal.
"The incongruity of our ideas, during sleep," Brown
writes, "has always been remarked: yet he, who reviews
the adventures of the preceding night, will be able to
trace a connection, in the wildest assemblages of fancy."
(Obs., 336) Unfortunately, by failing to reveal his
trump-card (see case 3), he leaves us at least partially
convinced that we do in fact force the initial subject, A,
157.
out of the woods by the sheer 'act' of 'will-power'.
This inference, moreover, is further justified by
Brown's apparent uncertainty with respect to the function
of volition (if indeed there can be said to be one) in
many instances. At one stage, he argues against Darwin
that a person who stammers is "excited" towards the re¬
maining syllables of a word not simply by "associate
motions, induced by long habit" (Obs., 330), but also by
the same "efforts" of volition which had given him the
2
first (Obs., 332). Both in the Inquiry and in the
9
Darwin had been concerned to examine the con¬
sequences of a "dissevered" succession of musical notes
or verbal syllables. If Z instead of the usual D follows
C in a particular succession, how will D be restored to
its rightful position behind C? How will the musician get
back into the original melody, and how will the stammerer
who by now is flustered and anxious progress from the first
to the remaining syllables? The harder the latter tries,
attests Darwin, the more difficult it will be for him
"to rejoin the train" (see Obs., 331). Brown replies:
first, that since D has habitually succeeded C, the inter¬
vention of Z on just one occasion will scarcely hold
weight when the whole series is again repeated; secondly,
that the musician needs only to repeat the score to re¬
capture the air; and thirdly, that since, on Darwin's
view, volition brings about the utterance of the first
syllable of a word, volition with the help of association
will induce or "excite" the others. Brown is not at all
convinced that the distraught condition of the stammerer
prevents his enunciation of a word. School boys, he
argues, are not afraid of failing in front of their peers,
and yet some stutter; moreover, the anxiety to "shine"
produces "eloquence" in the orator not stammering. One
might justifiably be skeptical of these counter-instances
adduced by Brown, but he may be right that the "cause" of
stammering lies elsewhere. Darwin, he claims, has not
explained, but rather "[presupposed] the phenomenon"
(Obs., 330-5).
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Lectures, Brown unravels his confusion and clarifies the
matter somewhat, so that he no longer seems to be con¬
tradicting himself and handing back to Darwin the tyran¬
nical 'power* of volition he had previously withdrawn!
It is to his credit, on the other hand, that he
foresees the necessity of distinguishing between sub¬
conscious and conscious 'types' of association. (It
should be recalled that Stewart had affirmed that "the
same laws cf association which regulate the train of our
thoughts while we are awake, continue to operate during
sleep", - Elements, I, v, 299 f.) Darwin had reasoned
that where sleep interrupted the conscious train of ideas
induced by volition, "new trains of ideas (Obs., 336)
unique to the constitution of our dreams would take over.
But if these trains are cut off from voluntary stimuli,
what sort cf "trains" would these be? They could not
resemble our "waking trains" which are largely dependent
on volition. They would, in fact, be so unlike these
waking trains that they could hardly be regarded as
"trains" at all. And yet, disconnected and dissociated
as our dreams appear to be, we seem to be able to draw
significant patterns from them in our conscious recol¬
lections. This, for Brown, is the 'mystery' to be un¬
folded. We simply have to bear in mind that it is by
virtue of the relative order of ideas or trains of
ideas in their appearance to us that we come to remember
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some more than others (Obs., 337). A dream just ended
may haunt us with its 'memories' to such a degree that we
'forget' the normal duties of the day. It is this im¬
pingement of more recent events on our memories and
3
activities which turns the 'laws of memory' upside down.
What, on a linear view, ought to be the first memories
are generally the 'last' and the last 'first'.
Perhaps it is worth noting that nowhere in the
more recent Malcolm-Yost debate on 'Dreaming' does
there occur a reference to our 'willed exertions towards
4
recollections'. The recognition that we often have to
struggle to remember and frequently fail to recall our
dreams in no way entails either that we first 'will' and
then 'remember' dream-contents or that our failure to
recall them is a failure of 'will-power'. Yost does
speak of a willed effort on the part of an individual to
wake up during or in the terminal stages of what he calls
5
a "false-awakening dream". This is a different, although
3
cf. Condillac, Traite, II, xi, 13; III, viii, 2.
4
Norman Malcolm, "Dreaming and Skepticism", The
Philosophical Review, 65 (1956); and R.M. Yost, Jr.,
"Professor Malcolm on Dreaming and Skepticism", The
Philosophical Quarterly, 9 (1959) , pp. 142-51 and pp.
231-43.
^Yost, op. cit., pp. 241-2.
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very revealing, matter. No attempt is being made here
to recollect or otherwise manipulate ideas through some
voluntary activity. Rather, and this point conflicts
with the suppositions of both Darwin and Brown (but
agrees with that of Stewart), a claim is made for the
exertion of an individual's will during that state re¬
ferred to as 'sleep'. Malcolm, of course, denies such a
possibility on the grounds that willing, in general, is
a conscious activity and that the state of sleep logically
precludes any conscious activity. (One cannot both say
that one is asleep and be asleep.)^ Yost, on the other
hand, argues quite convincingly that dreaming and waking
experiences, as well as their contents, are similar in
more ways than Malcolm will allow, to the extent that
7
people often ascribe to one the 'memories' of the other.
As we have very briefly indicated, there would be
very little in the philosophies of Condillac or Brown to
dispute such a contention. On their view, the data of
recollection are largely, although not entirely, autonomous;
^The linguistic ruling seems to be that it makes no
sense to talk about 'conscious states' unless one is pre¬
pared to provide vocal confirmation of them; having done so,
one has 'expressed' all that there is or logically can be.
Presumably, a person is 'conscious' only in so far as he is
'talking' and 'asleep' as long as he says 'nothing'. At one
time, latter-day empiricists were satisfied to maintain that
'seeing or touching is believing'; now they insist that
'hearing is knowing all'. This position supposedly makes
short work of any nonsense about a "tacit dimension".
^Yost, op. cit., p. 240.
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they push themselves forward for our attention and re¬
flection. Initially, we might separate them into 'camps',
some belonging to dreams, others to conscious activity.
Yet it is quite conceivable that we might fall prey to
confusion, and momentarily lose the capacity for ab¬
stracting certain fragments from other, and more complete,
data. This is the substance of Condillac's discussion of
the "dream illusion" (Trait£, III, viii, 2). Ultimately,
the shock of contradiction between the order of waking
experiences and the disorder of dream one restores our
cognitive balance, but there can be desperate moments 'off-
stride' for the innocent or unwary.
In so far as we can 'forget to remember' we can,
moreover, 'forget to recognize'. Barring recognition,
'experiences' are lost. They become so many non-fragments
of nothing. The dire consequences of such a loss are
magnified if we consider that memory is indispensable both
to recognition and to a significant sense of self-history.
Condillac's portrayal of his statue's limitations under
such circumstances pin-points the dilemma:
"If there remained no recollection of former modifications,
then on the occasion of each sensation it would believe
itself to be feeling for the first time. Whole years
might be swallowed up in each present moment. Were its
attention always limited to one mode of being it would
never be able to take account of two together, and never
be able to judge of their relations. It would enjoy or
suffer without having yet either desire or fear."
(Traite, I, ii, 5)
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It was thus with due emphasis that Brown took up the study
of recollection and gave it a central position in his
philosophy of mind.
4
THE CASE OF THINKING OF
The second instance to be considered will almost
certainly prove to be disappointing. Not only does it
hold promise of much more than it explicitly offers, but
it is also naively simplistic. Nevertheless, within the
restrictions proposed for ourselves, even that sense of
exasperation can be mitigated somewhat by the thought
that Brown is at last digging his teeth into far weightier
material. It was G.E. Moore's opinion that "this mere
thinking of a thing which we are not directly perceiving
... is a mental operation which is of the utmost im¬
portance."^ We will be referring to Moore again in the
course of our exposition. Meanwhile, it should be taken
as a note of encouragement that Brown is more concerned
with questions of this sort than with the pros and cons
of whether we can, in fact, bandy ideas about at will.
In retrospect, the road probably appears tortuous to us;
in Brown's time, however, it was quite the opposite.
The passage which Brown quotes from Darwin's
Zoonomia is a curious mixture of sense and nonsense. In
G.E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (N.Y.:
Collier Books, 1962), p. 269.
- 163 -
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Brown's opinion,, the argument plainly confutes itself. In
the first place, it reasons that "I cannot will to think
of a black swan, without previously thinking of a black
swan" (Obs., 238) . The realization that volition is re¬
dundant is, of course, Brown's whole point: we can and
2
do entertain ideas without it. In the second place,
however, Darwin contends that "if I now think of a tail,
my will is so far free, that I can pursue the ideas linked
to this idea of tail as far as my knowledge of the subject
extends" (Obs., 238-9). Leaping from a singular depiction
or thought of a black swan to a generalized notion about
all tailed animals, the argument attempts to reintroduce
volition on the wing, as it were. Presumably the thought
of all animals having tails makes a difference. But where
and why? A particular idea is not a general idea, but
both are 'ideas', and the first part of the argument rules
that the mere thought of any idea is sufficient.
Brown approaches the question this way:
2
Since we have now firmly established Brown's
position on this score, it is safe to add the historical
comment that George Croom Robertson succeeded Brown in
holding to this view. "In regard to representations", he
asserts, "we have not the power of voluntarily bringing
up what is not in consciousness. We may wish as much as
we like to do so, and nevertheless not succeed. The
notion is self-contradictory. In order to bring it in
by willing, we must already be somehow conscious of it.
But then we have not to bring it into consciousness."
Elements of Psychology (London, 1896), p. 244.
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"The idea of a black swan occurs. I think of its head, of
its feet, of its tail, and I wish to know all the animals,
that have tails. But I cannot be said to recollect them
voluntarily. . . . the tail of the swan suggests the
tail of a peacock, but, that the excitation is not
voluntary, is proved by Dr. Darwin's argument: for I
must then have thought of the peacock's tail, previously
to volition, as in the case of the black swan."
(Obs., 239)
Now, what Brown has done is to consider the recollection
of all animals having tails as a succession of retrospective
thoughts. Looking back over my experience of different
animals, I single out those which possess the characteristic
particularized by the thought of the black swan's tail..
Even if I can abstract the idea of 'tail' from the thought
of 'black swan' (and, of course, there is no reason why
I cannot separate a part from a whole), it does not follow
that I can thereby will the thought of other animals
having tails, or the thought of other tails abstracted
from their owners, or the thought of 'tailed animal',
or indeed any thought of anything at all. The function
known as 'abstracting' does not entail a separate function
known as 'willing' by which it is preceded. To wish to
abstract a certain part from a conceived whole is to be
thinking of that part so separated. Hence, there is no
essential difference between thinking of a black swan and
thinking of other animals in respect of their tails:
volition is precluded by the simple performance of that
operation, if and when it takes place. (Brown is here
objecting not so much to the possibility that one might,
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actively, wish for something - this was Reid's point about
the necessity of volition having an object, A.P., II, i„ 59, -
as to the supposition that the activity of the abstracting re¬
quires a supportive 'activity' to lead the way, as it were.
The fact that abstraction could conceivably stand as an 'ob¬
ject' for volition - when, for example, one wishes one could
*
'separate things in one's mi-nd', - does not intrude upon the
argument that volition is not a precondition of every act of
abstracting, such that I must will to abstract some particular
aspect from a given whole.) It begins to look very much as
though Darwin expected the camouflage of abstraction to con¬
ceal the suggestion that one needs volition in order to think
beyond particulars to universals. Here as before, Brown
smells the rat of superfluity.
Yet we cannot leave the matter there. Brown has gone
a step further in his refutation
of the voluntary recollection of all tailed animals. He has
submitted his own claim that during the mental review of
animals possessing tails, "[the] mind is entirely passive"
(Obs., p. 239), in the sense that certain phenomena are now
being presented to it for consideration. (Brown's charac¬
terization of the situation as 'entirely passive' is probably
unfair to what is obviously an admixture of passive or 're¬
ceiving' and active or 'reviewing' elements.) The thought
of the swan's tail is succeeded by the thought of the peacock's
tail. Far from wishing this to be the order of my re-
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capitulation, I am led by suggestion to pass from the one
to the other. If I had thought of the tail of a mina
bird instead, this and not the peacock's tail would have
stood second in line, with the peacock's tail third, or
perhaps that of the ostrich or the sandpiper. Individual
experience, learning, and preference might all figure in
the determination of rank. "The natural train of ideas,"
writes Brown, "passes through [the mind], and it is in
the power of any stronger association, to turn the course
of thought, into another channel" (Obs., 239). What makes
the train "natural" (and therefore either 'haphazard' or
'reasonable') need not concern us here, although clearly
Brown believes that a body of 'laws' governs the passage
from one idea to the next.
So far, we have not introduced Brown's distinction
between simple and relative suggestion, as developed
between Lectures XXXIII and XLVI. Aspects of this dis¬
tinction will appear later in this case and more fully in
the next. At the moment, I need only point out (a) that
simple suggestion is characterized by a certain looseness
or 'coincidence' in the conjunction of ideas, and (b)
that Brown makes very explicit the type and nature of
those laws without which the mind could not operate as
mind. That peculiar 'contingency' of ideas in simple
suggestion does not conflict with the possibility of
governing laws, but simply defines the latter's status as
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empirical (or 'matter of fact'). Brown ultimately reduces
the primary laws of simple suggestion - namely, resemblance,
contrast, and contiguity, - to the unitary foundation of
"prior coexistence" or "immediate proximity" (L. XXXV,
11), although for the sake of convenience and of others,
he effectively retains the Aristotelian trilogy. The nine
secondary laws of simple suggestion - length of time;
degree of liveliness; frequency of occurrence; degree of
purity; differences of original constitution; temporary
differences of emotion; differences of bodily state; and
general tendencies produced by prior habits (cf. L.
XXXVII, 44 ff), - all tend to offer explanatory support for
the primary laws and to curb the temptation towards the
assignation cf "mysterious unions" between the parts of
3
a train (cf. L. XLIII, 146). In contrast to the
association of ideas in simple suggestion, the conjunction
of ideas in relative suggestion holds necessarily (cf.
L. XXXIII, 519-20), and so creates, in Brown's words,
3
One need have no qualms about lauding Brown's
considerable achievement in this connection. H.C. Warren
testifies that Brown was "the first to distinguish clearly
between the primary and secondary laws of association -
between the different sorts of union and the factors which
determine its quantitative variation. In particular, his
analysis of the secondary laws is remarkably complete, and
his formulation of them is thorough, not to say redundant."
A History of the Association Psychology from Hartley to
Lewes, op. cit., p. 119. For once, we seem to have a
strong instance of Brown's originality with which to
counter Hamilton's oft-repeated charge of scandalous
"appropriation".
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"a suggestion of a very different sort". More important
for our purposes at this stage, however, is the im¬
plication that suggestibility plays an integral part in
our handling of universals.
Let us replay the train of ideas envisaged by Brown
in his example. We can assume for the moment Brown's
conclusion that the will is "an intruder, without any
business of its own" (Obs., 239), and concentrate on the
concatenation of ideas itself. "The idea of a black
swan occurs." This we can call representation A. "I
think of its head, of its feet, of its tail. ..." To
think of something, in this context at least, is synonymous
with having an idea of or attending to it, and so we may
label these representations B, C, and D. At this point,
"I wish to know all the animals, that have tails." I
have, in other words, selected representation D (the tail)
for further examination. My thought lingers, as it were,
on this representation. But we have arrived at a pre¬
carious fork in the road: whether I say 'this A has a
D' or 'all A's have D's', I am committed to more than is
contained in the particular representation at hand. I
have bon gve , mal gre involved myself in the language of
'universals'. If Brown realizes this, he does not let
on. Of course, this may not be the time or place for
judgments. Consequently, we can safely hold to the
isolated representations A and D. Even this tactic is
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not altogether satisfactory, however, for the relation
'belongs to' is implied by the phrase "its tail". But
where did the relation originate? We know from the
Lectures that Brown believed relations of this sort -
involving two or more objects or ideas, - to be intuitively
felt (cf. L. XLI, 111-2); they are not built on successive
comparisons with other so-and-so's standing in a certain
way to a such-and-such. Thus, in advancing beyond A with
D in hand, I pass on to other 'complex unities' wherein a
particular relation is felt to exist between the subject
and its predicates. "... the tail of the swan suggests
the tail of a peacock ... ."My thought now brings
itself to bear on a second complex representation P,
having something which goes by the same name as D, the
tail of the swan. For the sake of convenience, and while
awaiting inspection of this curious new arrival, we shall
call the representation of the peacock's tail, D^. Since
our train is momentarily complete, we can run back over
the series of events with a view to testing the factor
of suggestibility.
The manner in which B, C, and D suggest themselves
to me has something to do with my having the thought of
A. Merely attending to A brings to mind B, C, and D.
The idea of A, which to all appearances is complex, lends
itself to diffusion over B, C, and D. Because each of
these representations stands in relation to A as well as
171.
in relation to one another, the pattern of suggestion
whereby the unfolding takes place is a relative one. A
child, for example, is as much a member of his 'family'
as he is the son and brother of his 'parents' and 'brothers
or sisters' respectively. But the manner in which P +
suggests itself to me after the mere thought of A + D
possesses none of the above characteristics. The re¬
presentation of the peacock's tail is simply there before
me. Whereas it would be most peculiar for me to assert
that I was surprised by the suggestion of the tail with
respect to the peacock, a reaction of surprise would not
be unwarranted in the second case; for I might just as
easily have thought of a bluejay's tail. The element of
surprise, therefore, makes a telling difference between
the simple suggestion (A + D) (P + D^) and the relative
suggestion (A + B, C, D) or (P + B^, C^, D^). Yet this
telling difference is not, for Brown, the crucial one.
Nor does it help us to understand the implication for
'universals' of the factor of suggestibility.
Suppose someone mentions in passing the name of
a mutual friend. While the other fellow drones on
oblivious to my inattention, I am captivated by the thought
of this friend. Brown uses the expression, "the conception
of our friend" (L. XXXIII, 519) , but we will retain our
previous terminology and refer to the fact that I have
drifted away from the mainstream of conversation to 'think
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of him®. Now, the sound of his name seems to involve
"no feeling of any common property" (ibid.) with the
idea of him, or if you like, with the image which I have
conjured up and to which I have given my attention. As
Brown affirms, it is "precisely the same state of mind,
which might have been induced, by various other previous
circumstances, by the sight of the chair on which he sat, -
of the book which he read to us, - of the landscape which
he painted." (ibid.) From the subjective point of
view, I experience surprise, mixed with feelings of
warmth and nostalgia; from the logical point of view, I
am struck by the sheer contingency of simple suggestion.
Nothing is shared, and yet any one of these items might
suggest my friend. Of course, it is not quite true that
there is no connection between them: after all, sug¬
gestibility depends on what Brown terms the "bearing" of
one idea to another (L. XXXIII, 518). It is not just
any chair which brings to mind the image of my friend,
but the chair on which he sat. The class of chairs,
however, does not include my friend as one of its members.
Of this, at least, there can be no doubt.
Returning to our original train of ideas, we dis¬
cover that the case has grown in complexity. Swans and
peacocks do have things in common - tails for example, -
just as 'head', 'feet', and 'tail' possess standing
membership in the idea of 'swan' or 'peacock'. (Should
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the club fold, of course, swans, and logicians alike would
have to revise their thinking on this score.) Whether
the relation be one of 'resemblance1 or 'prior coexistence',
the fact that one idea suggests another arises out of a
sense of their 'relatedness'. If 'tail' is a general term
covering the field of 'like entities', then this term is
grounded in a feeling which we hold in respect of the
tails of these or those individuals. On this point,
Brown is quite adamant: general terms, he writes, are
"expressive of own internal feelings of resemblance, and
of nothing more, - expressive of what is in us, and [not] . . .
dependent in any degree on laws of matter" (L. XLVI, 184;
italics mine). Since suggestion is only another name for
the "rise of the feeling of relation" (L. XLV, 174), it
becomes the sine qua non of our understanding and use of
'universals'. Without it we should not be able to pass
from the swan's tail to that of the peacock. Led on by
our feeling of resemblance between them, we aptly sym¬
bolize the transition by twice employing the word 'tail'
or the letter 'D'. And so, it is with firm approbation
that Brown cites Reid's testimony concerning the necessity
of general words in the formation and structure of
language. Deprived of general terms, our "knowledge"
would be as "incommunicable as [it would be] vague" (L.
XLV, 178-9). This is not the place to explore that
question further, but it is clear that Brown believes
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suggestibility to be the crux of the age-old problem of
universals.
What we must do here, in the way of recapitulation,
is to pick up the thread of volition as it relates to
our case of 'thinking of'. Far from being irrelevant,
the resolution of this facet of the larger question re¬
tains a significant grip on the whole. A resemblance or
contrast between two objects or ideas is, after all, some¬
thing which we notice, in some, not too literal, sense
of that word. But if my attention is directed towards a
certain feature of a situation, might that not mean that
I perform the directing, in other words, that I in¬
tentionally regard them in a particular way? It is pre¬
cisely this inviting use of words to which Brown must pay
special heed.
We have already touched on Brown's denial that my
'recollection' of all animals having tails has anything
to do with volition. "I cannot be said to recollect them
voluntarily", he argues. "My mind is entirely passive.
the natural train of ideas passes through it, and it is
in the power of any stronger association, to turn the
course of thought, into another channel." (Obs., 239;
italics mine). With regard to certain of these points,
however, there is cause for challenge and query. In the
first place, did not Brown himself say immediately before
this that "I wish to know all the animals, that have
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tails"? (italics mine) It is not, then, a matter of
pure coincidence that my thoughts pass from the swan's
tail to that of the peacock. Having chosen to attend
exclusively to this feature of the swan, I begin to seek
out other objects with the same, or at least a similar,
attribute. The comparison seems to be quite deliberate.
Secondly, the mind cannot be said to be "entirely passive"
if, as Brown later insists, the mind's "internal feelings
of resemblance" are responsible for the birth of general
ideas, such as 'tail'. 'Labour pains' entail a certain
amoung of work on the part of the person involved.
Furthermore, the "laws of the mind", unlike some other
types of law, are not meant to sit idly on the statute
books: either they operate or we cannot think! Thirdly,
and this relates back to the first point, my train of
ideas is hardly left to the whims of "nature" if I am
busy seeking out resemblances. I am trying to recollect
and imagine animals with a similar characteristic and, as
Coleridge realized, the work of imagination is a far cry
from that of mere fancy. The upshot, then, of our challenge
to Brown is that the range of 'suggestibles' is limited
both by intent and by logical necessity. It is to the
first of these that we must summon Brown's 'rescue
party'.
Obviously, what Brown is resisting is the inter¬
vention of a voluntary act in the midst of the logical
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machinery of suggestion. Even more objectionable to him
would be an intellectual act' whereby general ideas were
discovered (or 'seen' in Plato's sense) outside the mind
and brought to bear on the manifold of particular in¬
stances. Surrender here means surrender not only to
Realism, but also to the desperate 'evils' of an a priori
metaphysics. For Brown, the only meaningful course to
follow is the one which begins with what we have, and that
initially is very little. In time, analysis will yield
more, but we must not delude ourselves with 'mysteries'
purchased at too high a price!
What we have to retain, then, is our simple
acquaintance with the "spontaneous" flow of our ideas or
states of mind. In a passage illustrative also of
Brown's independence of thought, we find the key to his
theory of suggestion:
"Our consciousness, during perception, is . . . far from
indicating any process of association; and all of which
we are conscious, at the time of the suggestion itself,
is the mere succession of one feeling to another, not
certainly of any prior process on which this suggestion
has depended. The laws of suggestion, then, as opposed
to what may be called association, - or, in other words,
the circumstances which seem to regulate the spontaneous
successions of our ideas, without reference to any former
intellectual process, except the simple primary per¬
ceptions, from which all our corresponding conceptions
are derived, - form a legitimate theory, being a perfect
generalization of the known facts, without a single cir¬
cumstance assumed."
(L. XL, 93; italics mine)
The intellectual processes discounted by Brown include
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not only original capacities for conjunction and com¬
parison (cf. L. XL, 88), but also the voluntary re¬
collection of ideas on the occasion of a particular per¬
ception. We do not consciously associate one thing with
another either at the time of our initial perception or
when a certain likeness later occurs to us; nor do we
require a special act of willing to recall the resemblance
of one thing to another when we are confronted in experience
by some object.
"I see two flowers, of the same tints and form, in my
path. I lift my eye to two cliffs of corresponding
outline, that hang above my head. I look at a picture,
and I think of the well known face which it represents; -
or I listen to a ballad, and seem almost to hear again
some kindred melody, which it wakes in my remembrance.
In each of these cases, if the relative suggestion take
place, my mind, after existing in the states which constitute
perception, or the remembrance of the two similar objects,
exists immediately in that state which constitutes the
feeling of resemblance, as it exists in the state which
constitutes the feeling of difference, when I think of
certain circumstances, in which objects, though similar,




"when I look at two flowers, it is not necessary that I
should have formed any intentional comparison. But the
similitude strikes me, before any desire of discovering
resemblance can have arisen. I may, indeed, resolve to
trace, as far as I am able, the resemblances of particular
objects, and may study them accordingly; but this very
desire presupposes, in the mind, a capacity of relative
suggestion, of which it avails itself, in the same manner,
as the intention of climbing a hill, or traversing a




The decisive factor in both perception and conception is,
therefore, the immediacy with which either similarity or
difference is felt to exist between any two objects or
events. Yet, in drawing this case to a close, we must
single out a second, an equally important, element which
binds the logic of 'thinking of' to that of 'attending
to'.
Brown has allowed that there are indeed instances
when we wish to study a group of objects with a view to
'tracing' their resemblances. The example of the black
swan and the peacock is one of these. Desiring to know
whether or not this particular object shares membership
in a certain class with that object implies: (a) the co-
presence in our minds of two or more objects; (b) the
capacity first to abstract them from the surrounding
scene, and secondly to focus on them exclusively; and
(c) the disposition to attend to the business at hand, viz.,
the search for relationships and subsequent naming of
these. If a person lacks any sort of inclination to
explore their common features, he cannot properly be said
to be attending to the subject. "To attend", writes
Brown, "is to have a desire of knowing that to which we
attend, and attention without desire is a verbal
contradiction, - an inconsistency, at least, as great as
if we were said to desire to know without any desire of
knowing, or to be attentive without attention." (L. XXXI,
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486; italics mine). This logical inconsistency is
brought out when, for example, we catch ourselves in¬
advertently or absentmindedly staring at a group of
objects. When asked to describe what it is we are looking
at, we reply (not without some embarrassment): 'Well,
actually I wasn't paying very much attention.' By admitting
that our minds have been 'elsewhere', we acknowledge that
we were intent upon something^quite different. Similarly,
a teacher who senses that her class has lost all desire to
follow the lesson knows very well that the situation is
hopeless, even though she may struggle painfully to re¬
capture their attention. Nevertheless, we must distinguish
between the function of desire in attending to objects or
ideas and its function in ascertaining the sort of relations
into which they do or must enter. Although desire is an
integral part of the operation of attending to something,
it may or may not come into play when one thing suggests
itself to another. The desire to know more about a
4
In addition, attention oum desire creates an aura
of expectancy and fulfilment. cf. Inquiry, 2, 76: "Attention
is merely the lively and permanent desire of those ideas,
which we expect to rise immediately." Brown later expressed
this view in a somewhat different manner: "To attend, is
simply to wish to know: we are conscious only of the wish
and its effects; and it is truly a beautiful provision in
the economy of the mind, that what we wish to know becomes
immediately on that very account, by the influence of the
ordinary laws of thought and emotion, more easy to be
known." (Sketch, 173-4).
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certain aspect of an object is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition of the felt apprehension of its
relations. Not infrequently, notes Brown, this apprehension
comes about quite spontaneously (cf. L. XXXIII, 518). At
most, desire may 'co-exist' with the "course of suggestion,
which continues still to follow its own laws" (L. XXXIII,
521). The same distinction applies to the 'willing away'
or 'banishing' of ideas: we are restricted either to
'forcing' our attention on to other things and letting
these carry us willy-nilly by association or allowing the
natural flow of suggestion to follow its own course by
simply 'relaxing into it' (cf. 'Inquiry, 2, 76ff).
Throughout his writings, Brown is very much concerned
to emphasize the autonomous character of suggestibility
and, within the present context, to free relations from
any sort of psychological dependency on Emotions. Whatever
role the latter may assume, whether 'co-existing' or
'mingling' with "our trains of intellectual thought" (L.
XXXIII, 517) , they are incapable of altering either the
nature or the laws of our "mental affections". The only
feelings with which we are "intellectually conversant",
affirms Brown, are conceptions (or "images of the past")
and relations (L. XXXIII, 518). Hence, the desire which,
as it were, ignites attention can sometimes add perseverance
to our search for resemblances, but it is neither essential
to the progression of suggested relations nor logically
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bound up with the work of comparison. At least part of
Brown's stand here is taken against Condillac's view of
5
comparison as 'transformed sensation'. It is as im¬
portant to recognize the difference between 'love or hate'
and the sensations of 'smelling or hearing' (L. XXXIII,
515) as it is to distinguish between our emotional and
intellectual states of mind (L. XXXIII, 517). Any attempt
to reduce the one to the other leads to "excessive simplifi¬
cation", subsumes two separate "effects" under one "cause"
(L. XXXIII, 516), and obscures fruitful delineations.
Those who insist that all comparison is intentional, and
thus governed by 'feelings' of an altogether different
sort, are compelled to exclude from consideration those
'leaps of mind' which surprise us with their unexpectedness
(L. XXXIII, 518). Brown's solution is to release the
5
Like Brown, Condillac deciphers a connection between
attention and desire. But whereas for Brown this link is a
conceptual one (involving what we mean when we use the term
'attention'), for Condillac the binding factor is their co-
modal evolution from a common base in sensation. The
passage to which Brown objects, and which he also believes
sets Locke firmly apart from Condillac, appears in Part I,
chapter vii, section 2 of the Traite: "If we consider that
to remember, to compare, to judge, to distinguish, to imagine,
to be astonished, to have abstract ideas, to have ideas of
number and duration, to know truths, whether general or
particular, are but so many modes of being attentive; that
to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to fear, to
will, are but so many different modes of desire; and that
attention, in the one case, and desire, in the other case,
of which all these feelings are modes, are themselves, in
their origin, nothing more than modes of sensation, we cannot
but conclude, that sensation involves in itself - enveloppe -
all the faculties of the soul." (quoted by Brown in
Lectures, XXXIII, 506-7).
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function of comparison from all such explanations, and then
to drop the term once and for all. Rather than invite mis¬
understanding, he suggests, we would do well to start off
on another foot.
We have seen that the problem of 'thinking of'
grows into that of 'attending to', and thence into the
entire question of universals, the structure of suggestibility,
and the relatively minor function of desire with respect to
the tracing of resemblances. The shape of the case brings
to mind a labyrinth of organic complexity. Only in the
Lectures does Brown begin to tackle this whole and each of
its interdependent parts. Again, we must observe that in
his eagerness to separate the 'desire to study' resemblances
from the 'autonomous operation' of suggestion, Brown loses
sight of the fact that the former depicts a mind not
'entirely passive' but in some measure at least 'active',
although not in the sense of 'voluntarily active'.^ And
so, while the case with which be began expands into a rich
In the Lectures, Brown disputes the "very ancient"
division of mental phenomena into those of the under¬
standing (intellectual powers) and those of the will (active
powers). The overlapping of these 'powers', he contends,
occurs much too frequently and is too heavy with indecision
to permit such a division to stand (L. XVI, 243. f). The
mind, rather, must be deemed active """only when some intel¬
lectual energy co-exists with desire"; thus, "to will, is
to act with desire; and, unless in the production of mere
muscular motion, it is only intellectually that we can
act" (ibid., 244).
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promise, it shrinks into a disappointment. The debate
with Darwin over the extent of our volitional capability
proves to be insufficient for the issues it raises. Our
regret must be tempered, however, by the realization that
Brown did not assign himself a full-fledged investigation,
and only gradually awoke to the wider implications of the
subject. In the next and last case, we will follow yet
another seedling to its partial flowering.
5
THE MEMORY CASE
If one were in the mood for careless phrasing, one
might herald the third case as the 'clincher'. In Brown's
mind, no doubt, it laid to eternal rest the 'nonsense' about
our voluntary manipulation of ideas. Unfortunately, such
thinking remains wishful only. The truth of the matter is
rather that the case relies heavily on the principle of
association (which at the time of the Inquiry Brown had not
seen fit to call suggestion), and on a peculiar function of
desire whose importance is almost overshadowed by the
former. One difficulty, certainly, is that Brown asks us
to accept too much at face-value. Nevertheless, we have
scouted the terrain of suggestion sufficiently to comprehend
at least its skeletal workings. We can allow ourselves
some breadth, therefore, in manoeuvring that special
feature of desire into position. Once again, it will be
necessary to tax potentialities to their limit.
Even if one grants, with Brown, that we have no
'direct' voluntary control over our 'trains of thought',
one might still reason that 'indirectly' we are capable of
wishing a particular idea into the foreground of our
attention. The operation would proceed in this way:
- 184 -
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"if I wish to remember a piece of news, which was com¬
municated to me by a friend, it is admitted, that I cannot
call up directly that particular piece of news; but I am
said to have the power of calling up ideas which I know to
have been associated with it in place and time, - the idea
of the person, of the spot, of many little events that may
have happened while we were standing together, and of other
circumstances which were the subject of conversation."
(Inquiry, 4, 57-8; cf. L. XLI,
113-4)1 ~
One would have to assume, of course, that the order of
ideas recollected coincides (or nearly so) with the order
of events as these originally took place; otherwise, one
would never be certain that it was this friend, at that
spot, on such-and-such occasion, who had conveyed the piece
of news to us. Tests of such correspondence are undoubtedly
problematic. We might say, on the one hand, that we have
an "obscure sort of consciousness" of the thing remembered
(Moore), such that it makes sense to affirm that 'we know
very well (when or that) we remember it'; on the other
hand, our own memory 'claims' are often as suspect as the
alleged 'proofs' which others endeavour to bring forward
to refute them. But we may waive consideration of this
issue for the moment.
What we cannot overlook is the hidden supposition
that direct willing of various features of the situation
Unmasked, the point is most certainly Reid's; see
I.P., III, 7, 381. We will have occasion to return to it
in due course.
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(with or without the assistance of the so-called 'power
of association') indirectly generates the remembrance of
yet another item. If I can voluntarily 'call up* several
elements in a 'memory cluster', what is to prevent me from
directly willing the recollection of one more member?
The logic applicable to the first case surely meets the
conditions of the second. Consequently, it is evident,
Brown attests, "that to will the renewal of any one of
those ideas is to will that particular idea directly; and
if I can effectively will the idea of the person, or of
the spot, without any idea of the person, or of the spot,
implied in my volition, I may as readily will at once the
unknown idea, which is the object of my search." (Inquiry,
4, 58) The claims of "indirect volition", then, are
spurious: direct volition is the real accomplice and it,
as we already know, has no claim at all to the power of
calling up ideas. Either the idea is there in my mind
(in which case there is no need to wish it present) or
it is not (in which event I am helpless to rush the order
of suggestion and recollection). And so, we are forced
to the conclusion that if direct volition is an alien
without logical status, indirect volition is merely a
ridiculous stowaway.
Yet, many would protest that it certainly does make
sense to say that we often have to struggle to remember
things. Surely when we are thus 'racking our brains', we
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want nothing more than to recall that elusive idea.
Admittedly, we have to be careful about how we refer to
that idea: if we can announce what it is, our search is
an exercise in contradiction. That, however, is hardly
our intent when we scratch our heads and sigh in exasperation.
Moreover, unless we acknowledge that there are times when
recollection simply fails us, the logic of 'forgetting' will
lose all significance; so too will the sometimes 'sudden
remembrance' of things about which we are no longer con¬
cerned. These are, in a sense, peripheral aspects of our
subject, important in their own right, but secondary to
that initial 'struggle' for recollection; for it is from
this effort that there will stem either the proud beam of
success or what Brown demurely calls, "the hopelessness of
gratification" (Inquiry, 4, 59). If we were to make a
random collection of even a few words or phrases with which
we ordinarily describe the frustrations of a memory lapse,
such items would appear as: 'Try as I might . . .'; 'If
only I could place the day . . .'; 'Oh, it's on the tip of
my tongue'; 'I can remember his brother's name, but not
his'; 'I almost had it a moment ago*; and 'There goes the
chance of any sleep tonight'. Forgetting is a tolerable
condition (tolerable perhaps because unnoticed) until a
need for recollection arises or we wish to remember that
'something'in a hurry. Then it becomes a tormentor,
seemingly superior to our most strenuous efforts. The
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temptation to pit some kind of personal 'power' against
this adversary is largely responsible for the belief that
if and when success comes, it is this power in the form
of 'volition' which has overcome the foe. When we have
exerted ourselves to such an extent that the strain is
written on our faces, is it not fair to credit ourselves
with enormous concentration and will-power? The only
abuse of language would appear to come from those who
endeavour to deprive us of this sense of accomplishment.
That Brown is sensitive to this objection is clearly
manifest in the way in which he handles his answer. One
cannot espouse the principle of common sense or the
methodology of empiricism and at the same time deny the
testimony of our everyday experience. Brown is aware of
this. Yet in rethinking the structure of events leading
up to recollection, he is inclined to doubt the case with
which we attribute our success to a 'power' of the above
sort. The description is not so much careless as it is
overly enthusiastic. Admittedly, pressure is brought to
bear on the problem at hand: we need and want to recall
a certain object or event. We undergo a 'tensing' of
our capabilities in an effort to recapture the missing
2
piece. By 'keeping up the pressure', as it were, we do
2
Since attention is, strictly speaking, an active
function (i.e. something which we do or engage in), it
seems fitting to refer to the above experience as a
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our utmost to shed light on that particular dark corner
of our memory. But at no time do we call into play a
special faculty called 'volition'; for if the tension
created by our desire cannot retrieve the memory, nothing
can. Later of course, it may flit across our mental
horizon of its own accord, with something akin to an
obdurate smirk on its face I Perhaps a better way of
putting this would be to say that a complete description
of recollection must accommodate those painful instances
of sustained pressure and the peculiar toll which they
exact. Assigning the name 'volition' to this feature of
our experience, however, neither alters nor enlarges upon
the description. The "true" theory of voluntary recol¬
lection, according to Brown, is essentially a "simple" one,
combining "the permanence of the desire, and the natural
order of the associate ideas" (Inquiry 4, 58). If we once
'tensing' of our relevant energies. I am indebted to John
Macmurray for this point. cf. The Self as Agent (London:
Faber & Faber Limited, 1957), p. 171. A rather more
physiological interpretation of the phenomenon of tensing
appeared in Bergson's Time and Free Will, op. cit., pp. 27-8.
Taking his lead from Ribot (Le mecanisme de 1'attention,
1888), Bergson cites various accompanying muscular changes:
the contraction of the frontal muscle, the wrinkling of
the forehead skin, the overture of the jaw, and so on. He
still speaks of a growing awareness of "tension" in the
"soul", but finds reason to rewrite this "impression" in
terms of "the feeling of a muscular contraction which spreads
over a wider surface or changes its nature, so that the
tension becomes pressure, fatigue, and pain."
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recognize this special function of desire as maintaining
a constant pressure, we should have no difficulty in
seeing that it gives free reign to the workings of sug¬
gestion.
A perplexing sidelight to Brown's theory of 'pres¬
surized' recollection is the inevitable question of causation.
Does the sustained desire bring about the recovery of the
lost piece of news in a manner analogous to that in which
the application of heat is said to 'cause' the water in
the kettle to boil? In Brown's own terminology, do these
items stand together as antecedent and invariable con¬
sequent? The answer has, in part, been foreshadowed:
Brown never insists, of course, that if we wish to remember
a certain object or event, we can rest assured that it will
come back to us. People often report that things have
'completely slipped their minds', and we must take their
word for it that they have tried and failed to recall
those elements. Moreover, a quick reappraisal of our in¬
tellectual evolution will reveal that forgetting has para¬
doxically enabled us to grow. For this reason, no doubt,
W.K. Clifford once remarked that "oblivion is really a far
3
more marvellous thing than memory." On the basis of
3
W.K. Clifford, "On Some of the Conditions of Mental
Development", Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan and
Co., 1879) , I, 93.
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these reflections, and from Brown's lengthy illustration
which we will shortly quote in full, we may conclude that
the causal framework and analogy do not hold.
Yet the temptation to attribute the eventual ap¬
pearance c£ a memory-item to the constant pressure of
desire does not yield easily. There are surely degrees
and types of causal 'invariability' such that while
factor A might always 'cause' factor B, P might only
occasionally 'cause' Q (when, for example, conditions
are found to be ideal). Given this stipulation, we could
argue that whenever certain conditions are met, the pres¬
sure of desire will 'almost always' bring to mind the
required object. Again, we sometimes overhear a parent
or teacher telling a child, "You can remember if only you
will try a little harder." The unfortunate child is not
in. a position to reply (as he might): "I don't mind trying,
but remember, there is no absolute certainty attached to
this." Still, we can perhaps agree with the argument to
the extent that we know and accept those "certain conditions".
These, however, are rather more difficult to define. Would
they depend on a guarantee of 'retentive stability', in
other words, that we always remember things in the order
of their original appearance? Would the structure of
suggested correlates be similarly under the 'pressure* of
desire? Must what Brown consistently refers to as the
"natural order" of associated ideas subjugate its spon-
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taneity to an 'external authority'? And how would one
know in advance whether the conditions - whatever these
are, - were ripe for continued pressure? One might, for
example, decide to give up when in fact the desire was on
the verge of pushing the train of suggestion towards its
very goal. Such fatalities are the stuff of a conceptual
field which is "human a11-too-human". The lure of a causal
formula for the case at hand really stems from the modelled
efficiency of a mechanistic orientation in which in¬
dividual parts will indeed react to the pressure exerted
on them by other parts. As long as the instrument is
adequately serviced (here one can talk freely about 'ideal
conditions'), a prediction as to relevant effects is
entirely in order. But we have not yet learned how to
'service' the human mind to this level of efficiency. More
to the point, it is not really clear whether the mind and/
or brain is a suitable 'organization' for language of this
sort. Perhaps the child cannot remember because he has
already lost interest in the subject, because he is dis¬
tracted by another train of thought; perhaps he cannot
remember because there is simply nothing there for him to
recallI Nevertheless, there seems to be some kind of
interaction between what Wolfgang Kohler called "this
4
little stress of mine" and the suggested correlates, and
4
Kohler's own example is worth quoting in full:
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it is to this co-operation that we must now turn.
Before following with Brown the 'proper' course of
recollection, we must insert an important qualification.
As a proposed explanation of some types of memory, the
conjunction of desire and suggestion is necessarily limited
(a) by its very scope, and (b) by the probable need for
revision in the light of further experience. Although
Brown does make it the basis of a definition of 'recollection'
(L. XLII, 125), he is aware that not all 'rememberings'
take this form and that even those which do are not always
model illustrations. Like the ingredients of a cake or
pie, desire and suggestion are apt to mix badly so as to
produce disastrous consequences. We are sometimes thwarted
"What was the name of that town on the Santa Fe Railroad?
There it comes! When I am searching for a name, searching
does not occur as one thing apart; nor does the gap of the
forgotten name occur as an isolated item among other
things - a headache, the noise of the wind, the lamp
before me, and so forth. Searching is experienced as
directed toward that definite name, hidden as yet, but now,
at last, yielding to the stress of my attitude. As it
appears, its coming is felt as being achieved by just this
little stress of mine. I ask again, did I learn gradually
through numerous experiences that in this particular
situation such an attitude will be followed by a name so
that now I may venture to guess about their mutual relation?
Without previous training, would that noise outdoors be
connected with the given attitude as well?" Dr. Wolfgang
Kohler, Gestalt Psychology (N.Y.: Horace Liveright, 1929),
pp. 357-8^ Kohler and Brown seem to be agreed that
'attitudes' such as these and 'feelings' of relatedness
spring naturally from the simple occurrence of the ex¬
perience (cf. Kohler, pp. 355-6). Brown, it will be re¬
membered, rejected Hume's supposition of a customary build¬
up of dispositions.
194.
altogether in our search, and at other times we are dis¬
tracted by more compelling suggestions. Occasionally the
trials of recollection succeed only to disappoint: the
end result may prove to be a poor copy of its imagined
original. The formula, therefore, if one can call it
that, is submitted merely as the most likely account, or
conceptual rendering, of a limited range of memory-cases.
Brown believes it to be well-supported by psychological
(or 'introspective') and linguistic evidence. That, of
course, does not immunize it against falsification.
The case of the missing 'piece of news' can be
read as a balanced interplay of forces, the outcome of
which is always in doubt:
"I have a continued desire of remembering something which
was told me by my friend, at a certain time; and, during
the continuance of this desire, the spot, the events, and
other circumstances, rise according to the usual order of
our spontaneous trains of thought. The conception of
these can scarcely fail, at every moment, to suggest
something which was said at the time. If it suggest that
particular part of the conversation, of which I remember
only that it was something which interested me, and which
I wished therefore to be brought to my mind again, the
desire of course ceases with the gratification of it,
when I recognize what is thus suggested, as that which
was the object of my obscure desire. If it suggest any
other part of it, the desire, continuing, keeps before me
the images of the person and the place, which may almost
be said to be involved in the desire itself, and allows
other images, associated with these, to arise, till I
either remember what I wish, or the wish itself die away,
in the hopeless ness of gratification, or in the oc¬
currence of new and more interesting objects."
(Inquiry, 4, 59; italics mine)
One sees in this record a dual contingency. In the first
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place, the desire may or may not sustain itself over the
whole course of the investigation: it may be satisfied
with just a fragment of its object or it may wane pre¬
maturely as new concerns arise. Secondly, the pattern of
suggested correlates may or may not yield the right object:
the force of this contingency is contained in the repeated
5
phrase, "If it suggest ... ." Nevertheless, recollection
seems to take place, if and when it does, on the heels of
their successful interaction.
Again, not all memories conform to this pattern of
"intentional reminiscence". "We as little will the varying
5
The tenuousness of that condition was noted by
Schopenhauer, who supposed that if the train of associated
ideas were to falter, the art of mnemonics might be em¬
ployed to render assistance. "... the impossibility of
the appearance of a thought without its sufficient occasion,
even when there is the strongest desire to call it up, is
proved by all the cases in which we weary ourselves in vain
to recollect something, and go through the whole store of
our thoughts in order to find any one that may be associated
with the one we seek; if we find the former, the latter is
also found. Whoever wishes to call up something in his
memory first seeks for a thread with which it is connected
by the association of thoughts. . . . the worst of it is
that these occasioners themselves have first to be recalled,
and this again requires an occasioner. . . . sometimes we
do not trust ourselves to connect directly the name of this
person, or town, river, mountain, plant, animal, &c., with
the thought of each so firmly that it will call each of
them up of itself; and then we assist ourselves mnemonically,
and connect the image of the person or thing with any per¬
ceptible quality the name of which occurs in that of the
person or thing. Yet this is only a temporary prop to lean
on; later we let it drop, for the association of thoughts
becomes an immediate support." The World as Will and Idea,
II, 324-6.
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scenery of our reveries, and all the strange forms which
seem to people them, as we will the conception of any one
with whom we are acquainted, when it rises to us in
instant suggestion, merely on reading his familiar name."
(L. XLII, 126) Not surprisingly, on the threshold of a
Proustian insight, Brown never quite takes the plunge.
The element of chance is there. Brown agrees with Proust
that it is often pointless for us "to try to evoke our
past? all our intellectual efforts are futile. It lies
hidden beyond the reach of the mind, in some unsuspected
material object (rather in the sensation which that material
object would produce in us). And it depends entirely on
chance whether or not we encounter that object before we
g
die." What is missing is the unique characterization of
past experiences entailed by Proust's distinction between
voluntary and involuntary memory. In his excellent little
book entitled The Seventh Solitude, Ralph Harper depicts
the lack of cogency (or "self-revelation") in the former:
"One does not love the past only because it is a revelation
of the really present and mysterious, but because it reveals
the mystery of setf-experience, our past. And yet no
revelation comes when voluntary memory recalls the past;
all the details are turned by by force of will, but lack
'the idea of existence,' or real presence. . . . Voluntary
memory can make us see, it cannot move us as if we were in
communion with someone.
Proust, Du c6td de chez Swan, I, 44.
7
R. Harper, The Seventh Solitude (Baltimore, Md.:
The John Harper Press, 1965), Appendix "Remembering
Eternity", pp. 146-7.
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It is, as it were, a new self which places itself at the
helm of remembrance; for the eI' which now attends to
the past feels differently from the 'I' which laughed or
wept in response to those events in the past.
This is not to say that the seeking out of a memory
is entirely devoid of what one might loosely describe as
'feeling-tones'. As John Macmurray has argued, the
"intention to attend" is governed by a "motive" born of
O
the reference of a "feeling" to a "situation". The
desire to recollect the piece of news, for example, places
a sense of urgency over against the problem of recovery.
The sense of urgency, because it is directive, tends to
diminish the possibility of one of those unexpected and,
in Proust's sense, 'authenticating' eruptions out of the
past. We have, in Brown's scheme of things, a referential
scope within whose boundaries a series of self-regulating
moves and counter-moves determines the progress of ful-
9
filment. While the object to be recollected may be
dimly apprehended (in what way we shall see in a moment),
8
John Macmurray, The Self as Agent, op. cit. p.
19 i.
9
Macmurray rightly describes this series as one
which is "progressively determined". Ibid., p. 189. The
indeterminancy of the total framework of 'action' makes
both possible and necessary a continuous realignment of
means and ends.
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the stages of recovery are pawns in the hands of its
'agents', namely desire and suggestion. The limits of
our referential scope, therefore, merely set the stage
for and do not entirely cover its internal functioning.
Indeed they are themselves open to revision. To this
extent alone does Brown's formula permit of any significant
degree of surprise. But then, of course, surprise is not
exactly the sort of thing one looks for in voluntary
memory. The pity is that Brown did not adequately complete
his sketch for a distinction between these two kinds of
memory-activity. His primary concern, however, is to lay
bare the "true" operation of those 'rememberings' which
are 'forced' and which he calls "recollections".
At first glance, it would appear that the desire
for something which we are capable of remembering is a
desire which can be specified. After all, if we could
give expression to the object, we would surely possess it.
In that event, however, the logic of 'having' would preclude
the logic of 'desiring'. Is there any sense in wanting
'you-know-not-what'? The answer is 'yes' and 'no'.
Certainly, people do have vague rumblings of unsatisfied
desire: the child in us frequently stamps its feet with
impatience until someone comes up with a 'desirable'
solution. It does seem strange to say 'I know that I
want (or need) something, but I can't tell you what', and
yet the other person usually understands the frustration
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of your nagging discontent. Is there a type of desire
which only discovers its object after it has been born?
Perhaps so. At least we can say that there are memory-
situations in which we are aware that an object exists
without necessarily knowing what it is, in whole or in
part. E. J. Furlong has labelled these "negative memory-
situations",''"0 a typical example of which is the statement,
"No, his name was not Thackeray, although it did begin
with a T." The subordinate clause ('although it did
begin with a T') is said to be a "hidden premiss" which
has been "suppressed" in the original denial. Similarly,
that which we desire to remember can, on the one hand, be
concealed from immediate recall and on the other, be
implied by our motive for recollection. The child who sets
out on a game of 'treasure hunt' believes that he will
find something even though that 'something' remains hidden
from view and knowledge alike. Indeed, the 'desire to
find' may be sufficient to drive him on. The affirmative
portion of our answer is therefore restricted to the
relatively mild claim that the object of desire is sometimes
concealed from us at the outset of our uneasiness. If we
resemble the cautious hunter stalking the unknown prey in
^"°E. J. Furlong, A Study in Memory: A Philosophical
Essay (London, Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.,
1951), pp. 32-6.
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dense bush? our risk is the price of curiosity.
On the negative side, we find a certain unhappiness
with the logic of 'unspecifiable elements'. The scent of
Locke's "mysterious substrata" (those 'somethings-I-know-
not-what') seems to permeate the air. Reid gives weight
to this aspect of the question by asserting: "It may be
said, that what we will to remember we must conceive, as
there can be no will without a conception of the thing
willed" (I.P. , III, 7, 381). The force of this argument
will be apparent from Brown's analogous denial of a
voluntary control over ideas: to wish such-and-such an
idea is to have that idea already before one. If we want
to recollect a certain object, then that object is a
current feature of our memory, revived, apprehended, and
drawn into our present state of consciousness. Reid
discovers a way through this impasse, although not quite
as "easily" as he imagines. Brown takes very much the
same step, apparently missing the 'catch' as well. And
in the long run, both subscribe to another Lockean view:
"If [the idea] be sought after by the mind, and with pain
and endeavour found and brought again in view, 'tis
Recollection" (EHH, II, xix, 1). The possible validity
of each of their respective and mutual views is offset
by the unsatisfactory treatment which they give to the
expression, "the thing we will to remember". The last
move in this third case will concern that 'thing'.
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Reid attempts a solution along the lines which
we have met with above in our affirmative reply to the
question, "Can I want I-know-not-what?' He distinguishes
between our awareness that a thing exists (to be
remembered) and our momentary failure to 'conceive*
exactly what it is. In Brown's own illustration, the
piece of news is attached to the idea of the friend
who communicated it to me, or to the spot on which it
was told or even to the circumstances under which the
sharing of the news took place. That there is something
to be remembered is an associate feature of any or
all of these ideas: without them, I should perhaps
never "remember to remember" (Henry Miller) that I
have actually managed to forget it. And so I scout
around, like the hunter, interpreting noises, scents,
and moving shapres as signs of the hidden presence of
'we-know-not-what'. Yet, this 'something' is not 'any¬
thing' at all. At some point in my pursuit of the
hidden, an idea closely related to it uncovers the prey
and in Brown's words, "I recognize what is thus suggested".
Recognition implies knowing a thing again. That can only
mean in this context that I knew what it was; for when it
revealed itself, I exclaimed, 'Yes, that's it.' There
are, of course, situations in which nothing exists to be
remembered: although I myself may not recall the 'absence'
of memory, witnesses can vouch that such-and-such an event
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did not in fact happen. In that sense, I could never have
known it. But the case at hand is not one of these. Some¬
thing is there, but lost? something is recognized, although
not at first known? and something is remembered, we-know-
not-what. The paradoxes are only half the problem? the real
difficulty lies in the approach to recollection. Either
we begin in the dark (the prospects for which seem hopeless)
or we proceed with a light: but how, except in retrospect,
can we account for the acquisition of that light? "When
we will to remember a thing", in Reid's phrase, or "if we
wish to remember a piece of news" (now Brown's), we would
do well to maintain a judicious silence? for in the formu¬
lation of that 'thing', our memory precedes itself.
We do not, of course, make such obvious blunders.
The phrases employed by Reid and Brown to denote they-
know-not-what are innocent little gleams of possibility:
"a thing"? "a commission"? "a piece of news". Less than a
sketch and more like a curtained silhouette, these phrases
adumbrate the anticipated object of memory without at the
same time naming it. We know from Reid's example"^ that
The example, in full, reads: "I remember that a
friend charged me with a commission to be executed at such
a place? but I have forgot what the commission was. By
applying my thought to what I remember concerning it, that
it was given by such a person, upon such an occasion, in
consequence of such a conversation, I am led, in a train of
thought, to the very thing I had forgot, and recollect
distinctly what the commission was." I.P., III, 7, 381.
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we must recollect "a commission to be executed at such a
place", but we cannot name the commission. Whatever else
it may entail, the act of naming commits us both to a
specification ('that one') and to an immediate description
('the commission was for me to light the fire in his
12
living-room before he arrived home'). The reason why
the desired object of recollection cannot be identified
is that neither of these conditions for naming can be
adequately met. At most, our specification may point out
the area within which our object stands in relation to
others: the neighbourhood, as it were, but not the street.
Reid calls this the thing's "relative conception"; Furlong
13
refers to it as a "proposition about the past". The
advantage to Reid of the latter's terms of reference is
12
I have taken my lead from arguments first put
forward by Plato in the Cratylus. The view propounded
there seems to be that names possess the dual capacity of
'referential' and 'immediate descriptive' agents. Plato's
names not only identify (pick out of a crowd) a certain
object as "this one, Zeus" rather than "that one, Hermes",
but they aLso refer to its "nature" (Zeus as "lord" or
"author"). Although he does distinguish between proper
names and common names, he sometimes fuses the two into
an inseparable muddle. Yet the name "Zeus" when it refers
to his nature "lord" describes (almost in a short-hand
fashion) the only (for Plato) correct "relation" which can
exist between the expression (vocalization) of that name
and the sort of thing which is entitled to it. In one
quick step, "Zeus" refers both to the god and to the kind
of being deserving of the name. cf. Cratylus, 396, 421,
422.
13
Furlong, 0£. cit., pp. 36-7.
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that he can formulate his dilemma in a highly reasonable
and acceptable statement: 'I know he told me to do
something, but I can't remember what it was.' Furthermore,
unless it is the case that I do not know that he told me
to do something, the statement is true. Understandably,
the darkest hours for memory are those periods during
which I cannot be sure whether or not there is something
14
that I ought to remember to recollect. One is then
14
These are perhaps second only to the horror of
watching my cherished memories ejected from the very 'homes'
which I had believed would feed and nourish them. Returning
to the scene of his childhood, Jean Cocteau records the
shock which attended his surprise at what he saw (or failed
to see) and felt (or failed to feel): "My first sensation
was of being lost in space, just as when we are blindfolded
and released in one spot when we thought we were in another.
Was that my white gate, my trellised fence, my trees, my
lawn, the house I was born in, the window of the billiard
room? A sand path replaced the grass, the pool, and the
flower beds. A high gray building with a barn beside it
occupied the site of our house. Grooms were coming and
going, and looked at us suspiciously as we passed by. I
was holding the bars of the newly painted gate, like a
prisoner outside, when I felt a staggering pain which was
nothing but memories expelled by thrusts of a pitchfork,
memories unable to find their habits and the niche where I
thought them asleep and waiting for me." The Journals of
Jean Cocteau, tr. Wallace Fowlie (Bloomington: .Indiana U.P.,
1956) , p. 34". Equally frightening is the failure of an object
to leave any memory-trace whatsoever. This example from Dazai
Osamu's No Longer Human should be held beside those of Brown
and Reidl "The face is not merely devoid of expression, it
fails even to leave a memory. It has no individuality. I
have only to shut my eyes after looking at it to forget the
face. I can remember the wall of the room, the little heater,
but all impression of the face of the principal figure in
the room is blotted out; I am unable to recall a single thing
about it. . . . I open my eyes. There is not even the
pleasure of recollection. . . . To state the matter in the
most extreme terms: when I open my eyes and look at the
photograph a second time, I still cannot remember it."
(italics mine)
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likely to find oneself in an endless regress of harried
desires to remember the remembrance of remembrances past.
After a point, one would see the futility of that and
simply forget. Forgetting includes the will not to suffer.
The kinds of situation, therefore, in which I am
most apt to appear foolish do not concern my 'expressions
of intent' to recollect such-and-such a 'thing'. Rather
they involve my inability even to reach the threshold of
desire. Nothing in the logic of Recollection, as so
defined by Locke, Reid or Brown, prevents me from asserting
that I wish to remember something-I-know-not-what. The
obstacles are all on the side of fear and uncertainty.
The 'prisoner within the prisoner' who dominates William
Golding's novel Free Fall, describes his plight:
"there began to build up in me the conviction that even if
I wanted to I could not remember, would never remember
(the information I'm not even certain I have). I could
see a layer of concrete build up in my mind over the
forgotten thing, the thing down there that I had meant
to say. But when that concrete forms in the mind, no
internal road drill can break it up. . . . For, of course,
you can only remember such a thing by forgetting to
remember and then glancing back at it quickly before the
concrete has a chance to form. ... If you only gave me
a time not to think but a time to lie down under the sky
without steps or pain then the concrete would slip away
and the information come blurting out if there is any
information and then we could start fair. ..."
The 'piece of news' with which Brown initiated his
examination of voluntary recollection has endured a final
transformation in the forge of artistic sensibility.
Perhaps George Croom Robertson was right in saying that
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Brown's "analysis of voluntary reminiscence and constructive
imagination" was his "chief contribution to the general
15doctrine of mental association". The nucleus for a full-
scale assault on 'memory' was certainly there. Our
attention will soon be diverted to that task.
Conclusion;
In The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer describes
the relation between volition and the association of ideas
as one in which the laws of the latter find their basis
in the laws governing the former. The will, he writes,
"urges its servant the intellect, according to the measure
of its powers, to link thought to thought, to recall the
similar, the contemporaneous, to recognize reasons and
consequents. For it is to the interest of the will that,
in general, one should think, so that one may be well
equipped for all cases that may arise. Therefore the
form of the principle of sufficient reason which governs
the association of thoughts and keeps it active is ul¬
timately the law of motivation. For that which rules the
sensorium, and determines it to follow the analogy or
other association of thoughts in this or that direction,
is the will of the thinking subject."16
I have tried to argue in this that Brown adopts a position
more or less similar to the one quoted above. Substitute
the word 'desire' for the term 'will', transpose
15
George Croom Robertson, "Association of Ideas,"
reprinted in his Philosophical Remains, ed. A. Bain and T.
Whittaker (London & Edinburgh, 1894), p. 110.
^The World as Will and Idea, II, 328.
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Schopenhauer's "thinking subject" back into the empiricist
key of a "series of conscious states", and one is ham¬
mering on the door of agreement.
On the whole, it would appear that Brown's early
investigations into 'volition' extend well into the domain
of his philosophy of mind. Several key concepts cluster
around the conclusions drawn from these researches. Both
'attention' and 'memory', for example, are fulfilled in
the measure of their determination by desire (L. XLII, 125).
Even when the selection of images obeys the sole dictate
of suggestion, this type of 'imagination' is to be dis¬
tinguished from that in which we intend a certain con¬
figuration of images or groups of images (L. XLII, 128-9).
Brown's notion of the 'creative imagination' includes this
'mode of intentionality' which serves as a general frame¬
work surrounding any process of composition. Desire, he
writes,
"like every other vivid feeling, has a degree of permanence
which our vivid feelings only possess; and, by its perma¬
nence, tends to keep the accompanying conception of the
subject, which is the object of the desire, also permanent
before us; and while it is thus permanent, the usual
spontaneous suggestions take place; conception following
conception, in rapid but relative series, and our judgment,
all the time, approving and rejecting, according to those
relations of fitness and unfitness to the subject, which
it perceives in the parts of the train."
(L. XLII, 129)
In his final and incomplete work on the 'Physiology of
the Mind*, Brown mounts desire, along with other emotions,
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on a level of incontestable 'physical fact'. If the
critics to follow thought that he had gone mad with
"physicalism', present-day analysts would be similarly
dismayed by the appeal to 'psychological' explanation.
But Brown is never so crude as to suppose that an account
of how emotions actually function will constitute a
conceptual revelation, or of itself make the understanding
of attending and remembering more conclusive. He merely
calls upon his reader to verify the role played by emotion
in both perception and conception by a close observation
of his own experience. At the time, this sort of re¬
quest was rather commonplace: Brown was not alone in
thinking that it was possible to build a 'science' of the
human mind. (Was it because of opposition to this
'science' that Brown found himself posthumously stuck
with the label of an imitator or disciple of Cabanis and
Destutt de Tracy?) Unfortunately, this kind of science
was to strike the 'scientific' linguists and phenomenologists
as a completely bogus undertaking. In one way or another,
however, even these purists of the philosophic enterprise
were to acknowledge the extent of what Brown then termed
the "vivifying influence" of desire (Sketch, 171-2). It
has since been accepted by most philosophers that both
seeing and thinking are complex activities which involve
personal attitudes, dispositions, intentions, motives and
interests. Perhaps only those who cling to a rigid dichotomy
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between action and reflection would deny that the manner
of our response to the world at large is at one with the
manner of our thinking about it. Desire constantly shapes
and is shaped by both commitments. If, like John
Macmurray, we regard the subject primarily as one who
actsi then thinking acquires a new focus, the thinker a
new base, and the thought a new horizon. "Pure thought",
concludes Berdyaev, "does not exist; thought is saturated
with acts of volition, with emotions and passions and
these things play a part in the act of knowing which is
17
not simply negative; they have a positive role to play."
It has been assumed throughout that the business of
"having ideas' is a complicated one, and that it is no
small matter to 'become conscious' of something. The
freedom to think, as Sartre has pointed out, is real only
in so far as it does not issue from a state of 'mere
wishing". If I imagine that I can bandy ideas about at
will, that I can banish all the world of fact and order
at the slightest "whim", then I become a 'dreamer'
18
caught like a fish out of its dimension. In attending
to objects or ideas and in remembering specific details
17
N. Berdyaeu, The Beginning and the End (London;
Geoffrey Bles, 1952), p. 16.
18
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel
E. Barnes (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. 482-3.
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about the past, I am engaged in an open struggle with
myself and the world. The chance exigencies of an
individual's experience contribute to the idiosyncracy
of his associations. These latter, as we have seen, tend
either to thwart or to enhance his reflections. They
are the "resistances", in Sartre's sense, which enable
his efforts of thought and evaluation. The formidable
challenge of that engagement will be our next subject.
PART THREE
EXPLORATIONS FOR A PICTURE
By Memory's circling tie associate bound,
The gleaming phantoms float in mazy round,
Till Fancy's renovating witheries give
The shadowing band again to shine, to live.
Then opes, in deeper gloom, the noiseless reign,
Where dwells Abstraction with her shapeless train,
all dim to sense . . .
- BROWN, 'To Dugald Stewart, Esq.'
An experienced event is finite - at any rate, confined to
one sphere of experience; a remembered event is infinite,
because it is only a key to everything that happened before




As early as his medical dissertation on sleep,
Brown was intrigued by the functional interplay between
memory and attention. This interest was to sustain itself
well into the Lectures. It begins, however, as a question
regarding the claims which both perceptual experience and
reminiscence make upon our present attentiveness. To
which can cr should we be alert? Brown's answer is a
play on the delicacy of the situation. If we consider
the multifarious sensory disturbances which either
attract or distract attention (for we must bear in mind
Jean Wahl's dictum that "attention can be directed only
to the past"^" and can therefore only 'arrive' on the
scene ex post facto), it becomes clear that these
presentations may vie with our representations for what
we might call 'reality status'. 'Re-presentations' differ
from the former simply by their being 'present again'.
And 'being present' under any form would seem to be quite
a reasonable criterion for 'being real'. This might be
Quoted by Georges Poulet, Studies in Human Time,




particularly true if, as Moore states,
"what we often mean by seeing an object, is merely
directly perceiving a sense-datum, which is a sign or
effect of that object; and by remembering an object,
merely directly perceiving an image, which is an image
of the object."2
The problem becomes one of trying to squeeze two
presentational phenomena into one mould.
It was Reid's opinion that this confusion or
ambiguity in our use of terms originated with Locke and
Hume. Locke attributes to memory the 'power' of reviving
"perceptions'. That could only entail, affirms Reid, that
the objects of memory were themselves perceptions. "If
this be so, it will be difficult to find anything in
nature but perceptions." (I.P. , III, vii, 371) Has not
Locke perhaps inadvertently identified the mental
operations with their characteristic objects (ibid.)?
Hume, on the other hand, tries to steer a path of degrees
between past and present impressions or ideas. In either
case, the 'perceptions' are present to the mind. But
surely if they are separable at all (and they are so by
degree according to Hume), then it is on the basis of
our 'remembering' that 'impression' P occurred at t^ that
we assess its relative 'weakness' to impression Q occurring
at Thus, in rejecting the "common acceptation" of
2
G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (N.Y.:
Collier Books, 1962), pp. 264-5.
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memory as an "immediate knowledge of something past"
(as Reid claims Hume to have done), the latter has de¬
nounced that very aspect of remembering which he takes
for granted in his differentiation (ibid., 471-2).
Whether it propels or impedes our uncertainty, memory
must play a part and a unique one at that.
Brown is equally alert to the possibility that
we may confuse the apparitions of memory with the ap¬
pearances of real things (De Somno, 12). He had found
it necessary in the Observations to attack Erasmus Darwin's
misapprehensions on this very point. The proper dis¬
tinction he argued, ought to be that
"Our ideas of perception were mental affections, preceded
by organic affections: our ideas of memory are mental
affections, not preceded by organic affections."
(ibid.)
The likelihood of our mistaking a memory idea for a per¬
ceptual one remains, but now at least on a proper and
manageable basis. The difficulty forecast here is, of
course, merely an early expression of the deja vu ex¬
perience. 'Seeing again' has a peculiar logic of its own
which includes 'I have seen before' and 'I am seeing now':
the 'before' and 'now' are apt to appear as interchangeable
lines bisecting the common point 'I see'.
Brown insists in De Somno, however, that perceptual
ideas have the capacity to assert their claim to 'reality'
("ipsa vera efficiunt"). They.compel attention (or
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attract our notice) somewhat in the manner suggested by
Berkeley in the second dialogue between Hylas and Philonous,
which I quoted earlier. But the instrument which, in
Brown's view, often brings the mind back to the per¬
ceiving of objects outside itself is that same memory
which had led it away ("quae abduxerat"; De Somno, 12).
Remembering that we have been inattentive to the bom¬
bardment of our senses ("multa enim undique externa
auditum, visoum, tactum, solioitant", - ibid.), and hence
once more attentive to it, we curtail our reminiscences
of past perceptions, now 'present again' but once more
fading 'out of sight, out of mind'.
The shifting of attention from one object to another
or from one mode of experience to another, as from perceiving
to remembering, has therefore both an outer and an inner
determination. The same is more or less true of memory.
In the previous discussion of volition, I suggested one
feature cf the inner determination of memory, namely our
persistent desire to recollect a particular incident in
our past. At the same time, the mechanics of association
were shown to possess a similar obstinacy, in drawing our
attention along from item to item very much according to
their own modus operandi. This is not to say that some
external object or event might not act as a triggering-
device to set the tirain of suggestion in motion. Indeed
Brown cites numerous illustrations to show that we are
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as much at the mercy of these external coincidences (a
certain object appearing before us at a particular time)
as we are helpless to resist the reminiscences which they
evoke. He intimates in De Somno that since the mind is
more agile that its corporeal counterpart, sense per¬
ception has been geared or entrusted, presumably by
Providence, to prevent memory from running away with us.
It pulls us back from reflection or fancy in the direction
of our necessary interaction with (other) objects in the
world (De Somno, 12). We are beset by urgent demands
from our environment, as well as from our own physiological
3
needs. These 'facts', as Brown implies, can only be
dealt with by an active and integrative thrust into the
sphere of immediate concerns. He thus takes seriously an
insight which John Macmurray was later to advance, to the
effect that it is essentially as an 'agent' situated in
and coping with the world that the individual saves his
mind from an absurdly endless vacillation (ibid., 12-13).
According to Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, these
'physiological needs' (as I have called them) constitute
a "second class of impressions" determining "the operations
of judgment and of volition". (What we term "sensations"
make up the primary class.) The impressions of this
unique class are variously described as coming from "les
extremites sentantes internes" and "le sein meme du
systeme nerveux"; or in a word, from "determinations
instinctives". P. J. G» Cabanis, Rapports du Physique
et du Moral de L'Homme, 'Table Analytique' par D. de
Tracy, op. cit., xcv-xcvi.
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Memory enjoys a kind of 'free fall' from the time of its
release in reflection until its approach to earth and the
■problematic'. From that point, however, it is functionally
attentive to the unforgettable, if sometimes undesirable,
daily round. It is the habitual - that which happens with
monotonous regularity, - which of its nature draws memory
into itself.
Brown discusses habit in just this spirit. It
steers us, he asserts, towards "certain" (that is, pre¬
selected) "actions", and in due course improves or
facilitates our handling of those actions (L., XLIII,
140F). As a guide to action, habit was already well
established in the literature of that age. The human
machine had been seen to repeat itself. Prevost insisted
that habit as well as interest "more or less" determine
the direction sought by volition in governing attention;
the latter, in turn, becomes a precondition with association
4
of the shape of memory. The zone of the 'familiar'
expanded with the mechanics of association to dominate
eighteenth and early nineteenth century psychology. It
was the customary (to use a term much favoured in the
period) which spanned the philosophical spectrum from
what we might believe to what we ought to do. Yet it
^P. Provost, Essais de Philosophie (Geneve, 1805),
I, Bk. iv, Part I, sect. 1, ch. 2, pp. 117-8.
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was perhaps Bergson who most adequately and compellingly
wove habit into the very heart of memory, making the
latter the sine qua non of all 'conscious action'. Had
not Pascal declared that memory was "indispensable for
all the operations of reason" (Pensees, 228) and Reid that
"all experience supposes memory" (I ,P., III, vii, 373)?
Without the specific operation of "habit-memory", the
entire build-up of past experiences would be laid at the
feet of "recollection" for assimilation into and utilization
for recurrent and prospective events. Under any scheme,
such a responsibility would be considered a functional
overload. For Bergson, memory in either form is ultimately
related to and expresses itself in action, although ad¬
mittedly recollection entails consciousness of what is
past and therefore of what is not available for action.
Ernst Cassirer has argued in his Philosophy of Symbolic
5
Forms that Bergson's metaphysics commits him to letting
memory and action go their separate ways, the one taking
us with it as it slips relentlessly away from the present,
the other driving us forward pitilessly into action and
life. In his fine study of Bergson, A. D. Lindsay weaves
a pattern of interpretation around this dilemma, I think
5
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. Ill 'The
Phenomenology of Knowledge', tr. Ralph Manheim (New
Haven: Yale U.P., 1957), pp. 187-8.
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with some success. "Action", he writes,
"is always being modified by memory of the past; and memory
is approached through action in the present and realises
itself in present action. For our action seems to select
from memory as it selects from presented objects. It both
uses and inhibits pure memory."®
The inhibition in question is the obstacle we confront
when we seek to indulge in pure "reverie" or personal
reflection and find ourselves distracted by the world.
In a highly introductory vein, I have skimmed
lightly over certain aspects of the interplay between
memory and attention. The analysis reveals the com¬
plexity of memory performances from which and into which
attention itself operates. For it is at least apparent
that from one side, the sorts of things we remember serve
in part to establish the things on which we are apt to
concentrate and which perhaps we find desirable. From
the other side, those items to which we have given our
attention are likely (although not certain) to reappear
either voluntarily or involuntarily in our reminiscences.
Consequently, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
memory and attention engage in a kind of mutual resusci¬
tation, breathing both life and character into each
other. One wonders, in fact, why the interaction
^A. D. Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson (London;
J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.1911) , pp. 178 and 183.
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(assuming it is that) should not at last be submitted to
empirical testing and confirmation. The philosoph.es
believed this to be possible for all types of mental
activity within their foreseeable future. "The philosophy
of Locke and Condillac", asserts Colin Kiernan, "opened
up new possibilities and set the philosophes on the way
to the promised land. All they needed was to underpin
the new sensationalist psychology with a scientific
7
proof." They were divided, however, on the question of
a suitable scientific framework: Boyle, Voltaire and
H-elvetius upheld the mechanistic view-point, while La
Mettrie, Diderot, Condillac and Rousseau emerged as
advocates for the life-sciences. Whether the house
being divided fell or the vehicle of pure introspection
proved more tantalizing, the philosophical insight took
root and produced its own variants.
7
Colin Kiernan, "Science and the doctrine of man",
Studies on Voltaire and the 18th Century, vol. 59, p. 109.
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BACON FACES
The hope that this complex interaction of memory
and attention might be pinpointed, scrutinized and dis¬
sected somewhere within the bounds of 'experimental
space' was one which Brown approached with unusual
caution. He was not one to hedge his bets or to hold
his tongue; nor was he given to embarrassed blushes at
his own appearance on the historical stage attired in
the uniform of a 'mental physiologist' (cf. L.I., 13).
In his Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood expresses dis¬
may over that turn-of-events in the early nineteenth
century which saw the encroachment by "sense and appe¬
tite" on the territory of "reason and will". * The
"problems of logic and ethics", he argues, were thrown
wholesale into the lap of "psychology" for resolution
and eventual dismissal. This "science", moreover, as¬
pired to no less than the complete reduction of the mental
to the "psychical". Yet whatever sweeping effects one
might, in retrospect, judge to have occurred the movement
itself, I shall contend, had an uneasy birth. It was
^An Autobiography (London and N.Y.; Oxford U.P.,
1970) pp. 94 and 116.
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marked by severe traumatic shocks to the persons involved,
shocks which reverberated throughout the intellectual
world. Brown could not have failed to feel the initial
repercussions of what he and others were attempting to
bring about. But as I said, he was no coward.
His hesitancy was certainly not a reflection of any
misgivings on his part concerning the possibilities of
making the mind, like any other aspect of nature, an
object of empirical investigation. He was, however,
distressed at the readiness of certain of his contemporaries
to embark on a programme of inquiry with the only methodology
available to them, namely that derived from Newtoniwn
physics and couched in Baconian terminology. The re¬
luctance which he displayed was therefore connected not
so much with the aims of the new science as with its
methods.
Even at this, he was less sure of himself than his
outspokenness would seem to indicate. He was, perhaps
naturally, blind to the historical heritage which he would
utilize in his very struggle against history. And not in¬
frequently, he represents the operations of volition and
suggestibility, of which memory and attention were said
to be 'modifications'(suggestibility in particular acting
the role of Condillac's sensations), as though these
were immediate and observable items of experience instead
of the conjectual outlooks or 'ways of seeing' which they
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clearly were. Plainly, the distinction between hypothesis
and evidence (I shall return to this later) which, ac¬
cording to Reid, had been obscured in David Hartley's
research was still not properly illuminated. "It may be
observed in general," wrote Reid,
"that Dr. Hartley's work consists of a chain of pro¬
positions, with their proofs and corollaries, digested in
good order, and in a scientific form. A great part of them,
however, are, as he candidly acknowledges, conjectures and
hints only; yet these are mixed with the propositions
legitimately proved, without any distinction."
(I♦P♦, II, iii, 87; italics
mine)
Here, as elsewhere, Reid believes that he is following
the lead of the "great Newton" in his "never enough to
be admired" Principia as well as the Opticks (I.P., VI,
2
v, 643 and vi, 7, 687).
Brown's was not the only confusion on this score.
2
In this connection, compare also L. L. Laudan,
"Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Metho¬
dological Thought", in The Methodological Heritage of
Newton, ed. Robert E. Butts and John W. Davis (U. of
Toronto Press, 1970), p. 116 ftn. It might, of course,
be doubted whether hypothesis and confirming evidence
(or theory and fact) are "categorically separable,
except perhaps within a single tradition of normal-
scientific practice". See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, from International Encyclo¬
pedia of Unified Science, vol. II, no. 2 (2nd ed.; U.
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 7. Kuhn adds: "That is why
the unexpected discovery is not simply factual in its
import and why the scientist's world is qualitatively
transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fun¬
damental novelties of either fact or theory." (ibid.)
224.
Hypotheses were only just emerging from behind the cloud
of Newton. (The obfuscation, of course, had really been
an interpreter's nightmare for which hypotheses non fingo
was only a partial excuse.) P. B. Medawar has recently
drawn attention to and commended the efforts of Dr. John
Gregory and Dugald Stewart to liberate post-Newtonian
science from an "indiscriminate zeal against hypotheses"
(Stewart's words). Reid and J. S. Mill, on the other hand,
are depicted as frightened creatures, rhetorical spokesman
for a misguided and already outmoded conception of scien¬
tific 'invention', cursed with a seventeenth-century
3
abhorrence of the imagination and its 'vain' projections.
This is somewhat overdone: it does little or no justice
to Reid and, depending on the strength of one's allegiance
to him (a point which Medawar concedes), little to Mill
whose treatment of hypothetical constructs, like Brown's,
placed them in the more qualified position of being
suggestive frameworks for future observation. Such a
qualification sets both Mill and Brown squarely in the
tradition of Bacon; for the latter was, as Paolo Rossi
has shown, the champion of 'direction' in experimental
science.
"Bacon's logic was, indeed, an instrument made by man for
3
See The Art of the Soluble (Hammondsworth:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), pp. 157, 159 and 168.
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the domination of a resisting, recalcitrant nature; he
stressed the inadequacy of abstract, theoretical methods
in natural research, and the necessity of referring to
experimental data to prove the authority of definitions
and theories; he denied the correlation of elegantly
constructed theories and practical scientific results;
and he saw theoretical methods only as means of directing
and encouraging experiments.
I will elaborate on Brown's own propositions to this
effect in the final chapter.
Although it is undoubtedly true that Reid was
wary of the 'ingenious' hypothesis (or "conjecture"), his
caution must not be taken as a sign of impaired judgment.
He believed that "men should have a clear and distinct
understanding of the nature of hypotheses in philosophy,
and of the regard that is due to them" (I,P., II, iii, 43).
To this end he too allows that they might "suggest ex¬
periments, or direct our inquiries" (I.P. , II, iii, 91).
What he calls "just induction", on the other hand, looks
the other way, towards "doctrines" or "truths" which have
already been substantiated by means of 'productive'
5
experimentation (see I.P., II, iii, 85 and 91). This
4
Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science, tr. Sacha
Rabinovitch (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968),
p. 223.
5
Compare Reid's letter to Karnes, 16 December 1780,
in Works, ed. Hamilton (6th ed.; Edinburgh, 1863), I, 56.
Laudan contends that although Reid's position with respect
to hypotheses may seem to be 'ambiguous' - in part denun¬
ciation and in part support (somewhat along the lines of
Brown and Mill), - nevertheless the "thrust of almost all
Reid's arguments is towards discrediting those philosophers
(e.g., David Hartley) and scientists (e.g., the Cartesians)
who did use hypotheses, however sparingly"; op. cit., p. 117.
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backward and forward-looking movement has the advantage of
creating for the scientist a context of confirmed and
prospective experiences, a temporal juncture from which
induction and hypothesis take flight into past and future.
Newton himself, affirms Reid, stood at such a cross-road:
"[He] took great care to distinguish his doctrines,
which he pretended to prove by just induction, from his
conjectures, which were to stand or fall, according as
future experiments and observations should establish or
refute them."
(I.P., II, iii, 85)
Perhaps the time-slices are too serialistic, too firmly
divided into separate installments. Perhaps what is
missing is their closer integration, whereby induction
would be merely another name for experimental testing,
both complete and incomplete, of specific hypotheses. As
I have indicated above, Reid criticizes Hartley for just
this admixture of fact and conjecture, for the develop¬
ment of a system (of vibrations) which combines "strong"
as well as "weak" links. The latter, according to Reid,
constitute an 'adulteration' of true philosophy (I.P., II,
iii, 87). It seems clear, therefore, that Reid was con¬
cerned to maintain a viable distinction between "know¬
ledge" and "opinion" (I.P., I, iii, 41), and to credit
science with a degree of certainty and conviction uniform
at least with Baconian standards.
Devoting an entire chapter to the subject, Reid
gives a rather comprehensive and well illustrated exposition
227.
of Bacon's idols of shallow and easy opinion. At every
available moment he lauds that philosopher's "slow and
patient method of induction", by means of which sound
judgments night more nearly be approximated (I,P., VI,
viii, 691 ff). "The process of induction", he had noted
in A Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic, is "more arduous"
and less certain in its conclusions than "reasoning by
syllogism", since it is
"an ascent from particular premises to a general conclusion.
The evidence of such general conclusions is probable only,
not demonstrative: But when the induction is sufficiently
copious, and carried on according to the rules of art, it
forces conviction no less than demonstration itself does."^
Where Bacon's art failed, through the production of "some
obscurity in the work, and a defect of proper examples for
illustration", Newton "supplied" the necessary correctives;
for "in the third book of his Principia and in his Optics,
[he] had the rules of the Novum Organum constantly in his
eye" (ibid.). Reid's indebtedness to Bacon is profound,
in spite c£ his rejection of the latter's forms (Brown
concurred in this view) and the method of 'exclusion'.
Thus, while Newton undoubtedly furnished the letter, Bacon
7
provided the spirit of the law of induction.
^Chapter V, section 2; the 'Analysis' first appeared
in Lord Karnes's Sketches of the History of Man, published in
1773.
7
Laudan regards it as a "serious mistake" to take
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Over—the-shoulder glances in the direction of Bacon
had become a familiar and integral part of the new science
of mind. In his authoritative submission to the Royal
g
Society of Edinburgh on the subject of "Lord Bacon",
Napier cites Dr. Stubbe's derisive characterization of
seventeenth-century experimentalists as "a Bacon-faced
9
generation". It would be rather more flattering to
Reid as a "Baconian essentially and only incidentally a
Newtonian methodologist"; op. cit., p. 120. I find no
justification, however, for trying to give the edge to
either predecessor: their respective influences on Reid's
thought were surely of different kinds. Nor can I see
the point of Laudan's conclusion that "Reid was only
vaguely familiar with the details of Bacon's Novum Organum":
Reid's awareness of Bacon's short-comings as well as his
detailed exposition of the idols in Essay VI suggest, on
the contrary, a familiarity typical of the thoroughness
with which the Scotch philosophers read Bacon and the
excitement engendered by such reading. The latter will
become more apparent in what follows.
g
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh,
vol. VIII (1818) , pp. 373-425; reprinted in Lord Bacon
and Sir Walter Raleigh (Cambridge, 1853) , pp"^ 1-71.
Stewart speaks most highly of this essay in a letter to
the Lord Provost recommending Napier for the Chair in Moral
Philosophy made vacant by Brown's death in 1820. See
Selections from the Correspondence of the Lord Macvey
Napier, Esq., ed. by his son, Macvey Napier, and 'printed
for private circulation only' (London, 1877), p. 9. Leonard
Horner and Henry Brougham approached Napier in 1827, on be¬
half of the Committee of the 'Useful Knowledge Society'
with an invitation for him to contribute articles on the
Novum Organum and the De Dignitate et Augmentis to the
'Library of Useful Knowledge': "We both ended by being of
opinion that they can be confided to no hands so sure of
doing them justice as yours." Napier modestly declined.
See their exchange of letters in the Selections, pp. 51-6.
9
Lord Bacon and Sir Walter Raleigh, op. cit., p. 48;
Transactions, p~. 408 .
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depict the Scottish philosophers at the turn of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the same
epithet; for the incentive given to the mood of scientific
optimism among the intellectual members of that generation
was Bacon's zeal for any knowledge which might serve to
benefit human society. Lord Webb Seymour gives personal
voice to this feeling during the early stages of the
Baconian revival:
"In the course of the winter I have, in company
with a friend, read through Lord Bacon's De Augmentis,
and we gave every part of it such a discussion, as in
times of old you and I were wont to bestow on the pages
of Bishop Butler; I hope, too, with equal profit. Though
I had reaped no other advantage, I should think myself
well repaid by the enthusiasm for science and the improve¬
ment in philosophical temper which I must have derived from
it. Bacon's mind must have been influenced in all its
speculations by an ardent zeal for useful truth, an un¬
affected candour, and a sublime, yet modest, dignity;
qualities which, in the degree to which he possessed them,
may be deemed even more extraordinary than the vigour of
his comprehensive imagination, and the depth of his judg¬
ment. Without habitual sentiments of this kind he could
hardly have detected the fallacy of those misguided
exertions of the intellect which had been sanctioned by
the labours of ages, nor have had the courage to undertake
the reformation which he effected. We are now just entering
on the Novum Organum."10
Reflecting a widespread development in the eighteenth
century, the Scottish experimentalists insisted that a
Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner op.
cit., vol. I, Appendix A: 'Biographical Notice of Lord
Webb Seymour' by Henry Hallam, pp. 537-8; the quotation
is taken from a letter to Hallam by Webb Seymour, 18th
May, 1801.
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proper understanding of Nature must include a thorough
investigation into human nature or, as it was sometimes
put, a knowledge of the very 'principles of understanding'.
In this, Bacon was still their guide and mentor.
He inspired confidence in the experimental method
as a means of reforming the "plan of philosophical inquiry"
throughout all "branches of science" and not merely in
natural philosophy. The indebtedness which men like
Stewart felt towards Bacon was combined with a strong
realization of the pioneer efforts which they themselves
would have to make. And so the term "reformation" had this
double edge. "To this method of philosophizing", observes
Stewart
"(which is commonly distinguished by the title of the
Method of Induction,) we are indebted for the rapid pro¬
gress which physical knowledge has made since the time of
Lord Bacon. The publication of his writings fixes one of
the most important eras in the history of science. . . .
The reformation in the plan of philosophical inquiry,
which has taken place during the two last centuries, al¬
though not entirely confined to physics, has not extended
in the same degree to the other branches of science; as
sufficiently appears from the prevailing scepticism with
respect to the principles of metaphysics and of moral
philosophy. This scepticism can only be corrected, by
applying to these subjects the method of induction."
(Elements, I, i and ii, 7-8)
Belief in the applicability of experimental methods to the
mind depended to a large extent on the sanction of Bacon.
Yet this very sanction was tied to the wheel of a vicious
circle; for it was through their faith in the ubiquitous
scope of experimentation that the 'optimists' saw a
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11
precedent in Bacon. Napier, for example, argued that
the critics had no grounds for supposing Bacon's method
to be restricted to the "physical sciences alone". The
nature of philosophy itself, he maintained, determines
that the methodology should be universal.
"The object of philosophy, and the principles of philo¬
sophizing are the same, whether the investigation relates
to the laws of matter or the laws of mind; and thus the
logic of the Novum Organum cannot be useful with reference
to the one, without having the same character with
reference to the other."
(Lord Bacon, p. 12)
Was there not 'factual evidence' in both cases, and did
not induction arise through generalization from the 'ob¬
servation' of such facts?
Stewart pressed the matter home, and in so doing
gave witness to the level of certainty to be attained in
this the final stage of the Reformation.
"As all our knowledge of the material world rests ultimately
on facts ascertained by observation, so all our knowledge
of the human mind rests ultimate on facts for which we
This faith is not to be confused with the "rule
of faith" in Baconian science (namely, "experience") which
Feyerabend has observed to be "logically", although "by no
means psychologically vacuous", since there is no way of
determining "what experience tells us" except by means of
the theory which it is supposed to illustrate. See Paul
K. Feyerabend, "Classical Empiricism", in The Methodological
Heritage of Newton, op. cit., pp. 150-1; 154-5. It
resembles more closely Kuhn's paradigm of scientific pro¬
cedure, which serves as the eye-glass of all research, the
interpretative mould in which both the world and others
are cast. See Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
232.
have the evidence of our own consciousness. An attentive
examination of such facts will lead in time to the general
principles of the human constitution, and will gradually
form a science of mind not inferior in certainty to the
science of body."
(Elements, I, ii, 8; italics
mine)
The wording is crucial: not only with respect to the tone
which it set for the subsequent development, from Renouvier
to James, of an analytic 'psychology'; but also in terms
of the fierce debate which was to snap across the journals
during the first two decades of the nineteenth century.
That debate saw Stewart and Jeffrey as its principals,
with Napier and Brown acting frequently as 'seconds' and
sometimes as independent voices. Much of the discussion
centred on the science of mind: its historic roots in or
at least ready adaptation to the procedures of natural
science; its late arrival as a fashionable pursuit among
intellectuals; and its utility for ordinary, 'conscious'
individuals. The question of utility I will leave for
another chapter. That mental science had undoubtedly
ignited the attentions of French, English and Scottish
philosophers is, of course, a central and continuing note
in this thesis. The tendency towards analysis was an
aspect, perhaps better still a symptom, of their pre¬
occupation with the ways and means of understanding.
Stemming from Newton himself, this "method of analysis",
as Voltaire and others termed it, revealed itself as a
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"critical instrument for the exposure of humbug, prejudice,
12
and intellectual pretension", indeed as the precondition
of all philosophic ventures. What concerns us now is the
transposition of an inductive methodology from its suc¬
cessful debut (itself an open question in the debate) in
the Newtonian science to the faculties and operations of
Mind. If the mental scientists thought that it was a
simple matter of changing keys (up or down, depending on
the initial registration), they were due for a surprise.
Some members of their audience reacted almost violently,
as though the perpetrators of this transposition had
struck a sour note or invented, well before their time,
atonal music. Even in science, it seems, there are
classicists who prefer established forms to unruly in¬
novations .
Stewart refers explicitly to Priestley as one of
those "writers of the present age" (Hartley and Darwin
are among the others) whose "objections" to such a trans¬
position border on sheer prejudice. They are, he states,
"similar to the charge which was at first brought against
the Newtonian doctrine of gravitation, as being a revival
12
Henry Guerlac, "Where the Statue Stood: Divergent
Loyalties to Newton in the Eighteenth Century", in Aspects
of the Eighteenth Century, ed. Earl R. Wasserman (Baltimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 318.
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of the occult qualities of the Aristotelians" (Elements,
I, ii, 8). Since Newton had pointedly disowned the idea
that gravity was "an Essential Property of Bodies", that
early reaction was foolishness indeed. Stewart, however,
is here cfefending not Newton, but Reid who distinguished
between the discoveries of the natural philosopher, on the
13
one hand, and those of the metaphysician, on the other.
That it should fall to the metaphysician, rather than to
the natural philosopher, to explore operating causes, whether
in matter or in mind, was as much a part of Priestley's
disenchantment as the application to the latter of the
"method of induction", to which Stewart gives his un¬
qualified assent (Elements I, ii, 8). Quite naturally for
a materialist, Priestley finds this metaphysical role
both alarming in the first instance and theoretically
unsound in the second.
It is really Jeffrey, however, who by leaping into
the fray creates a storm of protest.^ His is not the
objection of a materialist to alleged 'metaphysical
13
Reid to Karnes, 16 December, 1780; quoted by
Laudan, op. cit., p. 129.
14
See Francis Jeffrey's reviews of Stewart's
Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D.D.,
P.K.s., Edinburgh (January 18U4) and Philosophical Essays
(November, ibiu), in Contributions to the Edinburgh Review
by Francis Jeffrey (London, 1846), II, 593-608; and 664-5.
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speculation', although his attack is directed against those
"metaphysical writers" who have dabbled - wrongly, he
maintains, - in experimental affairs. He wishes rather
to chide Stewart and others for advocating what he regards
as an erroneous extension of Baconian methodology from
the 'department of proper Experiment" into that of "mere
Observation" (Jeffrey, 1804, 594-5). It should be noted
at this stage that the critical line taken by Jeffrey
does not engage the quite distinct, and probably more
important, question regarding the validity of "physio-
logico-metaphysical theories" which attempt to explain
the "causes or mechanism by which the intellectual pheno¬
mena are supposed to be produced" (the words are those
of Stewart's apologist, Macvey Napier"*"^) . Adhering
strictly to the positions of Reid and Newton, Stewart
dismisses the idea that there is any relation whatsoever
between mental science or the "philosophy of the mind"
and the "metaphysical romances" of the physiologists
(Napier, 1811, 3). Jeffrey is guilty (and Napier detects
15
See Napier's review of Stewart's Philosophical
Essays in The Quarterly Review, vol. 6 (October, 1811) ,
pp. 1-37. Jessop wrongly attributes the review to T.
Bowdler, for Napier's authorship is confirmed by his
son in Selections from the Correspondence of the late
Macvey Napier, Esq., op. cit., pp. 3-6; letters to Napier
from Wm. Gifford (T5 August and 28 October, 1811) and
from Stewart himself (18 December, 1811) are substantial
proof of this claim.
236.
this) of a certain amount of bastardization with respect
to the word 'metaphysics', a word which, as Napier points
out, is "equally applied to the repulsive and visionary
speculations of the schoolmen" (ibid., 2). Under Jeffrey's
rubric, the metaphysician ought only to observe, and then
within the strict confines of "methodical arrangement"
(Jeffrey, 1805, 595), while never so much as entertaining
the suggestion of experimental research. The latter is
restricted to those "substances" which are "actually in
our power" and where "the judgment and artifice of the
inquirer can be effectively employed to arrange and combine
them in such a way as to disclose their most hidden
properties and relations" (Jeffrey, 1804, 594). The
mind, so the argument goes, is among that "other class of
phenomena" which
"occur in substances that are placed altogether beyond
our reach; the order and succession of which we are
generally unable to control; and as to which we can do
little more than collect and record the laws by which
they appear to be governed."
Apart from the sense in which Jeffrey's distinction some¬
what inverts the Stoical order of things which are 'in our
t
power' and those which are 'beyond our control' (Epictetus),
there is at least an apparent agreement with Reid and
Stewart regarding the mental philosopher's basic concern
for the "laws of thought", rather than for the "essence
of the thinking principle" (Napier, 1811, 3).
The aim of Jeffrey's critical apparatus, however,
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belies this appearance. The aspects of mental science
which he singles out for attack are the very features of
our conscious experience which those metaphysicians had
sought to elucidate in their analytic inquiries (the term
has a pejorative ring throughout the reviews) and which
he has obviously failed to grasp. Insisting that as mere
spectators we are 'powerless' to alter that which we
observe, he reasons that the classifier of mental phenomena
can neither "decompose" or "analyze" nor "know more of
them than has always been known to all to whom they had
been imparted" (Jeffrey, 1804, 596; 1810, 651). What
crucibles and prisms may be to the scientist who experiments
"upon matter", reflection and attention cannot, by any
stretch of analogical reasoning, be to the ordinary
individual who feels, perceives or remembers, observes
that he is doing so, and "knows exactly what it is" that
these words "denote" (Jeffrey, 1804, 595, 597). Jeffrey
is not decrying that particular kind of reasoning whose
evidence, as Campbell put it, is "but a more indirect
experience, founded on some remote similitude", and is
16
"hardly ever honoured with the name of proof". Indeed
he recognizes the need for such reasoning, at least
within the area of natural science; for it is the process
^Dr. George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric,
vol. I (Edinburgh, 1816), I, v, 124-5.
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whereby one experiment suggests other "analogous experi¬
ments" which leads "naturally to the interminable expansion
of enquiry and of knowledge" (Jeffrey, 1810, 655). The
evidence provided by mental phenomena, on the other hand,
is non-expansive. Instead of 'rousing' or 'inflaming'
one's observation, it "centres in itself" and at most
'gratifies' and 'allays' one's "curiosity". It becomes
clear that Jeffrey's intention is to root out what he
believes to be the fundamental problem: namely, the
metaphysician's preoccupation with analysis and, deeper
still, his conviction that by means of this double-
edged instrument of "reflection and attention", he can
increase man's knowledge of himself (Jeffrey, 1810,
651).17
The methodological issue is therefore only half
the story, and even this side of Jeffrey's argument cannot
be regarded as the break-through which he seems to have
hoped for. It is surely by attending to and reflecting
on what he does that the natural scientist learns to
Compare Reid himself (I.P., VI, i, 199): "The
judgments grounded upon the evidence of sense, of memory,
and of consciousness, put all men upon a level. The
Philosopher, with regard to these, has no prerogative
above the illiterate, or even above the savage. . . .
His superiority is in judgments of another kind; in judg¬
ments about things abstract and necessary." If Jeffrey
had pursued that last point, the debate would likely have
taken a different turn.
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apply the word 'experimentation' to his efforts. Further¬
more, observation is an integral part of that experimen¬
tation and not, as Jeffrey seems to allege, a helpless
and ineffective by-stander, suitable only for pre-
Newtonian "star-gazers" (Jeffrey, 1804, 594) and the
18
common man. Admittedly, there is something "different"
in the results of scientific "invention" (Jeffrey, 1804,
596), a way of looking at the world which is either wholly
or in part dissimilar from the previous mode of vision.
In that sense, each new discovery brings about "an increase
of power"; in short, the Baconian dream. Depending on
one's interpretation of Newtonian methodology, it might
also be true to say that there is an element of dis¬
closure into the "secrets of that internal structure"
(whatever it might be), which produces "a pretty correct
knowledge of the causes of the phenomena we produce" at
some later date (Jeffrey, 1804, 596; 1810, 650). (As I
mentioned above, this was by no means the reading of
18
In his paper on Bacon, delivered before the Royal
Society of Edinburgh in 1818, Napier goes to some lengths
to show how Bacon revitalized philosophy by 'systematizing'
the "true method of discovery". The mode of observation
employed by the ancients, Bacon realized, lacked a proper
experimental setting; this he provided, at least in prin¬
ciple and thereby founded "the art of observing for the
purposes of philosophical discovery". The "regeneration
of philosophy" was thus accomplished by means of "a well-
regulated use of observation and experiment". Lord Bacon,
pp. 13-17.
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Newton which Reid gave although it was, no doubt through
a kind of wish-fulfilment, the manner in which many
eighteenth-century writers held the new science.) But
Jeffrey rules out, I think inconsistently, the possibility
that there could evolve, through philosophical reflection,
different ways of seeing ourselves, perhaps even alterations
in the structures of self-consciousness (cf. Jeffrey, 1804,
598). The real bite of his attack on Stewart hinges on
the belief that there is nothing in the conclusions of
mental analysis which was not first "familiar" to every
man (Jeffrey, 1804, 597).
In two interesting but confused passages (Jeffrey,
1804, 597-8; 1810, 565-7), Jeffrey tries to find a home
for the philosophy of mind. He views it essentially as
a 'technical' re-distribution, after observation, of the
"particulars" of mind which are, however, "practically
known" to all; perhaps by analogy as a sort of 'grammatical1
re-arrangement of the language or "correct map" of the
districts of mind, again with which we are all intimately
acquainted; ,and finally as a verbal description of the
"laws of thought, or connexions of mental operation, that
are not so commonly stated in words", but which are
"universally known" even to those "who never thought of
enouncing them in precise or abstract propositions". He
remarks at one point that the philosophy of mind may be
"cultivated" by the student "in solitude and silence -
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by calm reflection on our own mental experiences, and
patient attention to the subjects of our consciousness",
yet asks at another:
"Is it not, on the contrary, universally understood to be
the peculiar and limited province of that philosophy to
explain the nature and distinctions of those primary
functions of the mind which are possessed in common by
men of all vocations and all conditions? - to treat, in
short, of perception, and attention, and memory, and ima¬
gination, and volition, and judgment, and all the other
powers or faculties into which our intellectual nature
may be distinguished?"
It was these, he attests, which "occupied" the attentions
of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Reid. Although he has al¬
luded here to the functions of explanation and distinction,
we must assume from everything that he has said that they
do not constitute a proper 'analysis', nor may they lay
claim to 'discovery' (Jeffrey, 1810, 658). We must also
suppose that they were always employed "without study
or exertion" (Jeffrey, 1804, 598). What are we to make,
finally, of Stewart's "supposed experiments" into "those
slighter shades of individual character"? Since they do
not treat of "what is common to all human beings", and in
spite cf their occasional usefulness as "illustrations",
they "can never be permitted to rank as a legitimate part
of that philosophy". The bastard, Jeffrey would have us
believe, is Stewart's own off-spring: a naughty child at
that, who feigns discovery where there is none to be had,
owing to the 'fact' that the adult community knows every-
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thing there is to know about itself in advance, that is,
"by nature" (Jeffrey, 1804, 596).
Jeffrey had maintained that Bacon's "code of laws"
for the "regulation of experimental induction" could only
be observed where there was 'clearly' something to be
discovered. Having quite arbitrarily excluded the domain
of mental phenomena, he then felt justified in mocking
the pretensions of the metaphysicians to rights under the
law. Yet behind those declarations of concern for the
protection of legitimate science, one begins to notice
that negative assumption and, in particular, the way in
which it determines the outcome of the argument. The
battle of the methodologies flags under this insight.
(It should be recalled, for example, that there was never
any question of trying to discover the causes of mental
phenomena or their operations: Reid and Stewart, Napier
and Jeffrey were here in agreement.) Suppose one does
not acknowledge with Jeffrey that there is "no opaque
skin ... on the mind" (Jeffrey, 1810, 652), or that it
is at all easy for anyone to arrive at "a perfect knowledge"
of his mind: one will then begin to think, if one is
optimistic and a progressivist, in terms of a gradual
increase in our understanding of ourselves. It is Napier
who finally restores a measure of balance to the discussion,
and he does so by attaching himself to this point inspired,
as he himself admits, not only by Stewart but by that
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"penetrating writer", David Hume (Napier, 1811, 9).
Napier is not even faintly troubled by the where¬
abouts of the word 'discovery' on that map which 'strictly'
defines the area of mental philosophy.
"If the intellectual philosopher is not to be ranked as a
discoverer, because all the facts with which his science
is conversant have always existed in our consciousness,
this is merely a matter of verbal criticism, and does not
at all affect the proposition that our knowledge of the
laws to which these facts belong is capable of being sub¬
stantially increased by metaphysical inquiry."
(Napier, 1811, 9)
The shifting of attention, away from the 'facts' of
consciousness (that we perceive, imagine, remember, and so
forth) towards the 'laws' which govern their behaviour
and thus thought itself, is subtle yet telling. Jeffrey
believed that one might describe these laws, but not that
one must ascertain them by a higher act of consciousness
which effectively makes that which was equal in conscious¬
ness unequal in reflection. What Napier finds dis¬
tressing in Jeffrey's attack upon Stewart is his inability,
or unwillingness, to subject 'consciousness' itself to
analysis, and thereby to realize the strain involved in
holding fast, even for description, what is "merely that
involuntary and momentary perception which the mind has of
r
any present thought or feeling." The view here taken of
consciousness is plainly Reid's, and will be examined in
another context. Napier's handling of it is important to
us at this stage for the way in which he supports the
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claims of mental science. "Its fugitive intimations",
he writes,
"leave no traces whatever in the memory, and only become
subservient to our knowledge of the laws which regulate
the intellectual phenomena, in so far as they are made
the objects of careful and continued reflexion. It is
owing to the great difficulty and complexity of this
operation, and the fugitive and subtle nature of its
objects, that there is so much uncertainty and contradiction
in our metaphysical opinions. Reflexion involves the
deliberate exercise of attention, recollection, and com¬
parison; - processes to which the bulk of mankind never
think of subjecting their thoughts, but to which it is
necessary habitually and methodically to subject them, in
order to arrive at an accurate knowledge of the laws of
the mind. It is only in this way that we can discover the
latent relations and dependencies of its various phenomena;
and every unnoticed relation which reflextion enables us
to perceive, forms a real addition to our intellectual
knowledge."
(Napier, 1811, 9)
Jeffrey might still question the usefulness or purpose
of these 'additions', but his doing so would amount to a
refusal to recognize the (quite familiar) distinction be¬
tween things cnly vaguely and things more "fully under¬
stood" (ibid., 10). Such a distinction could conceivably
be "wholly unsuspected by those who have not been instructed
by mental analysis", although this need not imply that an
individual may not instruct himself by means of reflection
on his own experience. Indeed, such is the process - and
it is not entered into (to use Hume's phrase) "without
pains", - by which alone we can come to any understanding
of ourselves. Nevertheless, even a modest extension and
refinement of this technique, with the assistance of the
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mental philosopher, enables us to trace and develop the
"various ideas and circumstances which combine in, or
are connected with our different operations and feelings"
(ibid.). Jeffrey notwithstanding, there is no escape from
analysis: "by reflexion", notes a "writer of the greatest
metaphysical acumen" (Napier alludes here to and quotes
Brown), "we analyse our thoughts". One might equally
observe that through analysis we begin to reflect on the
thoughts we entertain.
While Jeffrey's protest centered on the misuse by
philosophers of mind of the Baconian method of induction,
Brown's objections were directed against what he regarded
as a significant error in that method. The application
of inductive principles to the science of mind met with
his general approval, and so in this connection he was
able to support the cause of Stewart and Napier against
Jeffrey. On the other hand, he could agree to no more
than a limited use of the method, especially in its Baconian
form. Basically what he found objectionable in the latter
was the taint of methodological essentialism; that is,
Bacon's search for the Essences or Forms of material (or
by transposition, mental) substances under the aegis
19




put forward his own brand of methodological nominalism
in which he insisted, for example, that one must build on
the basis of the succession of particular states of con¬
sciousness, no one of which is mind, but "in which mind
exists at that particular moment" (L. XII, 259). That
the mental scientist should arrive at these 'elements'
by decomposing or analyzing the complex phenomena of mind
was, of course, never in question. Brown was not at all
satisfied, however, that Bacon had furnished such an
experimental model, for it seemed to him that Bacon had
exceeded the limits of true induction in pursuing the
"essential differences" among things as though these and
not the "simple fact itself", having been regularly ob¬
served, were the underlying 'principles' of any operation
or relation (Inquiry, 3, 456-8 Note L). Like Reid and
Newton before him, he considers "every thing beyond" the
actual circumstances "before observed" to be "only con¬
jectural", a "presumption, which may or may not be
verified by subsequent obervation" (ibid.).
Whether he would support the distinction laid down
by Brewster, Leslie and later J. D. Forbes, between "a
20
superficial and a profound version of empiricism"
(Bacon's being the former), is at first sight difficult
20
See G. E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect
(Edinburgh: the University Press, 1961), p. 184.
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to judge. The contrast between types of empiricism
depends on the latter clearly having "an anti-atomistic
organic character". Brown's own method of 'chemical
analysis' would, in spite of Ferrier's characterization
of it, agreeably fit into this. Finding, as Brewster
21
suggested, "some predominating fact or relationship"
was very much the procedure utilized by Brown in reaching
"general laws" of mental behaviour. Nevertheless, Brown
was apt on occasion to slip into an 'atomistic' mode of
reasoning, somewhat after the fashion of his teacher,
Dugald Stewart, developing out of units of experience a
broader picture of their inter-relationship. Such
moments were no doubt inevitable: the ideal of simultaneity
which was intended to govern the movement of his analysis,
at once 'involving' and 'evolving', was not always workable
in practice. Yet the fact that he should choose to employ
such a method is perhaps the best indication of his tendency
towards an empiricism more 'profound' that that offered by
Baconian induction.
The experimentalist of mind should now be ready
to demonstrate his skills. Stewart's portrait of this
newly conceived creature, and Jeffrey's caricature of the
same (by no means flattering) might, as it were, have
21
Quoted by Davie, 0£. cit., pp. 184-5.
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dangled from the walls of Brown's 'laboratory', but
they were not on the whole distracting. He was busy
testing the ground beneath such states of consciousness
as memory and attention. At times he came dangerously
close to solutions which, although in keeping with the
sort of questions posed, were clearly unacceptable to
him. Other mental scientists found, and still do find,
security rather than abhorrence in the prospect. For¬
tunately perhaps for Brown, there was the living example
of Erasmus Darwin an experimentatist, as he discovered,
of an entirely different species. Observing him closely,
Brown began to recognize his own affinity for a truer
method of philosophic inquiry. That method originated in,
but did not stop at, what I shall call the 'operational'
level.
3
A VIEW OF OPERATIONS
It is precisely because someone like Brown could
ask (with apparent philosophical impunity) 'how does
memory work?' and expect an answer borne out by the ex¬
perience of an inward-turning self towards its own 'land¬
scape' that a new breed of mental scientists could envisage
a final and totally mechanistic solution. Such an outcome
would certainly have been repugnant to the initial question-
posers, but their shock would be naively founded. For the
questions they ask in that particular way constitute a
quite definite class. Writing in 1830, Abercrombie
shrewdly observed that questions of this sort, regarding
the processes of the mind, seek to ascertain "how it
performs them"."*" "On this subject," he notes,
"we find great differences among philosophers. . . .
Some appear to have spoken in too unqualified terms
respecting various and distinct FACULTIES of the mind,
and have enumerated a variety of these, corresponding to
the various mental operations. Dr. Brown, on the other
hand, has followed a very different course, by referring
all our mental processes to the two principles of simple
and relative suggestion."
(Inquiries, 184-5)
^"Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers and
the Investigation of Truth [Edinburgh, 1830), p. 184.
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If mental 'faculties' are, by their nature and definition,
empowered to attend, abstract or associate, it becomes
reasonable to ask how this or that power or faculty is
or can be implemented (which is simply another way of
asking 'how does it function?'). Even the more 'refined'
question, 'what does it mean to attend to something or to
remember it?' can be swung around to join hands with 'show
me in what way attention is necessary for retention and
recall.' It is possible, in other words, to convert
conceptual clarifications into introspective soundings,
into common-sense appeals to what each of us supposedly
knows about the mechanics of his everyday apprehensions.
Stewart's philosophy of intellectual education
includes the idea of training the attentions of the
young (Elements, I, vi, 338) and of honing the instrument
of memorization while its powers are greatest (ibid., 373).
It is interesting to note that Abercrombie himself tries
to shift the ground of the question from how to what.
"My object", he states, "has been simply to inquire what
the mind does, without entering on the question how it
does so." (Inquiries, 186) Naturally he wants to avoid
identification either with the faculty psychology of Reid
and Stewart or with the rather different hypotheses of
that "eloquent and ingenious writer", Dr. Brown (ibid.,
p. 185). Nevertheless, the mental "operations" which he
unfolds lend themselves as answers to queries about how
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habit influences attention or how attention conditions
memory. It might be true to say that even those writers
who, following Hume's lead, made a point of distinguishing
the study of effects from the study of causes were not
always clear in their minds (hence conceptually) where
the one left off and the other began. The mere temptation
to explain the operation of those effects gave rise to
that slippery question 'how?' Perhaps the only way out
was to abandon altogether the appeal to experience, the
"rule of faith" in classical empiricism.
The same type of question, whatever its historical
matrix, will tend to breed answers of a similar species.
That species I have endeavoured to describe as broadly
mechanistic. It addresses itself to the framework of
Galilean physics out of which, according to Husserl, was
born modern naturalistic or behaviouristic psychology.
As Aron Gurwitsch interprets this idea, "modern psychology
has developed not only in historical but also in logical
2
continuity with modern physics." Thus that seemingly
2
"The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach
to Consciousness", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
vol. XV (March, 1955), p. 312. He goes on to say: "What
has to be stressed is not so much the definition of psycho¬
logical concepts in analogy to concepts of physics. More
important is the reference to physics in the very formulation
of psychological problems, especially problems concerning
perception. To account for perception, the psychologist
accepts, and starts from, the universe as conceived in
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innocent interrogative 'how' (with its ready accomplice
3
"why') is apt to lead an unsuspecting 'mind' into the
inviting arms of 'matter'. For this reason, even the most
'behaviouristic' of our ordinary-language analysts feels
obligated to pose new questions.
There are "boundary conditions", asserts Michael
Polanyi, to which we must always be alert. The boundary
conditions of the laws of mechanics, for example, do not
rule out "the operational principles which define a machine";
conditions binding muscular action may be controlled "by a
pattern of purposive behaviour, like that of going for a
4
walk". Similarly, operational principles governing the
physical science and considers the human organism as a
physical system acted upon by physical events. Indepen¬
dently of any theories to be advanced, the very problems
which the theories of psychology are meant to solve are
determined by allowance for the science of physics."
(pp. 312-3) Husserl himself was relentless in his con¬
demnation of "the deceptive image of a scientific method
modeled on that of the physicochemical method"; he adds:
"It is not without significance that the fathers of ex¬
perimentally exact psychology were physiologists and phy¬
sicists. The true method follows the nature of the things
to be investigated and not our prejudices and preconceptions".
Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, tr. Quentin
Lauer (N.Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965),
p. 102.
3
For we seek an explanation of these processes in
terms of "the laws and relations by which they are regu¬
lated". Abercrombie, Inquiries, 68.
4
Michael Polanyi, "The structure of Consciousness"
(1965), in Knowing and Being (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1969), pp. 216-7.
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mind are not apprehended in those governing its physiology;
nor do they "interfere with" or overrule the physiological
mechanisms, although they seem clearly to rely on the
5
"services" of the latter. At stake is what Polanyi calls a
"comprehensive entity", co-operating with mutual and tolerant
exclusion on two levels. In fairness to Brown, it was just
this sort of distinction which enabled him to resist the
clamouring of mechanists in his time for the complete and
sweeping destruction of Cartesian dualism. That they were
not 'clamouring' in this sense but were, instead, moving
quietly towards a materialist hypothesis might depend on
how much force and irony one attaches to the following
statement by Joseph Priestley;
"I am rather inclined to think that, though the subject is
beyond our comprehension at present, man does not consist
of two principles, so essentially different from one
another as matter and spirit, which are always described
as having not one common property, by means of which they
can effect or act upon each other; the one occupying
space, and the other not only not occupying the least
imaginable portion of space, but incapable of bearing
relation to it; insomuch that, properly speaking, my mind
is no more, in my body, than it is in the moon. I rather
think that the whole man is of some uniform composition,
and that the property of perception, as well as the other
powers that are termed mental, is the result (whether
necessary or not) of such an organical structure as that
of the brain. Consequently, that the whole man becomes
extinct at death, and that we have no hope of surviving (
the grave but what is derived from the scheme of revelation."
^Ibid., p. 221.
^Joseph Priestley, "Introductory Essays" to
Hartley's Theory of The Human Mind (2nd ed.; London, 1790),
pp. xxiii-xxiv.
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The opening phrase, "I am rather inclined to think", and
the final bow to divine revelation were probably deceptive
enough to fool some of the 'immaterialists1 only some of
the time.
It is worth remembering that Brown first drew
attention to his talents by observing the scientific as
well as the philosophic discrepancies in Erasmus Darwin's
7
Zoonomia. Indeed, if one gives credence to the view of
one American historian, Brown's efforts were confined to
the sphere of scientific innovation. "The systems of
Brown and Erasmus Darwin were foundations for scientific
work in physiological psychology and biology, but they
had no contribution to make toward moral and religious
g
knowledge." I regard this assessment as myopic and
7
"Mr. Brown is the first formidable antagonist
whom the novelty of Dr. Darwin's theories has provoked.
He has entered on his investigation, however, with all the
respect due to the great talents and extensive knowledge
of the author whom he criticizes; and whatever may have
been our partiality to the beautiful fabric which he
attempts to overthrow, we must consider him as a champion
worthy of being admitted to the encounter. . . . this
book is a very respectable specimen of the author's
talents and attainments." Review of Brown's Observations
on the Zoonomia of Erasmus Darwin in the Monthly Review, June
and July, 1799. (Welsh attributes this review to "Dr.
Duncan, senior"; see Welsh, 67.)
g
Herbert W. Schneider, A History of American
Philosophy (N.Y.: Columbia U.P., 1946), p. 247. Schneider
maintains further that Brown was "more nearly on the
borderline of academic 'science'. He became the chief
object of opposition among theologians, because they felt
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misleading, but obviously an impression had been made and
left in the memories of Brown's students, both Scottish
and foreign.
Darwin had clearly been on his way to erecting a
one-tier system. It was Darwin's belief, notes a more
recent commentator,
"that all appetites and all intellectual life can be
explained on the basis of physiology. Analyze organic
life with its muscles, nerves and fibres, and you will
discover the source of not only the physical, but also
the intricate moral and emotional life of mankind."9
Ideas were thought by Darwin to consist of "contractions",
"motions" or "configurations" of "fibres" in our sense
organs (Obs., 111). Brown takes this 'definition' to
mean that of the two "effects" brought about by the
"action of the external object" - the "organic affection"
and the "mental affection", the one causally preceding
that his 'rationalism,' as they usually labeled Brown's
attempt at a thoroughly mechanistic or associationist
psychology, was headed for materialism." (ibid.) It should
be remarked in this connection, however, that Brown's early
paper from the Inquiry, entitled "On the Credibility of
Miracles", was republished in A Collection of Theological
Essays from Various Authors, edited by George R. Noyes
(Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1856). At least
same of his better admirers, therefore, were theologians;
for whatever theological category Brown's views might fit,
there can be no doubt that his religious faith was deeply
felt and unflinchingly expressed.
9
J. V. Logan, The Poetry and Aesthetics of Erasmus
Darwin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1936), p. 21.
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the other, - ideas belong "simply" to the former. Darwin
does not help his case by applying the term 'idea'
variously to both parts of the process (Obs., 113), but
he is, after all, endeavouring to prove "the identity of
the mental, and organic affections" (Obs., 116). Ideas
are said to be analogous to "muscular motions", from the
comparison of which Darwin ascertains a "similarity of
nature" (Obs., 117). The argument between Brown and
Darwin then boils down to a discussion of the times
relative to the 'performance' of ideas and muscular
motions. The debate is neither trivial nor isolated.
If Brown were to concede that ideas and fibrous
motions might be 'clocked' - their actions being of
a similar and measurable kind, - he would leave an
opening through which Darwin's biological 'reductivism'
(cf. Obs., 117) could boldly penetrate. The illustrations
cited from the Zoonomia are, to Brown's mind, inconclusive:
"The time taken up in performing an idea ... is much
the same as that taken up in performing a muscular motion.
A musician can press the keys of an harpsichord with his
fingers, in the order of a tune he has been accustomed to
play, in as little time as he can run over those notes
in his mind. So we many times in an hour cover our eyeballs
with our eyelids without perceiving that we are in the
dark; hence the perception or idea of light is not changed
for that of darkness in so small a time as the twinkling
of an eye.
(quoted, Obs., pp. 118-9)
An initial objection to the identification stems from
Darwin himself: the time-span of a dream is commonly
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believed to be of "inconceivable" rapidity, such that
between the moment when our bedroom-door is pushed ajar
and the instant of our awakening, "we sometimes dream a
whole history of thieves or fire" (quoted, Qbs., 119).
Lacking modern experimental apparatus with which to test
and observe the speed of the dream in relation to muscular
reaction, Darwin has nevertheless 'speculated wisely'.
But Brown is surely right to note the faulty conclusions
drawn by that ingenious speculator. If the ideas in our
minds during sleep can be measured (an assumption which
Brown is not quite prepared to make), and if their speed
exceeds that of muscular movement, the clocking-procedure
proves only that the "performing" times of ideas and
muscular action differ. It certainly does not prove that
ideas are fibrous motions or, less strongly, that they
operate according to identical or similar principles.
The case of the musician is rather more perplexing
in so far as it tacitly assumes that there is a time for
both physical and mental events. Brown states only that
"the sounds were the result of muscular motions, and
[that] the relative time, as well as tone, of the notes,
is associated in the mind" (Obs., 119). We know that a
musician sometimes 'keeps time' by tapping his foot, and
in that sense we might be able to compare his performance
time, based on the sounds emitted from the harpsichord,
with his musical time, as expressed by this rhythmical
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tapping. Some might argue (Ryle, for example) that any
further appeal to a musical counting "in his head" is
not only a redundant but also a misdirected feature of
what it means for the musician to know at what tempo to
play a particular composition. Brown's sole concern in
this matter is to bifurcate the muscular and mental
activities so that he may leave adequate room on the side
of the latter for a preview of the musical 'intention'
of the artist. In terms of his model of "affections",
this means that the transition from organic to mental
affections must function for both perceiving and willing.
In perception, the fibrous motions precede the sensorial
ones; in volition the process is reversed (Obs., 111 and
118). We have an idea in our minds and a desire to
express it: if that idea involves a musical sequence
'understood' in a certain way, then this pre-conception
has a validity quite apart from what may or may not
happen after the fingers strike the keys. Execution is
thus carefully segregated from either our memory of a tune
or our attention to its 'running off' or from both.
Actual clock-time (or better still, metronome time)
may or may not coincide with the inner (biological) sense
that this is how the running-off should take place. The
conception, whatever its form, will not bend to physical
quantification.
The 'eyelid' case is perhaps less important than
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the two previous examples. The blinking or "twinkling"
of our eyes is scarcely an operation for which we would
want to have an 'idea' every time it feels necessary.
Nor would it be to our advantage if we had to remember
to blink each time or to pay heed to the execution. It
is the sort of thing which we leave entirely to organic
efficiency, becoming conscious of it only when we are
told not to blink or not to reopen our eyes. (Even then
we often have to struggle against ingrained habit.)
Brown suggests that it is "because the organic affection,
necessary to the production of the new idea, cannot be
changed, in so short a time" (Obs., 119-20). In this
instance, he might better have given credit to the per¬
formative skill of the body, instead of attributing to
it again that lassitude so frequently mentioned. What
is significant about his rebuttal of Darwin is the
interest which he shows in mental and bodily interaction.
This display of attention was not unbecoming in an age
which regarded seriously the deterioration of the body
as a reliable guide to the conduct of the mind from youth
to old age. As Stewart pointed out, there is something
to be learned from ascertaining which things we forget
first, and why we become preoccupied with childhood
reminiscences when we finally cease to attend to present
realities (Elements, I, vi, 356 ff).
The idea of memory gives Brown yet another weapon
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with which to combat Darwin's reductivism. The principle
that, by definition, all ideas are fibrous motions will
necessarily extend to such ideas as those "of judgment,
wisdom, memory, &c." (Letter to Dr. Darwin, 28 Dec.,
1796); in ether words, to "our reflex ideas" (Obs.,
127). Darwin had argued that reflex ideas were "partial
repetitions of our perceptions" (ibid.), but he did not
explain what sort of 'contractions' were commensurate with
'partial repetitions'. Brown endeavours to come to his
aid: perhaps Darwin has in mind fractions of a contraction,
like a half or a third? or perhaps different degrees of
contraction; or again, a numerical difference among the
fibres contracted (Obs., 128). The fractional view,
however, is outrageous. The possibility of degree can be
rejected on the grounds that every contraction, according
to Darwin's theory, must pass through the stage of
irritaion, "partial renovations" of a previous contraction
from any other source thereby being excluded. And the
suggestion that the "number of fibres" contracted can in
any way alter or determine the "simple" idea of, for
example, 'whiteness' is absurd. The idea of whiteness
with one fibre more or less is still the idea of whiteness.
(Although Brown uses a general term here he has in mind,
I believe, a particular instance of a 'white something-
or-other'.) Brown concludes that "my idea of memory
cannot, therefore, be the contraction of a less number of
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fibres: for these fibres will still constitute the idea
of whiteness" (Obs., 129). His concern at this point is
to ascertain what takes place when we attend to an impression
of a stimulus for the second time. What happens, for
example, "when the same circular coin is, a second time,
pressed on the hand"? The number of fibres contracted
must remain the same; and yet "the idea of memory exists"
(Obs., 129). If this is the case, "reflex ideas ... do
not differ from our original perceptions, in the number of
their fibres" (ibid.).
But the screw turns more tightly still. Suppose
we allow Darwin his numerical differentiation:
"the contracted fibre, which constitutes the idea of
memory, must have existed, in the same state, in the
original perception, and the first motion of the organ
of sense have been thus attended with the belief of a
previous similar sensation."
(Obs., 129-30)
In the language of the Lectures, we have a 'conception'
accompanied by a feeling of the relation of 'priority',
of something 'past' which, by its 'similarity' to the
present conception, is once more realized. But if a
"certain stimulus" acts on us "alone", in a single un-
repeated instance, an "idea of memory" will have been
produced "without any object of remembrance" (Obs., 130).
At first glance, much of Brown's argument appears to
elude our grasp. In the first place, he has failed to
explain what he means by saying that the idea of memory
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and the original perception must exist "in the same
state". Secondly, he introduces the notion of a "belief"
which we can only assume, on Darwin's terms, must be
another 'contraction'. A four-fibre perception, however,
is not identical with a three-fibre idea of memory, and
the x-fibre belief (apparently linked to the latter) has
not been accounted for in terms of either.
Perhaps Brown is trying to suggest that, whatever
their numerical difference, the contractions which consti¬
tute both the perception and the memorial idea would be
the same by virtue of their relation to a common factor,
Q. Should this be the case, that which can be affirmed
of the latter will necessarily apply to any description
we might make of the former. Such a description would
include for both the feeling of a past sensation which
bears a certain resemblance to the present sensation .
But if the contraction occurs only once, the stimulus
never again repeating itself, the product will be a complex
perceptual idea one of whose elements is not an "object
of remembrance". Darwin's theory would therefore entail
the confluence of a perceptual and a memorial idea, of
C>2 and , where in fact no idea of memory could have
existed. In the case of the twice-pressed coin, such an
idea exists as a result of there being a second impression
on the hand, or as Brown states, "of the second perception"
(Obs., 129). Thus perceptual ideas differ from memorial
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ones not as being two variations of the same contraction
(however these variations might be conceived) but as
being the products respectively of single and successive
contractions. Darwin has been guilty of overloading his
contractual hypothesis.
Brown repeated his objections under another form
in a subsequent letter to Darwin (28 December, 1796) .
"My idea of memory" he wrote,
"is itself a particular idea; and if ideas be fibrous
motions, my idea of memory must be the contraction of
certain fibres. I therefore ask what those fibres are.
Let us suppose a person born with the sense of hearing
only, let a bell vibrate a second time. The contraction
of the fibres is in this case the same; yet he will not
have the same idea alone. He will be conscious of a
previous similar sensation, that is to say, of memory;
nor can this be resolved into association, for association
cannot take place between a contracted fibre and itself:
it may take place between A and B, but not between A and
A. Nor will he be conscious of a previous similar sen¬
sation alone. He will also receive from the second
vibration the ideas of time and of number. Here then
are different ideas with the same contraction."
(Welsh, 54-5)
Here again the emphasis is placed on the similarity (or
'sameness') of the contraction. Although the bell
vibrates twice, the contraction is the same in both
instances by virtue of the relation to a common stimulus:
it is a physiological reaction brought about by the
vibration of a bell near at hand. We might say, following
Leibniz and Hume, that the contractions were numerically
distinct but qualitatively similar or 'identical'. Brown,
I suspect, is quite aware of this. His basic intention,
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however, is to show that "reflex ideas" are not reducible,
as Darwin had suggested, to fibrous contractions.
Brown goes about this by contrasting the 'sameness'
of the contraction with the 'difference' in ideas. The
initial idea or conception is singular and isolated; the
second necessarily complex and integrated. While the
former stands alone, a wallflower without a partner, the
latter is joined by an idea of memory (which, of course,
is the original conception in a retentive guise) and by
the "ideas of time and of number". The possibility of an
"association" between the original conception and itself
is ruled out as an incestuous type of logical inbreeding
or perhaps as an example of the sin of conceptual narcissism.
An original conception can only be said to resemble itself,
in at least some respect, when it re-appears at a later
time. The initial vibration of the bell is at most a
'fraction' of our 'total' conception of 'bell ringing'.
Depending on the range of our experience at that moment
(and Brown does not specify just how much we apprehend),
this fraction may be infinitely small or large enough to
include a background of other auditory objects variously
sensed with different degrees of attention. Yet even
this 'widening of our conception' under a 'spatial'
aspect (L. XLI, 111) is deprived of the momentum which
would carry it forward into the 'whole' sphere of relations
in which cur apprehension of 'resemblances' takes place.
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That momentum is the mobility of subject and object in
temporal succession. Discussing Valery's philosophy of
time, Georges Poulet notes appropriately:
"In place of being, things now demand to have been. They
wish themselves surrounded not simply by patches and places
but by causes and time. They claim the right to be annexed
to a duration. They entreat the mind to set them against
the background of a past, one single past, of all possible
pasts."10
Brown requires the bell to vibrate again, experience to
repeat itself. Repetition is thus the foundation on
which all relations are finally built, and consequently
the condition by which alone we are able to attend to,
remember, judge or know anything at all."*'"'" Brown's
opposition to Darwin extends far beyond the issue of
the kind or number of fibrous contractions which may or
may not be involved in the perceiving or conceiving of
an idea. It reaches into the very heart of his philosophy
of the spatial co-existence and temporal succession of
both our external and internal affections. In short, the
genesis of Brown's metaphysics is the complex nature of
being. Darwin's simplifications rub against this grain.
The clocking controversy, to which I have alluded
"*"°Poulet, Studies in Human Time, op. cit. , p. 284.
11cf. L. XXV, 12; XLV, 171: I must hold the full
import of-these passages in abeyance until the next
chapter.
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above, was to figure again in Brown's De Somno, this time
in connection with at least three problems: (1) the
relative strengths of the ideas of memory and perception;
(2) the phenomenon of 'fatigue' or the capacity of the
mind for undivided attention; and (3) once more, the
'sluggishness' of muscular motion as contrasted with the
ease and speed of attention to ideas in the mind (cf. De
Somno, 11-12). The first problem involves an epistemo-
logical query: how do we know which of the phenomena
present before us to believe? The second and third are
largely concerned with volitional puzzles: what is the
'intentional' span for both perception and reflection?
if we are engaging an object, a thought or an obstacle,
how long can we sustain our purpose for any of these? or
again, do we sustain an argument or a difficult stratagem
of reasoning in our heads with the same concentration as
we would tackle a block of wood on a lathe? what are the
consequences for mind and for body of inattention or
distraction? To the question of ontological cogency we
already have part of the answer. Perceptual phenomena have
a way of forcing their 'reality' on us; failure to pay
heed to them can result in chaos or disaster: a train
missed, a suit scorched by the iron, Dr. Johnson's
infamous sore foot. But in addition, the orderly succession
of events reappearing as 'our remembrance of what happened
at tx' - a succession drawn up by association from a
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•confused throng of appearances', - is quite unlike a
chain of induction whereby the 'shifting appearances of
external things' are sorted, classified, compared and
resolved. Not only similar features (Resemblance) but
also dissimilar ones (Contrast) may be brought together by
the application of our reasoning (Judgment) to the
experience of 'random but definite items' (De somno, 11).
What Brown does not consider at this stage is the inte¬
gration or confluence of memory and perception in acts
of recognition, at both the immediate and more abstract
levels. Nevertheless, he is keen to point out that
'memory schemes', when they are 'alive and vigorous' (cf.
De Somno, 6), are even more 'diverse' than their per¬
ceptual and interpretative counterparts. The free-play
of memory in states of reverie or dreaming is characterized
by what Bergson later explained to be a 'disinterestedness'
on the part cf the subject "in the present situation, in
12
the present action" . That situation, described by Bergson
13
as the condition of "common-sense", demands the "complete
adjustment" of the person and his memory-images to the
14
"sensation" at hand. In a statement to which Brown
would almost certainly agree, Bergson concludes: "Our
attention to this external and social life is the great
12
Dreams, tr. Edwin E. Slosson (London: T. Fisher
Unwin, 1914), p. 37.
"^Ibid . , p. 52 .
^Ibid. , p. 56.
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regulator of the succession of our internal states."
Whatever it is, memory is not the same when it is left
to its own devices: its intention undergoes a change.
At the same time, Brown recognizes that memory as
"habit' or 'reflex' is essential to the efficient
operation and survival of the body (De Somno, 12). Habit-
memory both eases the strain of 'mere existence' and
frees attention for greater gain. Yet attention like
memory has its own hum-drum routines in addition to its
more rewarding or vivifying moments. Again, it is
essential to our everyday survival that attention should
be habit-forming; for unless we concentrate on what we
are doing, utilizing to the full our accumulated experience
of causes and effects, we are destined to fall into re¬
peated error when performing even the simplest tasks.
Our so-called 'lapses' of memory and attention amount to
suspensions of habit and can expose the subject, often
needlessly, to accident and fatality. Forgetting to
remember the time, however, or to pay heed to the road
might equally be regarded as familiar occurrences since
it is also true that new, dazzling, or unexpected items
constantly divert us from our occupations. Whether our
reasoning is locked in a practical or a theoretical
~^Ibid. , p. 57 .
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quandary the distractions, notes Brown, are many and the
resolve weak (ibid., 11 and 13). The interesting thing
about these distractions is that they approach one as
much from the perceptual as from the memorial 'environ¬
ment' . I shall consider next and at some length one of
Brown's most poignant illustrations of this phenomenon
and some of its ramifications.
What is it, Brown wonders, which lends to the
dancing-girl (saltatrix) her remarkable grace in directing
step after step with no apparent effort? Obviously the
skill acquired by long and intensive practice enters into
the controlled bodily movement (ibid., 13). She does
not appear to exert her 'will' over each step; indeed she
does not 'consciously' perform the dance at all, if this
be taken to mean that she cannot simply 'know how' to
alter her moves but must, instead, watch over and direct
them. Brown rightly sees the absurdity (as Ryle was later
to proclaim) of 'double attention', of attending to y and
attending to my attention of y. In his own dialogue on
the dance, entitled 'Dance and the Soul', Valery seized
upon this complete absorption of the dancer in her art
to convey that swelling silence which awaits ex tempore
the step back into time's continuum.
"She is entirely in her closed eyes, and quite alone with
her soul, in the bosom of the most intimate attention. . . .
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She feels in herself that she is becoming some event. ^
With respect to the chorus of dancers as a whole, he
remarks; "They know not what they are doing, but they do
17
it like gods." So too of Brown's saltatrix.
But Brown employs the analogy of the dancing-girl
to reach yet another insight. The perception of objects
in the world is primarily the work of the self as agent:
I do not merely receive impressions: I act upon them.
Conscious experience, according to Gabriel Marcel, is a
18
mixture of "pure ardour and pure receptivity" rather
19
than simply an "absorption" or "ingestion" of items.
Consciousness as such is more akin to an act of "straining
20
oneself towards something". It would be misleading
therefore, to say that our impressions in some way 'cause'
the self to 'will' a particular course of action. That
this may seem to be the case is a fault both of language
^Collected Works, tr. Wm. McCausland Stewart
(London: Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1958), IV, p. 40.
17Ibid., 28.
1 8
G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, tr. G. S. Fraser





and of reflection. What happens, declares Brown, is
that these phenomena draw out the already stirring desire,
giving it a focus or an object towards which it can 'intend'
a result. If, on the other hand, the perceptual impact
is too great, such that first one then several items
attract the agent's attention, he will be diverted from
his course. An unfavourable or irregular surface - one
that is either too hard or too soft, - may cause the
dancing-girl to break her step and lose her balance. The
sudden flash of a disturbing memory may have the same
effect. In its more subtle forms, this product of
"luminous" intervention (Proust) disrupts as it perhaps
dilates routine perceptual situations; in its more
dramatic guises, it causes us to stub the toe of disaster.
Inattention and memory, as so conceived, are conceptual
co-ordinates giving point to the inadequacies of even
the most habit-bound of human activities.
Lapses of attention to external phenomena may be
brought about when peripheral items in our perception
obtrude themselves on the focal elements, displacing the
latter while they take over and occupy the focal position.
A somewhat different effect, yet one whose ultimate
consequences may prove to be highly similar, occurs when
the 'exterior' mode of attention gives way to the
pressures of its 'interior' mode. Remembering or re¬
flecting upon our experience brings attention to bear on
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phenomena in terms of which we are logically unable to
intend further action. We remember and reflect upon
what is past, however 'present* it may be to our conscious¬
ness. The struggle between the 'already' determined and
the 'as yet' indetermined is essentially a struggle
between the interior and exterior aspects of attention.
The one pulls us, either by inclination or by means un¬
known to ourselves, into the past; the other prepares us
with almost feline intensity to launch into the future.
(I have previously remarked how Cassirer read this
conflict of past and future into the philosophy of Bergson.)
A suggestion of 'fatigue' emerges.
Both in the Observations and in De Somno, Brown
depicts physical and mental fatigue as an inability to
sustain attention for long periods in either of its
modes (Obs., 120-1; De Somno, 4-5). To relieve physical
tiredness, we can either exercise different muscles or
drift into that state of sleep where even our most
strenuous 'labours' leave undisturbed the relaxing
muscles and nerves. Weariness in the mind has its own
peculiar diversions, and indeed its own connotations for
the word 'fatigue'. "Dr. Darwin forgets," claims Brown,
"that the muscular fibres are not susceptible of the
uneasy sensation of fatigue, which can be felt, only by
the sentient principle, or spirit of animation. There is,
therefore, no analogy of the ideas, and fibrous motions,
but of the ideas and motive affections of mind."
(Obs., 120)
273.
The most unique feature of mental inattention, however,
is that we seem to be unable to hold an idea or line of
reasoning in our minds for any length of time (Obs., 120-
1; De Somno, 11). The dancer can apply her attention and
limbs to the shape of the music with a seemingly unbroken
steadiness. She can 'think of nothing' except the completion
of a phrase or series of phrases. In the reflective
state, on the other hand, ideas jostle each other in endless
disarray: memory supersedes memory; image erases image;
and an argument once developed conjures up its opposite.
Brown is clearly impressed (perhaps even overwhelmed) by
this discovery. It becomes the basis for his sustaining
principle of suggestibility and the root cause of his
philosophy of mind. He begins to build the remainder of
his philosophical structure on the apparently shifting
sand of mental inattention. It is not what we receive
through the senses so much as how we receive it that is
ultimately important: the integrations, the overlaps,
the emotional tinctures, the continual shading of ex¬
perience, the complex evolution of actions and convictions,
the wonder and delight of imagination and reminiscence, -
all of these will constitute his growing fascination with
his fluctuating subject, man. That this creature is the
epitome of distraction is the prism through which we are
able to witness his multifarious workings.
Remembering, therefore, entails our yielding attention
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to something v/hich is characterized by its 'pastness'.
By the same token, it implies inattention to the sphere
of action in and design on the world of objects or other
individuals. In practice, most of us reveal considerable
powers of recovery in swinging back and forth from action
to reflection. The theoretical distinction, however,
opens that frontier to exploration. Stewart is noticeably
preoccupied with our "habits of inattention" (c£. A.P.
II, iv, 164-5; and Elements, I, vi, 388 and 418), but he
seems to have missed the full impact of his researches
into human development. "It was plainly the intention of
nature," he asserts,
"that our thoughts should be habitually directed to things
external. . . . accordingly the bulk of mankind are not
only disposed to overlook the mental phenomena, but are
incapable of that degree of reflection which is necessary
for their examination."
(A.P. II, iv, 164)
And later on the same page he writes:
"the bulk of mankind are so engrossed with external objects,
that they overlook entirely their own mental operations,
and even lose the capacity of attending to them; insomuch
that the mind is compared by Locke to the eye, v/hich sees
every object around us, but cannot see itself."
As statements regarding the absence of an introspective
tendency in most individuals, the above quotations do not
need to be taken too seriously. Of more interest might
be the question, "What does it mean to give attention to
one's own 'mental operations'?" or the question, "Under
v/hat conditions might it be said that there exists an
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interior mode of attention?" Nevertheless, Stewart is
working towards an inference of greater note. The habits
of inattention which we apparently acquire at an early
age impede, in his view, both the capacity for remembering
(Elements, I, vi, 388-92) and the power of reflection
(A.P. II, iv, 164-5; Elements I, vi, 429). The man who
awakes to this fact in his maturity has already lost the
advantage of youth. At the same time, a preponderance of
"solitary speculations of the closet" (Elements, I, vi ,
422) distracts the understanding from its "complete and
prompt command of attention to things external" (ibid.).
Too much reflection, therefore, would seem to be equally
misguided or unhealthy. But does this not bring us back
full circle to the position regarding our attention to
items within the horizon of action? Ought we to complain
once more about our habits of inattention? The case is
indeed circular - thus is its more obvious weakness, -
but behind the confusion lies a concern to put straight
the balance between 'exterior' and 'interior' attention.
It is only as this balance is seen to hang on a delicate
web of interlacing that the functions of attention,
recognition, memory and reflection can be properly
unfolded. Without the proposed balance, the order of mind
must revert to a form of chaos of which the struggle
between the different modes of attention was a mere
harbinger.
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For the moment, we must leave this operational
picture of memory and attention in order to pursue still
another vantage-point. We began by exploring the possibility
of a purely scientific investigation into the question,
with all of the accompanying baggage of method and pre¬
supposition which one is led to expect of such a venture.
The prospects were seen to be neither remote nor vague,
in so far as daring hypotheses to this end had already
been put forward in Brown's time. Optimism was in the
air, and it was contagious. Brown seems to have been
unable to resist taking part in it. Yet in doing so, he
discovered his powers of cautious and sustained analysis:
tools useful for achieving philosophical gains over the
optimists and even for adding to the new and exciting
knowledge of mental phenomena, its elements and behaviour
as well as its laws. Beyond this point, however, he proved
to be the enemy, not the friend, of scientific assumptions.
He resolved to work on his own in the laboratory of mind,
eschewing the researches of his colleagues who found neural
and sensory matter more advantageous to their designs.
Indeed, it was because he could not share their purposes
that Brown seems to have withdrawn, even at the threshold,
from accepting the challenge of a final reduction. I
shall argue later that his highly sensitive understanding
of art, morality and religion harnessed him to a different
sort of vision for man. Meanwhile, I shall measure the
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possibility of yet another and perhaps more perplexing
aspiration.
4
FITTING THE SIZE OF A DEFINITION
It is not wonderful, that we should remember
best the objects to which we pay most
attention, since this is only to say, that
we remember best the objects on which we
have dwelt longest, and with greatest
interest, and which we have, therefore,
known most accurately.
(L. XXXII)
Rejecting the view from scientific space, we might
yet see hope from the summits of 'logical space'. In its
very general form, this latter view suggests that if one
uses words in a certain way - proposing a definition or
setting up a language, - then one is responsible for
holding to all of the implications which follow for
other terms or statements one might choose to employ.
Historical revisionism aside such a view would, of course,
emanate largely from the twentieth, not the eighteenth,
century. The latter, I have suggested,was willing to
sell philosophical insight for scientific proof if and
where it could get it; at least willing in France if not
Germany (in spite of Christian Wolff, Tetens and even
Goethe), and in 'Lunar' England if not orthodox Scotland.
The point here is not so much that eighteenth-century philo¬
sophers eschewed logic - that would entail, among other
things, that they tolerated inconsistency, - but rather
- 278 -
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that they were interested in any details regarding man's
experience which might generate more consistent theories
about it. I agree with Zora Schaupp, however, in
reference to Condillac, that "neither he nor his con¬
temporaries had a very clear idea of the kind of facts
which would throw light upon the problems of philosophy".^"
They were fishing in a large and relatively unknown pond
and might appear to show a disproportionate amount of
enthusiasm over the discovery of a new species. Nevertheless,
the approach by way of logical and conceptual analysis
will certainly appear to some to be more suitable to the
philosopher's task and less unworthy, in its aspirations,
of his special calling.
The trick here is to ask the kinds of questions
which will stimulate conceptual revelations without at the
same time dressing these up as 'answers' or 'factual
solutions'. Since introspection was once deemed to be a
'science' analogous to chemistry, and was still the
philosopher's 'art' in Brown's time, this trick would
hardly have satisfied those who found it thoroughly
sensible to look within themselves. Yet not a few of
the questions which we might pose today were certainly
Zora Schaupp, "The Naturalism of Condillac",
University of Nebraska Studies in Language, Literature
and Criticism^ no. 6, p. 23.
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part of the subterranean current giving rise to the
speculations of such men as Locke, Reid, and Brown. Does
it make sense, for example, to say that one remembers
something to which one had never paid attention? Indeed,
can we ever know that we have attended to a particular
except through our memory of it? If 'impressions' are
the kinds of things which are 'imprinted' on the 'mind'
(Locke and company) or 'brain' (Hobbes and his followers),
then their 'retention' by that faculty or organ is a dual
function of our capacity to 'attend' to things in the
first place and of our ability to 'reproduce' or 'recall'
them at some later stage.
The logic underlying this empirical structure would
seem to be that the notion of retaining presupposes the
idea of obtaining. This may sound like a rephrasing of
the familiar Aristotelian dictum, nihil est in intellects,
quod non fuerit in sensu, but the emphasis has been placed
on the manner in which items take their place 'in the
senses' and in which they determine their own future 'in
the intellect'. The theory is that unless these items
are acquired in a certain fashion (that is, attentively),
they will fail to leave their mark in gust that way
which alone permits of retention. An extension of
this theory, taken from Erasmus Darwin, will perhaps
elucidate the point.
In the Zoonomia, Darwin argues that ocular spectra
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(variously described as "coloured spots", "phosphenes"
or "after-images") are the result of our concentration
on a particular type of object under severe lighting
conditions. His experiment takes this form:
"Place a circular piece of red silk about an inch in
diameter on a sheet of white paper in a strong light. . . .
Look for a minute on this area, or till the eye becomes
somewhat fatigued, and then, gently closing your eyes,
and shading them with your hand, a circular green area
of the same apparent diameter becomes visible in the
closed eye. This green area is the colour reverse to
the red area, which had been previously inspected. . . .
Hence it appears that a part of the retina, which had
been fatigued by contraction in one direction, relieves
itself by exerting the antagonist fibres, and producing
a contraction in an opposite direction, as is common in
the exertions of our muscles."
(Zoonomia, 3rd ed., I, 18)
The importance which Darwin attaches to the studied gaze
on the object in question (to the point at which the
stress becomes too great, thereby breaking attention) is
revealed in an earlier letter to Benjamin Franklin in
which he prescribes that the subject fix his gaze on
2
"luminous objects" for "some time". Letting the eye
wander intermittently around the room simply does not
meet the requirement of fixed attention. Thus, the very
manner and assertiveness of our perception (or what
might be another way of saying the same thing, our
2
Letter to B. Franklin, 24 January 1744; quoted by
Desmond King-Hele, The Essential Writings of Erasmus Darwin
(London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968), p. 31.
282.
'attentiveness') directly determines the nature and
degree of the retained image.
Darwin's insight is ill-defined and experimentally
clumsy, but the idea was to take root in the minds of
Goethe, Helmholtz and later William James. Further dis¬
tinctions were forthcoming, distinctions based on the
'length of optical exposure' and resulting in terms such
as "primary positive after-images" (James), "memory-
after- images" and "ordinary after-images" (Fechner), and
3
"after-reverberations" (Richet). Experiments were even
made to test the effects of "inattention" in extending
the range of memory-images available to conscious appraisal.
Again, it is the proportional interplay between attending
to an object and the retentissement of it (Richet) which
proves fascinating to these men. While it might be
desirable to forestall the discussion with a discriminatory
gesture towards their status as psychologists, the fact
remains that they were toying with problems of immense
philosophical importance; problems, I might add, which
were more than just puzzling to Brown and his immediate
predecessors. Eighteenth-century epistemologies might
3
Wm. James, Principles of Psychology (London:
MacHillan & Co., Ltd., 1901), I, 645-7.
^Ibid., 646 (Exner).
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very well be seen to rise or fall on the basis of at
least some sort of resolution to their knotty implications.
Indeed, the eighteenth-century suppositions in this
regard are rather overwhelming in their scope. Even a
brief pre-Brownian review of them confronts us like a
labyrinth. Perhaps it is wise to remember, however, that
far from revealing an easy exit that same maze trapped,
convinced, and to some extent exhilerated nineteenth-
century minds as well. Hippolyte Taine still speaks with
an eighteenth-century voice when he asserts:
"Whatever may be the kind of attention, voluntary or
involuntary, it always acts alike; the image of an object
or evet is capable of revival, and of complete revival,
in proportion to the degree of attention with which we
have considered the object or event."5
The quantification of attention, which owes its beginning
to someone like Erasmus Darwin, is virtually consummated.
Initially, however, attention is confined to a
'handy-man' role helping repetition, Locke tells us, "to
the fixing any ideas in the memory" (EHU, II, x, 3). The
real task is performed by the impression itself which,
assuming it has sufficient force, arouses either a pleasurable
or a painful response. "The great business of the senses",
then, is "to make us take notice of what hurts or
5
On Intelligence, I, 77-82; quoted by James, op.
cit., p. 671; italics mine.
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advantages the body" (ibid.). Our attention is alerted
by the conjunction of an incoming impression and its
commensurate reaction. Within Locke's retentive vocabulary,
of course, we find the nucleus of the "storehouse" theory
of memory (ibid., sect. 2) combined with the notion of a
"stamp" (sect. 4) or a "print" (sect. 5) which is the
'content' of that repository. Yet Locke is aware that the
mind does not remain entirely passive in this operation.
Attention, or the mind in a more active state, can
determine the 'degree' to which the storehouse can acquire
and retain its imprints. "Concerning the several degrees
of lasting" , writes Locke,
"wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may
observe that some of them have been produced in the
understanding by an object affecting the senses once only
and no more than once; others that have more than once
offered themselves to the senses have yet been little
taken notice of [italics mine]: the mind either heedless,
as in children, or otherwise employed, as in men, intent
only on one thing, not setting the stamp deep into itself."
(ibid., sect. 4)
It would seem from these remarks that Locke considers
attention to be a sufficient but not a necessary ground for
retention. If one does 'take notice of' an impression, it
is bound to stick, the important thing, however, being
the proportionate 'degree of lasting'. Presumably when
the attention is keen, the imprint is set more deeply
into the mind which has regarded it. If there is little
or no attention given to the idea as it is laying itself
into the repository, then it is apt to leave "no more
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footsteps or remaining characters of [itself] than shadows
do flying over fields of corn" (ibid.). The print, that
is, fails to 'take'. This is surely a classic illustration
of a mechanical vision, one that is strongly reminiscent
of Hooker's idea (also in the seventeenth-century) that
memory is a proper 'organ of sense' which receives its
'directives' from the 'soul' (or from Locke's viewpoint,
"attention"). Finally, while it may be true for Locke
to say that attention is a sufficient precondition of
memory, this statement is itself limited since it applies
only to the casting of an imprint on the mould of re¬
tention. Recollection, in its turn, presupposes retention,
but the latter is not a sufficient condition of it. The
fact that we have retained certain imprints 'on the mind'
does not imply that we will recollect (or reproduce)
them: they may remain buried or dormant for life, although
there is a problem as to how we should know that. At any
rate, attention does not directly guarantee this 'higher
level' of memory. It is only the first of at least three
steps.
Among various others, Stewart, James and W. P.
Pillsbury were to argue that the kind of attention given
to original phenomena determines the kind of recall -
whether correct or erroneous, - which may eventually
take place. Pillsbury is quite emphatic about this:
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"recall is always directed by attention".^ This is a
separate matter which we shall examine in due course,
yet one which leaves unresolved or unstated Locke's initial
assumptions regarding memory and attention per se. There
seem to be two questions involved here: (1) if we attend
to X, will we recollect X? and (2) if we attend closely
to X, are we apt to recall it more accurately? The answer
to the first is a very contingent 'perhaps', and to the
second a highly probable 'yes'. Although we find no real
certainty in either, this is their only point of similarity.
After Locke and on the Continent, the ambivalence
of passive and active functions continues to perplex
philosophical writers. The receiving of external stimuli
is reconfirmed as the epistemological base from or on which
higher mental operations are built: sensations become
the 'first truths' of the new wave of empirical investi¬
gators. Unfortunately, it is easier to decide in favour
of this presupposition than it is to resolve the dif¬
ficulties of 'receivership'; for the function of 'having
an impression' can be viewed from either a passive or an
active standpoint. Condillac sets the trap for himself,
and some of his followers, Laromiguiere in particular,
are quick to push him in. Condillac, in his Essai, had
^W. B. Pillsbury, Attention (London: Swan Sonnen-
schein & Co., Ltd., 1908), p. 148.
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defined attention as "that operation by which our con¬
sciousness with reference to certain perceptions increases
so vividly that they seem to be the only things of which
we are aware" (sec. ii, ch. 1). This same "consciousness"
which fastens itself on to "certain perceptions" is no
mere recipient: it engages and drav/s the impression into
itself, bringing 'these' into focus as it simultaneously
rejects 'those'. On the other hand, the very conditions
of impingement determine the possibilities for their
admission to the focal zone. The more vividly they appear,
the better their chances. If we turn to the Traite, we
find that the conditions of impingement are, in fact, held
to be the substance of Condillac's definition of attention.
"At the first smell", he notes, "our statue's capacity of
feeling is entirely due to the impression which is made
upon its sense organ. This is what I call attention."
(Pt. I, ii, 1) One cannot feel something which makes no
impingement on the senses, nor can one feel something
which does not make itself felt. Only when an.object or
external stimulus makes itself felt can we really be said
to be attentive to it, and even then the force must be
strong enough to pull us out of reverie should we happen
to be quite 'lost' in it. According to Condillac's
stratagem, however, the statue reaches that stage of
distraction somewhat later. In the beginning, there is
only the feeling in an organ which is our attention to
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an incoming stimulus.
Yet attention is not confined to this seemingly
passive role. As Condillac unfolds his doctrine of
memory, attention gains its spurs. "The smell is not
wholly forgotten", he claims,
"when the odiferous substance which caused it has ceased
to act on the sense organ, for the attention retains it,
and an impression remains stronger or weaker according as
the attention has been more or less vivid. This is
memory. ... "7
(Traite, I, ii, 6; italics
mine)
Once again, "certain perceptions" are seen to be engaged
and drawn into "consciousness". Clearly, without attention
there would be no retention: the latter, in fact, is
the predicative development of the former ('attending
retains' is something like 'judging synthesizes'). It is
part of the definition of attention, therefore, to say
not only that it is a "capacity of feeling" when an organ
7
In the Essai, Condillac gives a more 'linguistic'
analysis of memory, defining it there as the name or verbal
sign of a particular past experience. Thus, when we
'remember' an object or event, we can be said to be 'as¬
signing a name' to the experience, not 'reliving' it. Like
Tetens, he seems ready to distinguish between a recurring
image and its meaning (cf. A. Wolf, A History of Science,
Technology, and Philosophy in the 18th Century (2nd ed.;
N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1961) , II, 690. ) Imagination
now assumes the task of reviving or 'making present again1
the original perception. The author of the Traite ap-
parentlv overlooks this distinction. (See Schaupp, op.
cit., p. 37) Within our present context, however,
the 'psychological' analysis of the Traite will serve our
elucidations more adequately.
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is "impressed" but also that it is a capacity for
'retaining* when the "cause" of that impression is no
longer present or active. There is, however, an indeterminate
step, or rather a bridge linking the two parts of the de¬
finition together. The statue does not feel sensory im¬
pingements on one occasion alone. It feels them repeatedly,
successively and/or simultaneously. The impingements
constitute a kind of bombardment stretched out over a
period of time. Of course, the statue has as yet no ap¬
prehension of time, but at least one can say that it feels
more than onoe. If this is the case, it attends by
definition to recurring impingements. This factor marks
a new and reserve capacity, one which allows the statue to
feel and feel again without loss. Condillac states the
matter quite dramatically:
"If there remained no recollection of former modifications,
then on the occasion of each sensation it would believe
itself to be feeling for the first time. Whole years might
be swallowed up in each present moment. Were its attention
always limited to one mode of being it would never be able
to take account of two together, and never be able to judge
of their relations. It would enjoy or suffer without
having yet either desire or fear."
(Traite, I, ii, 5; italics
mine)
We have feelings and we remember them; more than this,
however, we attend to both the 'having' and the 'remembering',
and we can do so by embracing both together under the same
act of mind. Condillac does not explain the intricate
mechanism of this operation (as Bergson and Husserl were
290.
later to do, again in different ways), but he intimates a
progression of ensuing "transformations" which take their
start from this critical dual capacity. Although attention
and memory can be regarded as joint favourites for the
title of 1primary transformations of sensation', the onus
clearly lands on attention, without which there would be
no memory at all unless at the subconscious or biological
level. This was certainly Brown's verdict on the affair
(L. XXXI, 482). The curious feature of Condillac's account
is the suggestion in the second definition of attention
that 'retention' falls more readily under its class-scope
than it does under that of memory. Condillac does not
explicitly say so, but he might well have asserted that
attention retains its feeling by virtue of its inherent
function of holding to a perception. 'Paying attention'
is fastening on to the subject at hand, and so is much
stronger than, for example, 'noticing' or 'catching a
glimpse of*. When we pay heed to something, we expend
both mental and physical energy. Condillac thus paved
the way for the eventual investigations into the nature
and degree of "muscular effort" expended in attention.
Brown was among those philosopher-psychologists who took
up the cause (cf. L. XXXII, 493).
Before turning to some critical variations on
Condillac's theme, we might note briefly the views of
two German thinkers, Christian Wolff and Nicolai Tetens.
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Both maintain that an epistemology which assumes the
passivity of mind cannot survive a rigorous analysis of
experience. That we are the recipients of a sensory
assault they do not deny; what they do object to is the
suggestion that our awareness of the assault is a mere
'reflection* of the encroaching phenomena. The mind is
not the sort of thing to sit back on its haunches. It
possesses numerous 'powers' or 'faculties', Wolff argues,
and it uses them to entertain judgments. Among its
activities are the operations of attention and memory:
from them we acquire 'knowledge' of the world and into
them we feed the passions and dispositions of our capacity
for 'feeling' that world. Wolff declares that attention
helps to bring about the 'clarification' of ideas; other¬
wise the perceptual array (or disarray) would remain aim¬
less and indistinct. As Brown himself affirmed, in the
moment of attention "the landscape become to our vision
altogether different" (L. XXXI, 485). Nevertheless, if
it is called upon to accommodate a vast assortment of
g
ideas, its 'efficiency' decreases proportionately.
(Nineteenth-century psychologists were to lend support
to Wolf's insight with a considerable amount of ex¬
perimental research.) Attention also steers recol¬
lection through the natural association of ideas to the
g
See A. Wolf, op. cit., p. 691.
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desired object. The will to recall an object charges
attention with the task, first of fixing a retentive
•field', then of fixing a point within that field. The
notion that we recall a whole field of past experience,
instead of isolated bits and pieces, is a foreshadowing
of Hamilton's law of "redintegration". Brown's association-
ism led him to the same direction. The primary function
of attention, therefore, is to illuminate those ideas in
which we have a decided interest. That light shines
through the receding corridors of past experience.
Teten's approach to memory, on the other hand, bears
a strong taste of physiology. His Philosophical Essays on
Human Nature, published in 1777, resurrect both the per¬
ceptual complexes of British empiricism, with their over¬
lapping combinations of impressions and ideas, and the
generative hypothesis of the French 'sensationalists'.
Some account had to be given of the fact that sensations
were not only 'felt' but 'embraced'. Their residual nature
might be termed 'ideas' or 'higher transformations', but
the important thing was their continuing activity in the
mind. The physiological model on which Tetens bases his
theory of retention is the same one which puzzled and
intrigued Erasmus Darwin, namely ocular spectra or visual
after-images'.^ if the analogy is extended, it would
^Ibid. , pp. 689-90.
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appear that each instance of sensory impingement leaves
a trace commensurate with its nature and degree of
assault. This 'trace' becomes the substance of a definition
of memory-activity, for it is the measure of a sensation's
survival in the reflective life of the mind. Teten's
physiological explanation for this involves a slow oscil¬
lation of neural fibres: what we term 'memory' is, as it
were, "a lasting echo" of its sensory origins. Indeed,
it is to the retained element that we essentially devote
our attention. From the inner side, however, feeling
rushes to our sensory experience in order to render
assistance to the act of attention. Left on its own, the
latter will operate at best ineffectively; with feeling
it acquires both impetus and focus. Whatever the origin
of that subjective state, we can say of feeling that (to
quote Cassirer) "it represents a mutation within ourselves,
and we accept it as immediately given without relating it
to external objects."^"*" Thus, sensory traces must ultimately
be considered as fusions of received and accepting elements.
Reflective analysis may separate these two aspects of the
^A. A. Roback, History of Psychology and Psychiatry
(London: Vision Press Ltd., 1962), p. 52.
^E. Cassirir, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,
tr. Koelln and Pettegrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965),
p. 116.
294.
phenomenon but, as Brown was to argue, in the form in
which they engage us memories are 'mixtures' of external
and internal affections, of what comes in and what goes
out to meet it. In a sense, therefore, that which is
retained is that which we want to heed, and vice versa.
Memory and attention have become two sides of the same
experience. With Tetens we are thus farther from Locke
and closer to Brown, for the ideas of retention and
recollection are now joined and sustained by the mutual
feature of desire.
In France, the shift away from Condillac follows
much the same pattern. Attention is sharply distinguished
from passive, primitive sensation; it is viewed as the
'first activity', the primeval effort, as it were, of the
soul; passion, volition and habit are seen to govern this
effort like a woman behind the throne; and lastly attention
joins forces with the association of ideas to comprise the
sine qua non of memory. Prevost makes this last point
quite emphatically. "If these two causes cease to operate",
he declares, "there is no longer recollection {souvenir).
12
See W. B. Pillsbury, The History of Psychology
(London: George Allen & Unwim Ltd., 1929), pp. 117-22.
Pillsbury devotes a section to Tetens (to his mind a grossly
underrated thinker), and wonders what developments would
have transpired in the nineteenth-century had Tetens
emerged in place of Kant as the major figure in late
eighteenth-century German philosophy.
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And when one is suppressed (supprimee), memory is
strongly altered" (Essais de Philosophie, vol. I, Bk. IV,
Pt. I, sec. 1, ch. 2, 118). Memory without attention is
a state of remembrance in which one is left at the mercy
of any associations of ideas which force their way into
the mind. Conversely, memory without such associations
would resemble a focusing device deprived of its field of
vision. Prevost reiterates Condillac's observation that
attention enables us to direct ourselves towards (se
diriger) several objects at one time with a view to ap¬
prehending what they have "in common". This particular
"exercise" of attention he calls "abstraction" (Essais,
Bk. IV, Pt. I, sec. 3, ch. 1). But attention under any
form is "governed by volition" (Essais, Bk. IV, Pt. I,
sec. 1, ch. 2), and so we are thrown back on that interior
'force' which both underscores and determines the manner
in which our representations are brought before conscious¬
ness.
It became apparent to French thinkers after
Condillac, as it did to Brown himself, that Condillac's
fundamental error lay in the conceptual scope which he
had granted to sensation. By assessing such mental
functions as attention, memory, comparison and judgment
in terms of our primary experiences of external stimuli,
he had extended the idea of sensation far beyond its
legitimate sphere. Laromiguiere, for example, goes to
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great lengths to disprove the contention that sensation
and attention are "inseparable", the latter being only a
13
'modification11 of the former. His task is made more
difficult by the fact that the supporters of Condillac
viewed the soul as being "in an active state when it feels
(or senses)" (Lemons, no. 6, 114). Therefore, it is not
enough for him merely to distinguish between the inherent
passivity of sensation and activity of attention. A
careful restructuring of the conceptual field is required.
He agrees with his opponents that the soul cannot 'suffer'
and 'be inactive' at one and the same time. He reasons,
however, that the activity does not manifest itself in
the same instant as the sensation of, for example, pain
and that it is certainly not a modification of it. "It
is a phenomenon of a nature completely opposite" (ibid.,
118). The implication of this argument is that the
activity in question (or 'attention') arrives on the
scene after the event and yet in time to catch the after¬
math. (Tetens, it will be recalled, had consigned
attention to the perception in its 'immediately retained'
form, that is, as it initally begins its recession into
13
P. Laromiguiere, Leyons de Philosophie (6th ed.;
Paris, 1844) ; Sixieme Lecon: "Objections relatives a
l'activite de l'ame et a la nature de 1'attention", pp.
114-31.
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the 'past'.) Although his insight has every appearance of
being a factual inference, Laromiguiere obviously wants to
separate the terms of sensory and reflective experience.
i
It is into the latter category that attention should
properly fall.
Nevertheless, he makes a concession to Condillac
with respect to "involuntary attention" (ibid., 118).
When a reaction is "instinctive" (when, for example, one
leaps back from a sudden flame), it would seem that the
attention given to the stimulus is really inseparable from
the feeling of it. Neither desire nor any deliberative
process precedes and governs attention in this instance.
And yet one clearly feels the burning sensation, for one's
hand or leg takes immediate steps to remove itself: here
the body is fortunately quicker than the mind. By
contrast, calculated inattention to such a sensation has
allowed some individuals to overrule their physiological
initiative. Laromiguiere is justifiably concerned about
this 'pain' factor since the language of 'experiencing'
(epouvant) lends itself to possible ambiguity. Does it
denote a passive or an active function, or perhaps a
combination of the two? Laromiguiere suspects that
Condillac was not quite sure. I experience many sensations
but "there are very few of them", he writes,
"on which I may react voluntarily or on which I direct
my attention. Just now as I speak, I am receiving
through the window a multitude (foule) of sensations which
come to me from the surrounding objects; and my attention,
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if I come to give it, instead of bearing on all of
these objects which I see simultaneously, bears only on
one, on one sensation along."
(Lecons, no. 6, 118-9)
In short, "there are in us more sensations than there are
acts of attention" (ibid., 119). Thus, whatever meaning
we may attach to the notion of 'experiencing' must take
into account this discrepancy between the number of times
we 'hear' noises or 'see' objects and the number of oc¬
casions on which we actually 'listen to' or 'look at'
those items (ibid.). A sharp pair of logical scissors
will immediately find grounds to separate the totally
"passive" sensation from the "essentially active" act of
attention (ibid., 121). The latter, after all, is an
"action", one of which we "feel the exercise" (ibid., 123),
and it is properly allied to such terms as 'fixing',
"paying' and 'giving'.
Laromiguiere stresses throughout the impossibility
of defining attention. The "true definition" of any idea,
he asserts, requires an "anterior idea" from which it can
be derived (ibid., 121-2). In the case of attention, we
would have to discover an "action" which is psychologically
prior to it. None, however, exists. Yet through a logical
evolution from this point, we are able to define "comparison"
as "a double attention" to the simultaneous presence of
"several objects" and "reasoning" as a "double comparison"
between a number of ideas, some of which "envelope and
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hide" others (ibid.). Nevertheless, certain things can
be said about attention, and these are significant for our
understanding of the shift in French thought.
In the first place, the act of attending to our
sensations 'in the first instance of their recession' is
a movement from the "interior to the exterior" (ibid. 121)
of a person. It is a reciprocal movement which, as it
were, comes to meet its counterpart in sensation which is
bringing a stimulus "from the outside to the inside". This
confrontation, if and when it takes place (for Laromiguiere
has already quoted the odds), is the only thing which saves
us from complete 'ignorance' (ibid., 120). On it the
entire structure of our knowledge depends. It is, he
affirms, "the cause of all the changes (changements)
which do not depend immediately on external objects" (ibid.,
123). The degree in which we attend to what is happening
to IE is therefore the degree to which we shall ever become
aware of things. Learning, as Stewart was to point out,
is in the hands of attention. Nineteenth and twentieth-
century psychology has added little to this insight
beyond a plethora of experimental data.
Secondly, attention itself can only be apprehended
through the "action" v/hich constitutes it. This action
is a "force which we feel inside ourselves"(ibid.), a force
as real and basic as any external affection. No definition
can elevate it, but experience does and can confirm it.
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It is the 'atomic proposition' of the inner world. The
answer to Condillac, therefore, lies in the direction of
this vital interior movement, this outward extension of
the self which, in the sensitive hands of Maine de Biran
and Destutt de Tracy, becomes the ultimate determination
of what we are, what we do, and what we know. From this
standpoint, the problem of memory takes an appropriate
twist, establishing itself firmly in the life of reflection,
with broad implications for self-identity. The self which
remembers is the self whose past is alive in its attentions
to the unfolding present. This reversal of form, wherein
memory begins to flow back into attention, is the inevitable
outcome of the recognition of 'outward movement' from self
to object. The theory of 'memory-traces', however these
may be sown and cultivated by attention, draws too heavily
on the 'inward movement.' from object to self, taking this
to be the sole determination of consciousness. Laromiguiere
was among those Frenchmen in the latter part of the
eighteenth-century who endeavoured to rectify this im¬
balance. In Great Britain, a comparable swing was taking
place in the wake of Locke and Hume.
Reid finds Locke's position overdrawn on the side
of mechanistic presupposition. "I find in my mind", he
observes, "a distinct conception and a firm belief of a
series of past events; but how this is produced I know
not. I call it memory. ..." (I.P. , III, iii/ 328)
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The real stumbling-block is Locke's repository and
revival hypothesis: Reid can only conceive of the memorial
function in terms of an "original faculty" of the mind
(cf. I.P., III, vii, 368 f; ii, 328). At the same time
he concedes that "it is difficult to attend long to the
moments as they pass, without wandering after some other
object of thought" (I.P. , III, v, 355). The idea is
germinal and important. Reflection superimposes its
attention to the past on our attention to the present,
thereby creating a struggle of concentration between
memory and sense (I.P. , III, v, 349-59) which breeds
either 'inattention' to the one or 'abstraction' from
the other. Although we cannot see what is past, we can
nevertheless attend to it, and although we cannot remember
what is present, we can similarly attend to it (ibid.).
Yet there would be no attention to the past without a prior
attention to the present, however distinct these operations
may be, nor any significant attention to the present with¬
out an overlapping attention to the past. As we follow
the movement of any body, our 'seeing' and 'remembering'
dove-tail into one another. Their flowing together makes
it possible for us to say at least three things: (1) 'I
see the body move;' (2) I saw the body move just now;'
and (3) 'I saw the body move.' Reid notes, quite rightly
I think, that the little phrase 'just now' binds present
to past and past to present, in spite of the stringency
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of philosophical language which makes us separate seeing
from remembering and vice versa (ibid.). His summary of
the dove-tailing operation deserves to be quoted in full:
"There is no necessity in common life of dividing
accurately the provinces of sense and of memory; and
therefore we assign to sense, not an indivisible point of
time, but that small portion of time which we call the
present, which has a beginning, a middle, and an end.
Hence it is easy to see, that though in common
language we speak with perfect propriety and truth, when
we say, that we see a body move, and that motion is an
object of sense, yet when as Philosophers we distinguish
accurately the province of sense from that of memory, we
can no more see what is past, though but a moment ago, than
we can remember what is present, so that speaking philo¬
sophically, it is only by the aid of memory that we can
discern motion cr any succession whatsoever. We see the
present place of the body; we remember the successive
advance it made to that place. The first can then only
give us a conception of motion, when joined to the last."
(I.P., III, v, 350)
Thus memory can be as 'original' to our constitution as
seeing itself. It is, as Reid affirms, a necessary pre¬
condition cf the notion of 'duration' (I.P., III, i, 326;
v, 351). That notion, in turn, can exist "where there is
no succession of ideas in the mind" (I .P. , III, v, 351).
The inescapable, and thoroughly logical, conclusion
to be drawn from the above example is that the "successive
advance" which we "remember" the body to have made is the
product of our previous attention to these successive
stages in their individual appearance. I am not arguing,
as indeed Reid himself would not, that we must count them
one by one; perhaps only an extreme 'atomist' of per¬
ception would reason thus. Given an infinite number of
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points in the 'run-off* (the movement of the body from
P to 0) and the velocity with which it may take place,
we cannot be expected to recount a full enumeration. Even
in 'slow-motion' this would be tedious and inexact. But
in some primary way we must be attentive to that very
'progression' which it is in the power of memory to help
us to define. Part of that attention may, of necessity,
be 'unconscious' (or 'subsidiary' as Polanyi would put
it), and yet the whole requires the contributory partici¬
pation of each. The notion of a 'series' carries the
same weight: attention to 'one' makes it possible for us
to proceed to 'two', and so on. Much depends, according
to Bergson, on whether we have regard for the series or
number "in process of formation" or the number "once
14
formed". The infinite divisibility of "successive
advances" is an 'objective' feature of the movement
"in its finished state"; the 'realization'^ of points,
stages or elements takes place at this level by virtue of
the shape of 'continuity' or 'wholeness' which the completion
of the process confers on it. On the other hand, a
movement in the process of formation, one which is still
'acquiring its form', appears to be a "discontinuity" of
14
Time and Free Will, op. cit. , p. 83; italics mine.
^Ibid . , p. 84 .
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"indivisible" units. It is on this plane that we perhaps
feel justified in speaking of the attention which we pay
to each successive phase or unit. Bergson expresses the
change of view-point in the following way:
"in order to get a number [series or movement], we are
compelled to fix our attention successively on each of
the units cf which it is compounded. The indivisibility
of the act by which we conceive any one of them is then
represented under the form of a mathematical point which
is separated from the following point by an interval of
space. But, while a series of'mathematical points arranged
in empty space expresses fairly well the process by which
we form the idea of number, these mathematical points have
a tendency to develop into lines in proportion as our
attention is diverted from them, as if they were trying
to reunite with one another. And when we look at number
in its finished state . . . the points have become lines,
the divisions have been blotted out, the whole displays all
the characteristics of continuity."I6
We can say, therefore, that if it is the function of
attention to care for the 'seedlings' of discontinuity,
it is the function of memory to circumvent the tedium of
that perspective in order to survey at a single glance the
'rows' of continuity.
Before Reid, Hume had been arguing that the manner
of our attending to any progression of impressions or
ideas gives rise to the apprehension of 'succession' and
thence of 'time' (Treatise, I, ii, 3 and 5). His thesis
contained something of that suggestion which we found in
Condillac of 'mental houses' being built on 'foundation-
16
Ibid. , pp. 82-3; italics mine.
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stories of perception'. It is fair to say that he does
not go as far as his French contemporary, nor does he
admit, as Mach was to later, that the way of attention
must yield a "specific sensation" of time. Nevertheless,
he exerts himself far enough to hurdle the formidable gap
between the experienced changes in consciousness and the
consciousness of change. It does not seem to have occurred
to him that if we assume the logical feasibility of this
step, it still remains possible for us to shift our ground
of attention towards a single item - leaning first towards
this aspect of it then to that, - without the piling-on
of separate and succeeding factors. (Implied here, of
course, is an internal separation of facets within a
single item as opposed to the separation of two or more
items outside one another.) Such a manoeuvre would itself
entail a retentive 'keeping in mind' of the various aspects
attended to while the pivotal swing takes place. In any
case, our very activities of 'holding to' (Attention) and
'holding again' (Retention) seem to be woven tightly into
the temporal fabric; indeed woven in such a way that they
must be regarded as both mutually interdependent and con¬
stitutive. What we are holding to now is intentionally
sustained by what we are holding again gust now; while
conversely the latter, the 'just now', clings to the
former, the 'now', even as it stretches towards the dark
recessions of the remote past. This elasticity of the
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subject across the moment of relation to its object
expands and contracts between the fingers of attention
and memory. It is therefore the manner of our 'holding
to8 and 'holding again' which in part determines a rather
different kind of apprehension from the one envisaged by
Hume: namely, an apprehension of the potential breadth
of time held within the 'self8 as it turns and glides
towards the 'other'. In a sense, to be fully conscious
of anything is to fix its time with one's own; a syn¬
chronization of relata, of the relations which exist not
only between the self and the other, but also among the
phases of each. Confining consciousness to the 'now' (as
Reid did) creates a prejudice towards the 'moment'
which, in Hume's hands, shows itself as an inclination to
divide rather than to synthesize. Thus it may have hap¬
pened that, busy 'inscaping' successions of images, Hume
17
quite lost sight of the time.
By the time we reach Stewart, the proportionate
17
My account of Hume's theory will perhaps call to
mind Husserl's treatment of this problem in his work on
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, notably
in sections 31, 39 and 41. The adaptations, however,
where they occur, are probably too loose and clumsy to do
any justice to the complexity of Husserl's thought. I
have disregarded, for example, the necessary inclusion of
'protention' or 'holding before' in my scheme. In the
chapter devoted to Memory and Consciousness I will try, in
some measure, to put this right.
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measure of elasticity between attention and memory has
found a quantifying turn of mind, with an experimental
file in reserve (cf. Elements, I, vi, 352 ff) . The logic
of the inquiry has compelled itself to find a new focus
in the degree of attention required to bring about a
satisfactory retention. There is a subtle, perhaps un¬
conscious, shift away from the question, 'if v/e attend to
X, will we recollect it?' towards the question, 'how
closely must v/e attend to X in order to recall it more
accurately?' The exercise of our retentive and recollective
powers is seen to depend on a prior capacity to fix objects
firmly in our minds. If the insight is essentially
Bacon's, as Stewart modestly acknowledges, then its
repetition requires only supplementary evidence and ob¬
servation (ibid.). With the stress duly laid, Stewart
induces a programme of investigation which culminates in
the 'philosophical psychology' of Abercrombie, Taine,
William James and Pillsbury, these being only representative
of the many writers who accept the presupposition of
degree. I have referred already to Taine's summation of
the above principle, namely that "the image of an object
or event is capable of revival, and of complete revival,
in proportion to the degree of attention v/ith which we
have considered the object or event". It is still too
early, however, to discount the influence of volition.
For Stewart, as for Brown, the voluntary aspects of
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attention are those which give reflection as a whole its
personal quality and significance. Reflecting is at¬
tending to what has been for us and the latter, the 'has
been' which 'still is', might be described as the auto¬
biography of our concentration and discovery, our curiosity
and desire. "It is to experience, and to our own
reflections", observes Stewart, "that we are indebted
for by far the most valuable part of our knowledge"
(Elements, I, vi, 405). Personal reflection is thus the
anvil of 'self-making' for what Bacon in another context
called "the full man . . . the correct man . . . the ready
man" (quoted by Stewart, ibid., 429): on its steadiness
and strength the ultimate 'form' of the self depends.
Stewart, like Prevost, detects the structural
dependency of memory on both attention and the association
of ideas. Dependency in the case of the latter must not
be confused, however, with reduction. The 'order' in
which ideas appear and reappear is undoubtedly crucial to
the accuracy and utility of memory. Hume had made this
quite clear (Treatise, I, i, 3; iii, 5). But is the
principle of association really adequate to guarantee the
form of representation? Stewart thinks not. "The
association of ideas", he explains,
"connects our various thoughts with each other, so as to
present them to the mind in a certain order; but it pre¬
supposes the existence of these thoughts in the mind; or,
in other words, it presupposes a faculty of retaining the
knowledge which we acquire. It involves also a power of
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recognizing, as former objects of attention, the thoughts
that from time to time occur to us; a power which is not
implied in that law of our nature which is called the
association of ideas."
(Elements, I, vi, 354;
italicsmine)
At what precise state the 'groupings' of association
formulate themselves is not here at issue (for Brown, on
the other hand, the matter was vital). But we can, at
least, give priority to the acquisition and retention of
the elemental ideas. There can be no association of ideas
which have never taken root in us, which are not in fact
'ours'. Association is something which persons do in the
solitariness of their own experience. Recognition shares
the same fate: only I can recognize something to which I
first paid attention; which I now gather once more before
my mind; which I remember as 'that one'; and which I may
or may not link with 'those next to it'. You and he, so
it is implied, must accomplish your own feats of recognition.
Stewart does not say, (and it is a point which Merleau-
18
Ponty has found to be important) whether recognition
18
"A preserved fragment of the lived-through past
can be at the most no more than an occasion for thinking
of the past, but it is not the past which is compelling
recognition; recognition, when we try to derive it from
any content whatever, always precedes itself. Reproduction
presupposes re-cognition, and cannot be understood as such
unless I have in the first place a sort of direct contact
with the past in its own domain." M. Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin Smith (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 413; italics mine.
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presupposes recollection or vice versa, but he lays
considerable power in the lap of retention, sets this
firmly apart from recollection, and taking first one,
then the other, begins to build an unusually careful
analysis of memory. The significance of association is
therefore diminished beside the awesome faculty of re¬
tention, whose own power-centre resides somewhere in our
original capacity to attend.
Attending, in Stewart's view, involves a deliberate
act whereby one item is selected for perusal from the
manifold of representations. Again the factor of retention
has an implied presence in this exercise of volition.
However small or large a 'visible figure' may be we can,
he argues, attend to only one of its points at any one
time. Although it seems often to be the case that we
perceive in an instant "every point in the outline of
[an] object", analysis shows that the apparent simultaneity
of points presenting themselves is in fact "the result of
a number cf different acts of attention". The true
account of perception, therefore, must be based on an
assumption of successive view-points. At the same time,
"the perception of the figure of the object implies a
knowledge of the relative situation of the different
points with respect to each other". This "knowledge",
whatever it is, has something to do with the way in
which the "faculty of memory" retains the collection of
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points as they are successively viewed or attended to
(Elements, I, ii, 140-3). Stewart alludes to the same
function of retention in an earlier illustration. "When
two persons are speaking to us at once", he writes,
"we can attend to either of them at pleasure, without
being much disturbed by the other. If we attempt to
listen to both, we can understand neither. The fact
seems to be, that when we attended constantly to one of
the speakers, the words spoken by the other make no
impression on the memory, in cons equence of our not attending
to them, and affect us as little as if they had not been
uttered. This power, however, of the mind to attend to
either speaker at pleasure, supposes that it is, at one and
the same time, conscious of the sensations which both
produce."
(ibid., 135; italics mine)
The curious thing about his example is not so much that
Stewart appears to make an 'about-face' in the middle of
his case, but that he introduces the: remarkable idea of a
'dual consciousness' without fully explaining its mechanics.
Since he everywhere assumes that each act of attention is
voluntary - however habitual, instinctive or involuntary
some may seem (ibid., 127 and 143 ftn.), - we can only
conclude that the adt of attention which gives precedence
to one speaker is also a deliberate exclusion of the
other; in other words, that we can with one stroke will
the 'presence' of one thing and the non-presence or 'absence'
of another. Once more, a characteristic feature of re¬
tention comes into play: when we are "conscious of"
two or more sensations, we are 'attending to' one now
and 'holding' the others just now or about to arrive.
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(Brown, who denies the possibility of a 'dual-consciousness',
will have to insist on a similar trick of 'holding at bay'
the second or remaining elements in any composite view.)
What is implied here, of course, is a constant and re¬
ciprocal interaction between attention and memory.
The theory of the proportionate measure of attention
over retention is enunciated without qualification in the
chapter on Memory (Elements, I, vi, 352 ff) but with some
reservation in the chapter on Attention (Elements, I, ii,
120-4). In the latter, Stewart cites the unanimous opinion
of Locke, Reid and Helvetius in this matter, and even draws
the "vulgar" into the general agreement (ibid., 122). He
allows that if we are unable to recollect something to
which we have seemingly not given due attention - by virtue
of the rapidity of the perception or our state of indif¬
ference, - the failure of the one will commonly be ascribed
to a lack of the other. A parishioner, for example, who
has fallen asleep during the preacher's discourse, and is
then abruptly awakened, will be "unable to recollect the
last words spoken by the preacher, or even to recollect
that he was speaking at all". Similarly, a clock may
strike "in the same room with us, without our being able
next moment to recollect whether we heard it or not"
(Elements, I, ii, 120). Had the preacher's sermon been
too exciting to miss or the striking of the hour too
thunderous not to hear, then presumably our 'forced'
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attention would have left its mark on memory. But we
doze off in the middle of the former and are preoccupied
during the latter. Perhaps there are levels of attention,
however, which do not leave a memory-trace, yet by virtue
of which we might be said to be "conscious" (ibid.) of what
is happening around us.
Let us suppose that "the preacher were to make a
sudden pause in his discourse". Stewart observes that
"every person in the congregation who was asleep would
instantly awake" (ibid.) It is true, of course, that a
group of chattering 'busy-bodies' will often become aware
(just how is not certain) of a hostile silence among the
excluded persons nearby. It has also been recorded that
some individuals appear to be attentive to their surroundings
while they are immersed in sleep. An unusual example of
this ability, drawn from contemporary research, will
perhaps demonstrate Stewart's point more vividly:
"Friends of Norbert Wiener, the mathematical prodigy, used
to say that he listened better in sleep than waking. When
awake, he was too busy thinking to hear anyone else. . . .
It was, in a way, a compliment to hear Wiener snoring, for
it intimated that his mind was absorbing all that was
spoken."19
Prevost, Brown himself and later Norman Malcolm all dispute
Stewart's contention that we are in some way 'conscious'
19
Gay Gaer Luce and Julius Segal, Sleep (London:
Wm. Heinemann Ltd., 1967), pp. 225-6.
314.
or 'mentally active' during sleep. Bergson is more
sympathetic to Stewart's view (as indeed is modern research),
20
but inserts some important conditions into it. Yet even
if one accepts with Stewart that "the powers of perception:
are rot entirely suspended during sleep (Elements, I, v,
292 ff), one wonders how it is that the dozing parishioner
can be 'conscious' of the pause and at the same time be
unable to recollect whatever preceded that moment of silence.
He seems to be aware of the fact that the preacher halted
in the midst of his sermon; perhaps he remembers a dull
drone followed by a delicious quiet; he may even recall
that it was the subject of the Holy Trinity and church
finances which lulled him to sleep in the first place. Of
the rest he remembers nothing. Are there, then, types of
attention, such as 'vague' or 'unconscious' or 'effortless',
which do not fall under the category of 'degree', which
somehow fail to take up a position in memory, and upon
which we are nevertheless able to act? Stewart does not
20
Bergson argues that although we may be "indifferent"
to logical reasoning during sleep, we are not "incapable"
of it. Similarly, we may engage in a piece of analysis,
although "we cannot analyze ourselves in the dream itself".
The "incoherence" which characterizes the sequences of
thought in a dream results from the absence of any need to
'adjust' our memories to a sensation. That adjustment or
"adaptation" is the mark of all conscious effort during our
waking experience. Dreams, tr., Edwin E. Slosson (London:
T. Fisher Unwin, 1914), pp. 48, 49, 52 and 56.
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say: indeed, he does not seem to use his examples to
their fullest advantage. What he clearly wants to say,
however, is that there is more than simply a question
of degree in the interaction of attention and memory.
Both attention and memory require some "act or effort"
of mind (Elements, I, ii, 123) in order to fix, detain
and make exclusive a particular representation. "For
my own part," he writes,
"I am inclined to suppose, (though I would by no means
be understood to speak with confidence,) that it is
essential to memory, that the perception or the idea
that we would wish to remember, should remain in the
mind for a certain space of time, and should be con¬
templated by it exclusively of every thing else; and
that attention consists partly (perhaps entirely) in
the effort of the mind, to detain the idea or the
perception, and to exclude the other objects that
solicit its notice."
(Ibid., 123-4)
It is perhaps unfortunate that Stewart did not assert
his opinion with a bolder tongue; for he is surely on
the track of something.
Attention and memory do possess rather startling
similarities. Both entail a monopolization of certain
items to the exclusion of others; both involve a high
degree of concentration in order to achieve their respective
ends; both reveal a background of personal motive, interest,
passion and temperament (£f. Elements, I, vi, 353-4); and
both require "a certain space of time" in which to fulfil
themselves. Moreover, attention and memory fit logically
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into each other's schemes. When we are attending to
something, we naturally expect to keep it before us for
the necessary length of time or to call it back should
an interruption occur. Likewise, when we are trying to
remember some event or to recount certain of its features,
we expect to give our attention to this problem and not to
some other. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any analysis
of the two concepts which would not demonstrate their
interdependency. Of course, if one tried to imagine what
it would be like to attend to a single sensation (as
opposed to a 'perception'), completely isolated from all
temporal or contiguous spatial features; if, that is, one
resurrected Condillac's statue of a single sense and no
inherent capabilities, then perhaps one could bring about
their disengagement. But what would be left out of the
concept of attention? Condillac does imply that with its
first 'smell-impression', the statue attends, and that
its attention could be limited "to one mode of being"
(Traite, I, ii, 5). But he is grappling initially with
the problem of 'sense registration', of how the statue
first receives, takes in, or absorbs a stimulus, and
although attention does include the idea of 'noticing',
this is only one of its many facets. Attending at such
a primitive level of experience is really synonymous with
'smelling' or 'tasting' or 'hearing', and to that extent
one might even say that the term is presumptuous or
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premature. That Condillac himself realized this can be
ascertained from what he says elsewhere about attention;
for example that it is a vivid sensation which throws
other sensations into the shade or that its "reference to
certain perceptions increases so vividly that they seem
to be the only things of which we are aware" (Essai, sec. ii,
ch. 1). The implied 'compresence' of additional items
'behind' the subject of our attention, whether they be parts
of the same object or different objects altogether, is the
substance of eighteenth-century definitions of the term.
The so-called 'shifts' or 'acts' of attention carry this
implication within them: we move from item to item,
directing ourselves towards first one, then another.
Every move of this sort would be immediately nullified
if there were no retention of the original items, if we
could not 'go back'. It is because we do go back and
remember the way that we can afford to and therefore can
choose to be attentive to some particular. If eighteenth-
century philosophers had announced that it is impossible
to attend to one thing alone, they would not have abused
ordinary language, but would have pointed instead to the
immense complexity of experience, some aspects of which
we may perchance regard and retain. (Brown, for example,
begins with this enormity, not with rudimentary sensations.)
Hence attention like memory presupposes much, denies it,
focuses, and becomes lost again. Perhaps we ought to
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have begun with an analysis of distraction and forgetful-
ness; for therein lies the logical path to a fuller
appreciation of what it means to heed and to remember.
The picture as it appears to us in 'logical space'
invites a host of perplexing questions. To begin with, can
we say that attention is logically necessary and/or suf¬
ficient for memory? Does attention bear the same re¬
lationship to various forms of memory, to retention and
habitual-memory as well as to recollection? If attention
can be directed both outside and inside the mind, to things
spatially situated and to ideas temporally bound, how much
of its language applies to the terms of reference con¬
tained in memory? Is the thesis of proportionate measure
falsified by a single instance of forgetting? Does
'affective memory' presuppose 'affective attention'?
What relation does feeling have to the feasibility of
both? Many of these questions arise naturally and per¬
suasively during the course of one's investigations into
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century opinion. In a fit of
discontent, one may be inclined to pursue them instead of
the prevailing presuppositions. One wants to open logical
doors where too few perhaps exist. The temptation, however,
must be resisted; the frustration redirected. For these
are not always the right questions through which to
approach and unmask the conceptual underpinnings' of the
philosophy of this period.
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The right questions begin, as it were, on the hind-
side of accepted presuppositions. If one begins by
assuming the primacy of sense-experience, the structure
of conceptual development will tend to proceed from and
return to this source. The notion of attention, for
example, will be brought to bear on the manifold of
impressions; the notion of memory on their 're-presentation'
to the mind. Positing inherent or 'original' faculties
in the mind, on the other hand, may be merely a convenient,
and on Brown's view, unwarranted, means of providing ready-
made constructs in which to 'house' our experiences. But
as Reid ably demonstrated, one may say a great deal about
memory if one simply accepts that people can and do, as
a matter of course, remember things. The implication is
clear: one can extend the area of perception beyond its
natural limits. Perhaps Brown and the French 'sensationalists'
took too little for granted; perhaps Reid and Stewart were
offering a way out, into the wider reaches of philosophical
analysis; perhaps this confidence in the resident 'powers'
of the mind became a moat in its own eye. Possibilities
such as these must set the tone of our inquiry. Posing
these questions enables us to flush out some of the more
valuable insights on both sides. There is probably much
that could be gleaned from a strictly conceptual reap¬
praisal of the terms 'memory' and 'attention*. But our
search is rather for that 'picture' in which Brown's
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concerns may find a home and at the same time reassert
their validity. This is the only hope which a philo¬
sophical historian of ideas can reasonably indulge.
5
RESTORATION OF A PERSPECTIVE
If the foregoing assessments are valid, we would
seem to be drawn strongly to the conclusion that the
intrinsic relation between memory and attention weaves a
tight net around what Brown calls in his Sketch "the
field of mind" (Sketch, 22). The answer to the question,
'How do they co-operate?' becomes the centrifugal point
toward which 'evolving' analyses of mind (ibid.) must
flow. Assuming that the inquiries into Matter and Mind
are indeed analogous (a supposition which Brown never
doubts), we are compelled to inspect the latter under the
joint aspects of space and time. The attention which we
direct towards its "separating spaces" (Sketch, 14) will
uncover "virtual" demarcations (Sketch, 20) among
"unsuspected elements of thought and passion" (Sketch, 22).
The rule under which both the methodology and the dis¬
covery remain "virtual only" is the very principle which
guarantees the ultimate separation of Mind from Matter:
the actual simplicity and indivisibility of the former
combined with the actual complexity and divisibility of
the latter. Attention in the sphere of consciousness
must adapt, therefore, to rather different conditions.




21-2) of mental states, which permits us to feel their
interrelatedness, lends itself to abstraction of a type,
but never betrays the real unity of mind. These unique
characteristics of the mental field we will have to
elaborate more fully later.
Viewed under the form of time, the field of mind
reveals its composition as both successive and continuous.
Brown treats of succession in his inquiry into causal
relations and of continuity in his valuable contribution
to the subject of personal or 'mental1 identity. The
full assault on time and memory which would logically
have underscored these studies never seems to take place.
Instead, memory is confined to an explanatory position
under the category of 'simple suggestion', while the
idea of time is held to presuppose our 'idea of motion'
(Obs., 197) but to follow from our felt experience of
priority and consequence (L. XLI, 109). The phenomenon
of succession is thus accorded experiential and conceptual
superiority over the apprehension of and investigation
into time.''' I shall argue that Brown undertook a somewhat
misleading approach to memory and time in the light of
^"Brown's review of Charles Villers's Philosophie
de Kant, in the Edinburgh Review (1803) , reveals his early
antipathy to the presupposition that time is a "necessary
condition" or form of intuition "peculiarly" suited to
our "internal sense". Again, he stresses the fact of
succession in both the "changes without" and "those within",
(pp. 260-9)
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their very obvious importance for his theories of causality
and identity.
It has been suggested that the functions of attention
and memory are a co-operative force in the cognitive fields
of Matter and Mind alike. The precise direction taken by
that force in each sphere must therefore come under rigorous
scrutiny. I have previously raised the possibility, per¬
haps even the spectre, of an entirely experimental line of
inquiry. However extravagant the claim, the hopes of some
scientists both in Brown's era and today have decidedly
influenced research into this area. The question becomes
a meaningful one in the context of Brown's philosophy
since he not only begins but ends his work on a 'physio¬
logical' note. Without undue exaggeration let me say
that it is the insistence of this note which keeps the
historian of ideas on his toes. Indeed, it alone enables
him to reclaim a proper perspective on Brown's thought.
The picture of attention and memory as an inter¬
woven framework for our apprehension of Mind and Matter
suggests a high degree of functional simplicity. There
can be no doubt that Brown sought to furnish science with
a "greater simplicity" (Sketch, Preface, xiii) than he had
hitherto perceived in its observations and hypotheses.
The fact that he set out to construct a 'physiology of
the mind' on the structural analogy of the physiology of
the body (Sketch, Intro., 2) signifies further a desire
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on his part to pioneer the venture. He becomes as im¬
patient with the work of Condillac and Reid (Sketch/ 178-9)
as he had been with the reductivist strategies of Darwin
and Hartley. It is the scientist in him which intimates
that with each stride towards simplification, we advance
the power and wealth, of the human intellect (cf. L. XLIII,
122). Claiming few mentors and acknowledging even fewer,
he might yet have agreed with that other pillar of the
French school of Ideologists, Cabanis:
"The methods of the human mind, are, if we may use the
comparison, its levers and its balloons: by their assistance
it may move with facility the most enormous masses, or
elevate itself to the pure fountains of light. Let us
therefore endeavour to improve these valuable instruments,
to the utmost of our power.
The improvements envisaged by Brown consisted of trimmings,
alterations and reconstructions. Employing that same
comparison, he too could foresee from the ramparts of
mechanistic efficiency "the pure fountains of light".
What Brown never saw and certainly never advocated was
the next and final step in the development of 'mental
science', namely its assimilation by and into the science
of matter. One has only to turn slightly the face of
Brown the scientist to discover Brown the poet and defender
of a higher order of feelings.
2
P. J. G. Cabanis, Sketch of the Revolutions of
Medical Science, and Views relating to its Reform, tr. A.
Henderson (London, 1806), p. 381.
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We have to admit, then, that Brown may well have
foreseen the logical possibilities for solutions of the
neurophysiological type. Surrounded by proposals of this
sort from the time of his early exposure to Darwin and
Hartley, and acquainted with the swelling surge of bio¬
logical and medical research, he could not fail to wonder
at and perhaps savour such possibilities. Nevertheless
he does not himself explore them. In fact, he never
advances beyond a 'psychological' inquiry, in the limited
sense attached to that word by the history of science.
It must be remembered that a later psychologist, H. C.
Warren, complained of just this shortcoming in Brown's
theory of association. It lacked physiological con-
firmation! (The axe of William James fell repeatedly
on this 'pre-scientific' quality in the earlier psycho¬
logical treatises.) There is a striking illustration of
Brown's reticence to embark on such a 'radical empiricism'
in his refutation of the Darwinian hypothesis concerning
memory. It accords most fully with the standards for
'common sense' philosophy laid down by Reid and upheld by
Stewart. One can perhaps assert here that this attitude
marks the last road-sign to conservatism in British
empiricism. Thereafter, the two Mills, Spencer, Bain,
~*A History of the Association Psychology from
Hartley to Lewes, op. cit., pp. 35 and 118.
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George Croom Robertson and W. K. Clifford all accept
to some degree the utility of physiological evidence.
The 'mental science* of the eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century philosophers evolves into a 'psychological®
horse of a decidedly different colour. Perhaps for this
very reason, Brown and his precursors have not fallen
quite so heavily under the stringent contemporary in¬
dictment against the more recent forms of 'psychologism'.
They can be read, if one likes, as respectable conceptual
analysts, and straightway forgiven for their 'unfortunate*
leanings towards a crude psychology. I should prefer to
think of them, and of Brown in particular, as dedicated
introspectionists beguiled by their own self-certainty
but humble before their discoveries.
Repeatedly and in almost every context, therefore,
Brown finds himself bedevilled by the threat of re-
ductivism. Darwin, it will be recalled, had been busy
exploring the alleged correlation between psychic and
physiological phenomena. Yet instead of examining merely
the logical weight and tenor of this correlation, Darwin
seemed to find hope for a more radical conclusion, namely
that organic and mental affections might share the same
properties. In Brown's opinion, Darwin consistently
oversteps the boundaries of correlation (where, for
example, father and son stand in reciprocal relation to
one another), with the result that the two classes of
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phenomena are "confounded" or "identified". "The general
error of Dr. Darwin's instances of analogy", he writes,
"is that he has confounded the cause with its effect;
either considering the muscular motion, instead of the
motive affection, or the organic affection, instead of
the idea; so that all the facts, adduced by him, may be
admitted without furnishing any additional strength to
his theory."
(Obs., 123)
Most annoying to Brown as a philosopher is Darwin's
confused handling of the term "idea" (Obs., 109-13).
(At this point I am obviously treading over old ground
but, I hope, with more judicious step and towards new
insights.) On the one hand, Darwin defines ideas in terms
of the fibrous motions of our sense organs: when par¬
ticular organs perish, so must the ideas appropriate to
them (Obs., 108-9). On the other hand, he sometimes
regards ideas as the "sentient" notions we have of ex¬
ternal things: they are, in other words, mental affections
produced by our 'acquaintance' through the sense organs
with objects external to ourselves. (Obs., 112-3). The
first view, as we have seen, would require us to explain
something like memory as a "repetition of the original
motions of the organs of sense". A man who loses the use
of a limb will not thereby beurvable to remember, to some
extent at least, what it was or has been like to move or
feel things with it. The second suggestion is more
*
agreeable to Brown in so far as it places an order of
succession, of antecedence and consequence, on the
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perception and recollection of objects and events. Two
operations, not one, support the system, each feeding into
the other as the individual either perceives an object
or intends a certain action against it, as for example
desiring to recall part of a complex impression (Obs.,
117 f). Darwin cannot adhere, however, to both of these
standpoints: the first rules out correlation as a re¬
ciprocal interaction between two different types of
entity; the second fosters a wider understanding of this
same process. The former has its origins in the seven¬
teenth century: with Robert Hooker's identification
of memory with the functions of a proper sense organ
or with Glanvill's attention to the mechanics of memory,
given the prevalent Cartesian or Hobbesian conjectures
regarding the actual substance of the brain and the nature
4
of its motions. It certainly gains momentum in the
hands of those 'materialists' or near-materialists, Hartley
and Priestley. Brown has on his hands not a psycho¬
physical parallelism, however ill-conceived, but a
physiological reductivism.
If one does not accept the view that "recollection
or imagination" is a repetition of "animal movements"
4 •
See B. Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background
(N.Y. : Doubleday & Co."i Inc. , 1953) , pp. 179-81 and pp.
107-8.
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how, asks Darwin, is it to be explained? (Obs., 124)
"You tell me", he asserts, "it consists of images or
pictures of things. Where is this extensive canvas hung
up? or where are the numerous receptacles in which those
are deposited? or to what else in the animal system have
they any similitude?" (ibid.; italics mine) The 'canvas'
question is worthy of Hume when he proposes, then rejects,
the analogy of the 'theatre of the mind'. Brown does not
take the bait. Those who do speak of the ideas of memory
as "separate existences, images, or pictures of things"
(Locke and his followers for example) will no doubt be
hard pressed to erect these items on a screen in front of
the brain, and equally so to find an available "receptacle"
in which to deposit them (Obs., 124). If one is convinced
that there are such items and that they must have a
depository other than the neural substance, then of course
one will have to look for a 'canvas' and make a fool of
oneself in the process. But, answers Brown, "the modern
believers of phantasms, and species, form a small class"
(ibid.), and so presumably we need not concern ourselves
with their embarrassment. Furthermore, "the argument is
of no force, when addressed to those, who believe our
ideas to be affections of mind, and who need neither
canvas, nor receptacles, to remember, or imagine" (ibid.).
These affections, so the implication reads, do not fall
under the range of the question. Whatever the inadequacies
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of that question, I think Brown is here mistaken. In
his Lectures and in the later Sketch, he will make it
clear that there is no 'mental substance' over and
above the 'states' in which we are said to exist at any
moment. Consequently, a memory event is not drawn from
a 'permanent repository' so constituted, nor would it
be paraded as on a mental 'screen' in front of the
brain. At this early stage, however, Brown had not given
a satisfactory account of his position respecting mind,
and he had certainly not advanced his "mental affections"
into a more favourable light. What is to save them from
the charge that they, like those "phantasms" or "pictures
of things", are both unaccountable, unless as 'vibrations'
(something which Brown will not concede), and superfluous?
If Darwin's question were valid, which it is not in so far
as it assumes that mind too must have a 'place', it would
surely put the hooks in Brown's mental affections as well.
Some remedy to this imposition is nevertheless
provided by a cleverly manoeuvred rebuttal. "The opinion
attacked may be just", continues Brown,
"and the error lie, on the side of him, who demands
identities, and resemblances, where the nature of the
subject denies them. That alone can be explained, which
is capable of resolution into simpler ideas; and he, who
asks, what is meant by a particular quality of mind, may,
with as much reason, ask, what is meant by a particular
quality of matter; yet it is chiefly, in the former. case,
that the spirit of scepticism arises. . . . When the
Newtonian is able to inform us, what he means, when he
uses the term attraction, the opponents of Zoonomia will,
perhaps, be able to find a less complex term, than affection
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of mind. The sentient principle in man has its peculiar
susceptibilities, as the matter, around us, has its
peculiar attractions. The phenomena of both are the
result of regular laws, and, though we cannot explain, we
can observet and arrange. "
(Obs., 125-6; italics mine)
Although portions of this reply might leave the materialist
dissatisfied (he would want to claim, for example, that
his type of data was at least 'observable' in a way in
which the other clearly was not, even by introspection),
Brown has quite forcefully put the onus on his opponents
to make their case more convincing. He seems to be af¬
firming here, as he will do on many occasions, that what¬
ever a physiological reduction is, it is not the simplest
"resolution" which can be found. A theory which abandons
the operations of the mind to unsupported or contradictory
evidence with regard to man's sensory and neural structure
points in the opposite direction, towards complexity and
irresolution. Brown shares with them, however, a desire
to simplify the philosophies of both mind and matter.
And therein, I believe, lies the secret of his larger
conception of a sceptical philosophy, that should be
cast in cbubt vhich, in either sphere, serves to clutter
the conceptual field. Too many conceptual parents tend
to breed a saturated world-picture. In a word, the
sceptic's concern is 'over-population'.
Reid would not have felt much affinity for such a
notion. Yet he, like Brown, is sceptical of even the
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most startling discoveries which "medical art" could
foreseeably make (I.P., III, viii, 367). Far from dis¬
crediting improvements in that art or science, he wishes
to bring them out into the open so that he may study the
nature of the developments which might seem to follow
from the "proof' that "a certain constitution or state of
the brain is necessary to memory" (ibid., 366). The
facts, he agrees, are becoming increasingly evident. His
reasons for diminishing their importance are stated suc¬
cinctly and cogently. We are in no way enlightened about
memory, he af firms,
"by being told that it is caused by a certain impression
on the brain. For supposing, that impression on the brain
were as necessary to memory as the drawing of the trigger
is to the discharge of the musket, we are still as ignorant
as we were how memory is produced; so that if the cause of
memory, assigned by this theory, did really exist, it does
not in any degree account for memory."
(Ibid., 365; italics mine)
And again;
"if we knew as distinctly that state of the brain which
causes memory, we should still be as ignorant as before
how that state contributes to memory."
(Ibid., 367)
The question which Reid puts to physiologists and those
impressed by their researches is quite simply, 'what in
your mind constitutes an explanation for a phenomenon such
as memory?' It is a shrewd question, and one calculated
to redeem the view that memory, like other functions of
A
the mind, cannot easily be accounted for either in physical
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or in any other 'alien' terms.
Indeed, memory cannot be accounted for at all on
these terms, if the 'explanation' in this case is meant to
rest on additions and amendments to our knowledge of
neural functionings. Medical science may inform us that
it can now be shown that a certain part of the brain does
R with x whenever PA; it may advise us to define memory
as the set of "impressions made on the brain in perception:
which "remain as long as there is any memory of the
object" (I.P., III, vii, 364); it may suggest that, ac¬
cepting this definition, we can assert that 'bR x PA' is
the "cause of memory". And yet, Reid attests, unless this
same science can show us how the neural state produces
that 'effect' called the remembrance of an object, it
tells us nothing (ibid.). The statement 'M remembers y
because bR x PA' is as innocuous as the proposition "the
drawing of the trigger causes the musket to discharge".
The real test of an explanation, Reid seems to be saying,
lies in the satisfactory way in which it relates one
factor to another. Failing this, it leaves the problem
unresolved. Let the neurologists 'preserve* by new means
"that temperament of the brain which is favourable to
memory" (ibid., 367); let the gunsmith insert an improved
triggering-device into the musket: both the remembering
and the firing will remain "unaccountable as before"
(ibid., 365). With arguments of the above sort, Reid
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too made a stand against the encroaching spectre of
reductivism.
It was Brown's early contention that explanations
are not to be sought for either in conjectural or in
newly discovered items of experience. With a refinement
commensurate with their maturity, Brown's Lectures il¬
lustrate the familiar misapprehension with case and point.
At the same time, both hypotheses and theories come in
for a hard look. As explanatory devices, Brown argues,
they too have their short-comings, namely a proneness to
error. His illustrations, therefore, must be seen to
sound a quiet note of caution.
Suppose, Brown notes, that on discovering a new
planet revolving between the orbits of two planets already
on our charts, we were to assign to it a gravitational
orbit modelled after those of the other two; doing so,
we should be said to have constructed a "theory" regarding
its movements. On the strength of this theory, moreover,
we should feel entitled to make predictive claims. However
"conjectural" the theory (and it must be that, in part,
for it is founded on analogical extension), no one would
deny us this right. But let us suppose that, given the
same discovery, we were to fasten on to our "explanation"
of the planet's movements a certain rider. Instead of
modelling its orbit on those of previously known bodies,
we might attribute its "centripetal tendency" to the
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action on or against it of some "impulse of ether". Now
the planet is said to move orbitally around the sun
because the ether 'causes' it to behave in this manner.
Unlike the "theory" above, this "hypothesis" does not
attempt to link old and new phenomena by analogical lines
of similarity, but rather by the intervention of "third"
factors. The hypothesis thus rests on the future unearthing
of these explanatory agents (L. VIII, 126-7).
Careful observation will, of course, eventually
support or crush either the theory or the hypothesis, or
even both. A hypothesis becomes law (S. Toulmin) or in
the course of experimentation is supplanted by another
and critical hypothesis (Bronowski). Brown does not
carry the issue that far. What he does see is the greater
"risk" inherent in the structure of the hypothesis. Some
remarks on his uneasiness (his inquietude) may thus be
relevant at this stage. Their bearing on the problem of
explanation will manifest itself in due course.
In the first place, Brown's uneasiness does not
concern the legitimate function of the hypothesis in
experimental situations. (We should bear in mind through¬
out the neurological focus of our inquiry, and hence
that particular kind of experimental situation.) This
function can perhaps be described as a 'reason-compelling'
operation initially brought into play on the proposed
field of experimentation. A kind of steering device, the
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hypothesis offers both economy of effort and concentration
of focus. Assuming, with Brown, that philosophy admits of
the same sort of properties usually ascribed to science,
we can affirm that a hypothesis is of use "not as super¬
seding investigation, but as directing investigation to
certain objects, - not as telling us, what we are to
believe, but as pointing out to us what we are to endeavour
to ascertain" (L. VIII, 120). To this concise delineation
Brown adds the observation that philosophy realizes itself
"only when the experiments are made with a certain view"
(ibid., italics mine). This characterization of the
hypothesis, in Toulmin's words "as a guide to further
experiments",5 seems both sound and innocent enough to
find favour even among those who would subject all em¬
pirical statements to the onerous task of being 'hypo¬
thetical' ; in other words, of being perpetual guides to
incessant experimentation. (I have in mind, for example,
A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic.^) In a sense,
therefore, a hypothesis whether in science or in philo¬
sophy provides (or suggests) an answer to the question,
'why should we investigate these phenomena rather than
5S. Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science (London:
Hutchinson University Library, 1967), p. 70.
*
g
Language, Truth and Logic (Oxford University Press,
1936) , p. 132.
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those?' And in so far as the answer is compelling, the
hypothesis can be said to be a good or reasonable one.
Clearly, Brown would want to reinforce any notion which
emphasizes what he considers to be the more rational
"art" of "inquiring assiduously . . . [into] what we are
inquiring about" (cf. L. VI, 96 and L. VIII, 120). The
"utility" of science as a whole applies also to its member-
parts (L. VI, 97).
Brown's uneasiness, then, is a qualified one. He
has no quarrel with the hypothesis which inserts purpose
and direction into the scientific enterprise. The obvious
implication from this assent, however, is that any hypo¬
thesis which supersedes its rightful function is a genuine
hoax, a wolf in sheep's clothing as it were. Exposing
the wolf does not discredit all sheep, but only those
appearing to be what they are not. Brown introduces his
detection into the concept by affirming:
"To know well, what hypotheses truly are in themselves,
and what it is which they contribute to the explanation
of phenomena, is „ . . the surest of all preservatives
against that too ready assent, which you might otherwise
be disposed to give to them."
(L. VIII, 113-4; italics mine)
The phrase "too ready assent" indicates the nature of his
misgivings.
As I intimated above, there are those who regard
all empirical statements whatsoever as 'hypotheses'. This
claim (a) assumes among other things, that since empirical
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statements cannot be 'certain' and hence must be 'highly
probable only', no matter of fact can be asserted
which is not, by this sort of reductivism, 'merely'
another hypothesis forming conditional grounds for yet
7
another set of observations. The view here presumably
is that of a science without rest. Brown could not, I
believe, accept this position in full; it involves a
conceptual misshaping of what is, on his terms, simply an
instrument for steering science towards more productive
ends. Nevertheless, he would be sympathetic towards the
underlying tone of tentativeness which he too regards as
characteristic of scientific procedure (cf. L. VIII, 125-
6). His primary concern, however, is with concealed
variations of this claim. One might argue, for example,
that the class of empirical statements constitutes the sole
membership in the class of hypotheses and hence that (b)
all hypotheses are necessarily empirical statements. The
truth of the converse (b) obviously depends on the status
of (a), and this in turn on the conceptual texture of
(a)'s terms. I have suggested that Brown, for one, would
balk at the use of the word 'hypothesis' in that context.
The reasoning behind his hesitation must now be elucidated.
7
cf. Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 72-3. Toulmin, I think,
is right in arguing that a scientific edifice built solely
on hypotheses would necessarily crumble for want of agreed
or "established" frameworks of supporting laws.
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Brown is apparently distressed by the suggestion
implicit in (a) that empirical and hypothetical statements
operate in the same way, in other words, that they are
both assertions about what is the case. Even if the force
of the phrase 'what is the case' is diminished from
certainty to high probability such that it reads simply,
'what is most likely to be the case', he is compelled to
object. The scientific use of hypotheses, he will argue,
entails the selection of certain data or combinations of
same for the purpose of casting into explanatory or
predictive form a particular phenomenon under observation
(for example, the phenomenon 'bR x PA' cited above). At
most on this view, one is merely stating what might he
taking place given this or that 'hypothetical' perspective.
In this sense, a hypothesis affirms nothing whatsoever
about the world: to describe it as a 'matter of fact'
statement is to misconstrue its function completely. As
classes of stements, hypotheses and empirical statements
are not, therefore, mutually inclusive. Claim (a) is
rendered weak by conceptual misguidance and claim (b) by
(a)'s folly. Concerning their explanatory roles, we might
say that empirical statements provide the bases within
hypothetical frameworks for predictions about the behaviour
of specific phenomena. The root of Brown's quarrel with
the above claims would seem to be that a hypothesis can
never serve as the basis for explanation: it can at best
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group observable data relationally within possible frame¬
works. Better still, it is a possible framework for such
grouping, although by no means the only one.
Nevertheless, a claim revising (a) and (b) might
hold some weight and be less objectionable to Brown. One
can indeed argue that all hypotheses have properties
similar to those found in empirical statements. And
something like the following would be intended: (1)
empirical statements are not certain precisely because
one can always (at least) imagine a counter-possibility;
(2) they can be tested any number of times, but they must
always remain 'testable1: for this reason, we say that
even an apparently sound empirical statement is 'highly
probable only'; (3) hypotheses are the sort of things
which one is likewise always testing, although this con¬
dition does not preclude the fact that scientists use
any number of them as 'established laws' while sub-
g
jecting others to scrutiny; thus (4) like empirical
statements hypotheses are (in N. R. Hanson's words)
9
synthetic, contingent, verifiable and a posteriori;
more strongly, (5) the ultimate aim of any new or significant
8lbid., pp. 73-4.
q
I refer here to Hanson's "Hypotheses Fingo", a
paper read shortly before his death in 1967 at the
University of Western Ontario.
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experiment is always to "overthrow" or choose decisively
"one or two . . . simple alternative hypotheses"10
currently favoured by scientists; and (6) the falsifiability
of both empirical statements and hypotheses is thus ensured,
but their identities remain intact. As so formulated,
these modifications to claims (a) and (b) concede a
property-similarity without sacrificing an essential in¬
dependence of function. One thing a statement about
'matters of fact' cannot do is to prescribe how we should
go about examining other data. It is, as it were, a mute
accomplice.
The real danger of a "too ready assent" to hypo¬
theses such as '.bRxPA' can now be unfolded. Unless a
fundamental distinction is made between hypotheses and
empirical statements, one is liable to confuse the two and
to suppose of a certain hypothesis that it asserts what
is the case about a particular phenomenon. When a
hypothesis is thus used to make fanciful interpolations
of 'facts' into the world (L. VIII, 123), and is believed
as though it were a well-tested empirical proposition,
the very course of science comes to a stand-still. The
alleged facts under a false name freeze rather than release
(as a proper hypothesis would) scientific investigation.
10Bronowski, The Identity of Man, op. cit., p. 45.
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(This is surely the reason why Brown's 'scepticism' is
more broadly based than that of Darwin: it sets in motion
a vigorous inquiry into the operations of both the physio¬
logical or neural and the mental 'spheres'.) Modern
science has been a fight for survival against this
devastating notion that if hypotheses suggest abc, then
abc must be so. Although neither the first nor the last
to do so, Brown takes up the cause of science with
imaginative flair to combat 'mysterious powers' inter¬
jected by false hypothesis between cause and effect. He
will not concede that there are 'connections' between such
factors as 'neural states' and 'rememberings' unless
thesee and not something else, have been amply demonstrated
to be the case. When the supposed hypothesis states, 'Let
there be powers' or 'Let connections exist*, none appears.
And so, Brown wins both by default and by experiment.
Brown's conception of hypotheses does, of course,
fall short cf completeness. He does not, as later writers
on this subject have done, foresee their role as 'standing
principles' (supporting other hypotheses on trial) to be
a fundamental one, second only to their 'steering function'
in experimental research. To his credit as a 'scientist',
however, he recognizes that each set of "new circumstances"
constitutes both a tax and a limitation on the "certainty"
of even the most established hypotheses-turned-law. State¬
ments about 'matters of fact*, particularly causal ones,
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are a logical type susceptible to error and improvement.
The insight essentially is Hume's; what Brown adds to it
is simply the force and concern of an 'experimentalist1.
As he asserts, there is a "practical conclusion" to be
drawn from this;
"we should use hypotheses to suggest and direct inquiry,
not to terminate or supersede it. . . .in theorizing . . .
we should not form any general proposition, till after as
wide an induction, as it is possible for us to make; and,
in the subsequent application of it to particulars, should
never content ourselves, in any new circumstances, with
the mere probability, however high, which this application
of it affords; while it is possible for us to verify, or
disprove it, by actual experiment."
(L. VIII, 128)
The forming of hypotheses, we are told is an important
aspect, but only an aspect, of scientific procedure. It
cannot be allowed to monopolize the whole.
We must not be taken in, however, by the full
import of this philosophy of science. Brown clearly re¬
garded his observations and analyses as legitimate ex¬
periments in the 'science of mind'. Unlike Reid, he was
not willing to fall back on the belief that memory, for
example, is "an original faculty given us by the Author
of our being, of which we can give no account, but that
we are so made" (I.P., III, ii, 328). Memory as well as
attention are complex phenomena which, under the scrutiny
of a finer analysis, reveal the simple 'mechanics' of
their structures. In both cases, we discover a "conception"
drawn into the foreground of consciousness by a specific
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and compelling "desire" (L. XLII, 125). Nowhere do we
find a peculiar "Faculty of the mind" (Sketch, 169). To
this extent, therefore, Brown's experimentation carries
with it the conviction that some account of the operations
of mind can be given. Although it does not rule out any
particular type of explanation (Brown, we remember, was
open to any logical possibility - see Appendix F), his
methodology is dearly restricted to a certain class of
phenomena, namely that which comes within the range and
compass of introspection. Perhaps Brown could not be
expected to undertake physiological investigations as
well; as a philosopher of mind writing and teaching in
the wake of Locke and Hume, Condillac and Destutt de Tracy,
he would have his hands full. There were hypotheses to be
weighed and tested, data to be examined in his own mind,
redundancies to be eliminated. It was a task to which he
gave the best of his energies and for which he was both
praised and condemned. But sometimes the experimentation
was overruled by his very reliance on the guiding prin¬
ciples of 'volition' and 'suggestibility'. These hypo¬
theses occasionally became the sole content of his science.
And good Christian that he was, he found himself obliged
to lay some explanations in the lap of Providence. The
designs of Creation were for him a wonder and an impasse.
It is in these lights that one must evaluate the scope
of Brown's philosophy of science.
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There is an analogy traced by W. K. Clifford in
his lecture entitled "Body and Mind" which it would be
well to remember when one is trying to assess the
'scientific' tendencies of common sense philosophy. It
provides an interesting framework within which to
question the dedication of that philosophy's pursuit of
truth."In many parts of Europe", notes Clifford,
"it is customary to leave a part of the field unfilled
for the Brownie to live in, because he cannot live in
cultivated ground. And if you grant him this grace,. he
will do a great deal of your household work for you in
the night while you sleep. In Scotland the piece of ground
which is left wild for him to live in is called 'the good
man's croft.' Now there are people who indulge a hope
that the ploughshare of Science will leave a sort of good
man's croft around the field of reasoned truth; and they
promise that in that case a good deal of our civilizing
work shall be done for us in the dark, by means we know
nothing of. I do not share this hope. ... It is idle
to setbounds to the purifying and organizing work of
Science. Without mercy and without resentment she ploughs
up weed and briar; from her footsteps behind her grow up
corn and healing flowers; and no corner is far enough to
escape her furrow. Provided only that we take as our
motto and our rule of action, Man speed the plough.
Thus we come back full circle, through hopes indulged and
discarded, to the very aspiration with which Brown had
G. Combe, 0£. cit., p. 47. Andrew Combe thought that
Stewart, for one, preferred "truth and I in company" to
"truth, whatever may become of me". I do not regard this
condemnation seriously, but it illustrates a kind of
scientific impatience with metaphysical hesitation on the
one hand and extravagance on the other. That impatience
had been rising in France and England, under various guises
for the better part of a century.
^W. K. Clifford, "Body and Mind", in Lectures and
Essays, II, 70.
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always to contend, as it were, in mortal combat, the
hope that was to lift 'mental science' out of its idle
speculations and into the hot-bed of neuro-physiological
inquiry.
I have introduced the figure of "Brownie" at the
end of this Part as a symbol of the limitations under
which one must work in discussing Brown's view of the
mechanisms of memory and attention. One is stranded, so
to speak, somewhere between scientific and logical space,
between a Priestley and a Wittgenstein. I have given
precedence to the scientific side in the belief that Brown
began his researches closer to its boundaries and moved
gradually, but never completely, away from it. In shat¬
tering Darwin's theory, he had to familiarize himself
with its terrain. He did so as a philosopher upholding
standards of logical consistency and precision. And yet
the urge to explore the 'how?' as well as the 'what do
you mean?' grew in him, compelling him to try his hand
in the laboratory of mind. Mental phenomena became the
•particles' and 'motions' of his inquiry; relations
between them became the foundations for 'laws of regularity'.
It is now time to examine how they work both as separate
and as correlative functions, under the 'seeing-eye' of
that very Consciousness which they help to sustain.
